Opinion
No. 86 M.D. 2013
01-28-2014
Shawn P. Arnold, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) to a petition for review in the nature of a complaint (petition) requesting injunctive relief filed by Shawn P. Arnold (Arnold), a state correctional institution inmate. Specifically, Arnold requests an order directing DOC to resume providing legal advance sheets to institutional libraries or to implement some other method that will notify inmates of new decisions of the appellate courts in a timely manner.
In its preliminary objections, DOC asserts Arnold lacks standing and the matter is not ripe for consideration. Specifically, DOC contends Arnold's petition does not contain an allegation of actual harm, but only potential harm.
Also before this Court is Arnold's application for summary relief. For the reasons that follow, we sustain DOC's preliminary objections, but grant Arnold leave to amend the petition. Additionally, we deny Arnold's application for summary relief.
In the petition, Arnold challenges DOC's decision to discontinue subscriptions for advance sheets for the U.S. Reporter, Pennsylvania Reporter, and other legal reporters for the prison law libraries in lieu of Lexis Law Library online database, which is updated only quarterly. Arnold alleges DOC's library policy to update legal materials quarterly is inadequate and hinders his efforts to pursue his legal rights.
Specifically, Arnold claims the policy effectively prevents him, and other inmates, from timely filing post-conviction relief petitions based on new decisional law under Section 9545(b)(2) of the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §9545(b)(2). He asserts Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144 (Pa. Super. 2011), requires PCRA petitions based on new decisional law to be filed within 60 days of the date the new decision, not 60 days of the date the inmate learns of the decision. Thus, he alleges DOC's switch from regularly-disseminated printed materials to quarterly online updates effectively prevents him from timely filing a PCRA petition. Therefore, he contends, the quarterly-updated Lexis database is wholly inadequate. Arnold requests this Court enter an order directing DOC to resume providing the advance sheets or to implement some other method by which inmates will be timely notified of new decisions in the appellate courts.
This Court retains original jurisdiction of the action pursuant to Section 761 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §761. To the extent Arnold's petition appears to also seek review of DOC's denial of his grievance challenging the library's discontinuation of printed advance sheets pursuant to Section 763 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §763, we do not have appellate jurisdiction over such appeals. Portalatin v. Dep't of Corr., 979 A.2d 944 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (holding this Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over inmate appeals from grievance tribunals). --------
DOC responded by filing preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. DOC objects on the grounds that Arnold lacks standing and the matter is not ripe for consideration. Specifically, DOC contends Arnold's petition does not contain an allegation of actual harm, but only potential harm, which does not give rise to standing to bring suit. Further, the doctrine of ripeness mandates the presence of an actual controversy, which does not exist here. According to DOC, Arnold does not aver that the change from providing printed legal materials to a computerized legal database updated quarterly actually denied him the ability to seek post-conviction relief.
In turn, Arnold filed a response to DOC's preliminary objections. There, Arnold asserts he suffered actual harm as he was prevented, at least once, from timely filing a PCRA petition based on new decisional law. Additionally, Arnold filed an application for summary relief.
Preliminary Objections
Rule 1028(a)(4) and (5) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
(a) [p]reliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading and are limited to the following grounds:Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 1028(a)(4) & (5).
* * *
(4) legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer);
(5) lack of capacity to sue ....
In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true all well-pled, material facts, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible from those facts. Barge v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 39 A.3d 530 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). However, we are not required to accept as true any unwarranted factual inferences, conclusions of law, or expressions of opinion. Id. For this Court to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
"Generally, our judicial system requires a real or actual controversy before it will embrace a matter for review and disposition." Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 607 Pa. 527, 541, 8 A.3d 866, 874 (2010). The doctrine of ripeness "is a judicially-created principle which mandates the presence of an actual controversy." Id. at 542, 8 A.3d at 874. When determining whether a matter is ripe for judicial review, courts "generally consider whether the issues are adequately developed and the hardships that the parties will suffer if review is delayed." Id. (quoting Twp. of Derry v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 593 Pa. 480, 485, 932 A.2d 56, 60 (2007)).
