Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Cameron v. Westbrook

    No. 1 CA-CV 10-0398 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Westbrook claimed to have slowed down and ultimately stopped when there was no visibility, and Horta claimed to have begun braking immediately upon seeing the dust storm and then veered toward the shoulder upon entering the storm. In her reply brief, Cameron argues Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Co., 9 Ariz. App. 472, 453 P.2d 983 (App. 1969) is similar to the present case. Although Arnold also involved a multi-vehicle accident in a severe dust storm, the pertinent issue in that case concerned an "act of God" jury instruction, not a sudden emergency instruction.

  2. Lanz v. Pearson

    475 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1991)   Cited 7 times
    In Lanz v. Pearson, 475 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 1991), we held that the comparative fault of a consent driver is not imputable to the owner.

    Id. at 66, 368 N.W.2d at 456. Thus, the court ruled that an act of God instruction appropriately was not given. See also Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Co., 9 Ariz. App. 472, 474-75, 453 P.2d 983, 985-86 (1969) (trial court committed reversible error in giving an act of God instruction where accident occurred during dust storm; evidence did not establish that accident happened without negligence); Oakes v. Mannigan, 107 Misc.2d 926, 927, 436 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (1981) (zero visibility blizzard conditions do not meet act of God criteria that conditions are unprecedented, extraordinary natural conditions which could not be foreseen or avoided). Because no substantial evidence was introduced to support an act of God instruction, it was reversible error for the trial court to give such instruction.

  3. Rimondi v. Briggs

    124 Ariz. 561 (Ariz. 1980)   Cited 29 times
    Concluding that the witness did not provide expert testimony because he related his observations but did not testify on what actually caused the accident

    The trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on the admission of photographs. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 132; Baker v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 11 Ariz. App. 387, 464 P.2d 974 (1970); Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Co., 9 Ariz. App. 472, 453 P.2d 983 (1969). Pictures must faithfully represent what the party saw. Baker, supra.

  4. COX v. VERNIEUW

    604 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 1980)   Cited 13 times
    In Cox v. Vernieuw, 604 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 1980), we held that an "act of God" defense is superfluous in a negligence case and should not be considered.

    We agree with the view taken by the Arizona Court of Appeals in City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 6 Ariz. App. 570, 435 P.2d 77, 82 (1967), when the court said, "Jury instructions are complicated enough without obfuscating them with an esoteric as to which there is disagreement as to a proper definition." This ruling that an Act of God is improper in a negligence case was reaffirmed in Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Co., 9 Ariz. App. 472, 453 P.2d 983 (1969). The judgments as to all appellants are affirmed.

  5. State v. Brierly

    109 Ariz. 310 (Ariz. 1973)   Cited 48 times
    Finding police search of truck reasonable when, after stopping truck for malfunctioning headlight, police noticed driver had blood on his chest, arms, hands, and face

    The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the slip into evidence. See Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Co., 9 Ariz. App. 472, 453 P.2d 983 (1969). Brierly also contends that the admission of an eyeglass frame found near the body was error since insufficient foundation was laid to connect it with the killing.

  6. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.

    267 Md. 149 (Md. 1972)   Cited 81 times
    Finding that because the employee was not grossly negligent the employer could not be liable on the basis of agency

    Alabama: W.E. Belcher Lumber Co. v. Harrell, 252 Ala. 392, 41 So.2d 385 (1949) (wantonness) (driving truck on dirt road at excessive speed around curve); Arizona: Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Co., 9 Ariz. App. 472, 453 P.2d 983 (1969) (negligent conduct beyond the range of ordinary negligence) (driving tractor-trailer rig at an excessive speed in a dust storm); Arkansas: Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 234 Ark. 347, 352 S.W.2d 96 (1961) (wanton disregard of rights and safety of others) (rear end collision while intoxicated);

  7. Boyd v. Cleveland

    472 P.2d 995 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 9 times

    Plaintiff's counsel reviewed the history of the doctrine in this jurisdiction from Stambaugh v. Hayes, 44 N.M. 443, 103 P.2d 640 (1940), through Roybal v. Lewis, supra, pointing out that this instruction has been recognized as one tending to confuse the issues. He also has indicated what he considers a trend away from this doctrine in other jurisdictions. See, e. g., City of Phoenix v. Camfield, 97 Ariz. 316, 400 P.2d 115 (1965); Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Co., 9 Ariz. App. 472, 453 P.2d 983 (1969); Cannor v. Cooper, 245 Ark. 386, 432 S.W.2d 761 (1968); Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 396 P.2d 933 (1964); Sadorus v. Wood, 230 A.2d 478 (D.C.Ct.App. 1967); Vespe v. DiMarco, 43 N.J. 430, 204 A.2d 874 (1964); Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or. 24, 393 P.2d 217 (1964). Finally, on oral argument counsel contended that this instruction is in conflict with some of the expressed purposes of the Committee on Uniform Jury Instruction; namely, to eliminate unfair and repetitious instructions. He maintains, that since this instruction is merely a repetition that a defendant must be found negligent before damages may be assessed against him, such an instruction tends to inject a false issue into the case which might easily confuse the jury and in fact they might be led to believe that more than negligence of the defendant must be found. Because of this tendency to confuse, counsel maintains that this instruction was permitted to remain in the New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions only by

  8. Kovrig v. Vasquez

    456 P.2d 947 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 1 times

    Both suits grew out of a multi-vehicle accident in a severe dust storm on the Phoenix-Tucson Freeway, July 12, 1964. We have recently decided a related case, Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Company, 9 Ariz. App. 472, 453 P.2d 983 (1969), in which we described many of the details. We will not repeat the facts here except as necessary for this opinion.