"In the context of administrative law, the basic rationale of ripeness is to prevent the courts, through the avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and to protect state agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its efforts felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Id. (citation omitted). A matter is ripe for judicial review where the issues are adequately developed and a party will suffer hardship by a delay of review. Id.
In addition to ripeness, our judicial system requires that the party filing suit must have standing. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, ___ Pa. ___, ___ A.3d ___, 2013 WL 6687290 (Nos. 63 MAP 2012, 64 MAP 2012, 72 MAP 2012, 73 MAP 2012, filed December 19, 2013). With regard to standing, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds:
The core concept [of standing], of course, is that a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not 'aggrieved' thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge. In particular, it is not sufficient for the person claiming to be 'aggrieved' to assert the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192, 346 A.2d 269, 280-81 (1975).
Although standing and ripeness are distinct concepts, they can overlap. Robinson Twp. As our Supreme Court recently explained:
Generally, the doctrine of standing is an inquiry into whether the petitioner filing suit has demonstrated aggrievement, by establishing a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation. There is considerable overlap between the doctrines of standing and ripeness, especially where the contentions regarding lack of justiciability are focused on arguments that the interest asserted by the petitioner is speculative, not concrete, or would require the court to offer an advisory opinion. In this sense, a challenge that a petitioner's interest in the outcome of the litigation is hypothetical may be pled either as determinative of standing or restyled as a ripeness concern although the allegations are essentially the same. Standing and ripeness are distinct concepts insofar as ripeness also reflects the separate concern that relevant facts are not sufficiently developed to permit judicial resolution of the dispute.Id. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___, slip op. at 13, 2013 WL 6687290 at *5 (citations and quotations omitted).
With these principles in mind, we examine the sufficiency of Arnold's petition in light of DOC's objections. Arnold asserts DOC is violating his right to claim after-recognized constitutional rights from new decisional law under Section 9545 of the PCRA. He claims, under the new policy, the law library is constitutionally inadequate because the legal materials are updated only quarterly. Specifically, he contends the quarterly online updates are inadequate because the resulting delay in learning of new decisional law effectively prevents him from filing a timely application for post-conviction relief under the PCRA.
The PCRA is "the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies ...." Section 9542 of the PCRA, 42 Pa. C.S. §9542. The PCRA applies to offenders serving a sentence requiring imprisonment or special supervision. Section 9543(a)(1) of the PCRA, 42 Pa. C.S. §9543(a)(1). A petition under the PCRA generally must "be filed within one year of the date the judgment [of sentence] becomes final ...." 42 Pa. C.S. §9545(b); accord Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 227, 941 A.2d 1263, 1267-68 (2008) (citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom., Abu-Jamal v. Pennsylvania, 555 U.S. 916 (2008).
Nevertheless, courts will review an untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner alleged and can prove one of the following three exceptions in Section 9545(b)(1) applies:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;42 Pa. C.S. §9545(b)(1).
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively ....
The petitioner bears the burden to allege and prove one of the timeliness exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059 (Pa. Super. 2011); Leggett. Any petition invoking an exception to the one-year time limitation under Section 9545(b)(1) must "be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented." 42 Pa. C.S. §9545(b)(2).
Relying on Leggett, Arnold claims the 60-day period for a prisoner to invoke the exception to the one-year time limitation and file a PCRA petition on the basis of an after-recognized constitutional right begins to run on "the date of the underlying judicial decision" establishing such right, not the date the decision became available to the prisoner through the prison library. Id. at 1146. Consequently, he alleges his right to seek PCRA relief is hindered by the delay in receiving new decisional law.
An inmate alleging a violation of the right of access to the courts must show an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Prison inmates enjoy a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis; Bounds; Bronson v. Horn, 830 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). The right of access "requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828; accord Bronson.
The United States Supreme Court clarified the contours of this right, holding that, to prevail on a claim that inadequate legal materials or assistance resulted in a denial of access to the courts, an inmate must establish that he incurred an "actual injury," that is "the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; accord Moss v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 868 A.2d 615 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In other words, an inmate bringing an action based on a violation of his right to access to the courts must allege he was hindered from adequately pursuing litigation in some specific manner. Lewis. An inmate may make such a showing by alleging his complaint was dismissed or the inmate was precluded for some reason from even filing a complaint. Id. This injury requirement is not satisfied by any type of frustrated legal claim, but only by claims relating to direct appeals from criminal convictions involving incarceration, habeas petitions and civil rights actions to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Lewis; Moss.
The actual injury requirement ensures that courts provide relief to claimants only when they have suffered or will imminently suffer actual harm and prevents courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the other political branches. Lewis. Consequently, an inmate who cannot show he was hindered in bringing his claims or that he was otherwise injured by any alleged unconstitutional deficiencies in prison resources lacks standing to bring a claim of denial of access to the courts. See Lewis.
Applying these principles here, Arnold was required to allege he was actually harmed by DOC's policy. Although Arnold presents an interesting legal claim regarding the adequacy of quarterly Lexis updates in connection with the timely filing of a PCRA petition based on new decisional law, Arnold did not allege an actual injury with sufficient specificity to establish standing or ripeness. Although Arnold was specific about the insufficiencies of the quarterly updates and the potential harm in seeking PCRA relief, he did not allege how he was actually harmed. Indeed, Arnold did not allege that his PCRA petition was dismissed as untimely or that he was precluded from even filing a PCRA petition because the quarterly updates caused him to miss the 60-day deadline. See Lewis. In fact, Arnold did not even allege he is attempting to file such a petition, although this fact can be reasonably inferred from his other allegations. See Barge.
In his petition, Arnold merely alleges the new policy of eliminating advance sheets in lieu of quarterly online updates "effectively prevent[s]" him from timely filing a PCRA petition. Pet. for Review ¶9. He further asserts that he and other inmates "will be barred" from filing a timely PCRA petition. Id. at p.4. However, the potential threat of missing a PCRA deadline because of lack of access to new decisional law does not constitute an actual injury. See Lewis. Although Arnold asserted actual harm in his response to DOC's preliminary objections, he did not amend his petition to include these additional allegations; consequently, he deprived DOC the opportunity to respond to these new averments. Because Arnold's petition does not contain an allegation of actual harm, only potential harm, Arnold did not establish standing or an actual controversy ripe for review. Therefore, we sustain DOC's demurrer.
Nevertheless, we decline to dismiss Arnold's action and will allow Arnold to amend his pleading pursuant to Rule 1033 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides "[a] party ... by leave of court, may at any time ... amend his pleading. The amended pleading may aver transactions or occurrences which have happened before or after the filing of the original pleading ...." Pa. R.C.P. No. 1033. An amendment should be freely allowed where the defects in the pleading can be cured. Unified Sportsmen v. Game Commission, 903 A.2d 117 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Even where a court sustains preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, the right to amend should not be withheld where there is some reasonable possibility that amendment may be accomplished successfully. Id.
Here, in his response to DOC's preliminary objections, Arnold asserted actual harm. He claimed the new policy prevented him, at least once, from filing a timely PCRA petition. Specifically, Arnold stated he would have relied upon Commonwealth v. Champney, ___ Pa. ___, 65 A.3d 386 (2013), in seeking PCRA relief, but for the fact that this case, which was filed on April 24, 2013, did not become available to inmates on the Lexis online database until after 60 days from the date of that decision. He describes how this case would apply to his post-conviction relief request. He claims he did not file a PCRA petition based on Champney as it would have been futile as it was time-barred. Because it appears Arnold can establish standing and a controversy ripe for review, we will afford him the opportunity to amend his petition to include these allegations, which were improvidently included in his answer to DOC's preliminary objections, rather than dismiss the action at this stage.
Based on the foregoing, we sustain DOC's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, but we grant Arnold leave to amend his petition to include the allegations regarding the harm he incurred as a result of the policy. In light of this disposition, we deny Arnold's application for summary relief.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of January, 2014, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are SUSTAINED. Petitioner is GRANTED LEAVE to file an amended petition for review within 30 days of this date in accordance with the foregoing opinion; if Petitioner does not timely file an amended petition for review, this case will be dismissed as a matter of course. Additionally, we DENY Petitioner's application for summary relief, without prejudice to renew.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge