Opinion
44972.
SUBMITTED JANUARY 12, 1970.
DECIDED JANUARY 29, 1970. REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 6, 1970.
Action on note. Calhoun Superior Court. Before Judge Culpepper.
E. Louis Adams, for appellants.
Twitty Twitty, Frank S. Twitty, for appellee.
This case is here on appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment in a suit on promissory notes in which the defendants admitted that the promissory notes were delivered to the bank in blank except for signatures, dates and amounts filled in by the maker, and claimed an officer of the bank would complete the notes by writing in the due dates, "the name of the corporation, Sunshine Ford Sales, Inc.," above the signatures of the defendants. The answer of the defendants denied liability, stating it was the intention of the parties that only the corporation was to be liable, the defendants acting as agents and officers only, and "Bostwick was supposed to have written in when he completed the note the words `Sunshine Sales, Inc., and by the defendants.' " However, the affidavits do not show the bank official was to sign the corporation "by the defendants," but merely "to write in above the names . . . the name of the corporation." Held:
1. Under Code Ann. § 109A-3 — 403 (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 156, 257), if the representative does not show he "signed in a representative capacity" he is personally obligated.
2. Code Ann. § 109A-3 — 307 presumes the signature on the negotiable instrument to be genuine or authorized. In addition, the answers of the plaintiff to the defendants' interrogatories make an issue of fact in denying the claim of the defendants. Newby v. Armour Agricultural Chem. Co., 119 Ga. App. 650 ( 168 S.E.2d 652).
3. Under Code Ann. § 109A-3 — 306, the defendants are entitled to a defense of non-performance of a condition precedent. Compare Pitillo v. Demetry, 112 Ga. App. 643 ( 145 S.E.2d 792).
4. Material alterations avoiding the instrument have been held to be addition of (a) witnesses, one a notary public ( Cook v. Parks, 46 Ga. App. 749 ( 169 S.E. 208)), since it facilitated proof of execution; (b) a co-maker ( Williams v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 67 Ga. App. 711 ( 21 S.E.2d 349)); (c) a seal to a sealed instrument ( Hamby v. Crisp, 48 Ga. App. 418, 420 ( 172 S.E. 842)); (d) consideration where there was none ( Low v. Argrove, 30 Ga. 129); and dates and payee ( Winn v. Hinson, 64 Ga. App. 48 ( 12 S.E.2d 172)). While the above cases arose before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in this State, we think basically all applicable statutes involved in the above cases which were repealed are virtually intact in the new Code. See Code Ann. § 109A-3-407.
5. Where, on consideration of a motion for summary judgment, it appears from the evidence that there remains a genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and the motion should be denied. Bagley v. Firestone Tire c. Co., 104 Ga. App. 736 ( 123 S.E.2d 179); Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1 ( 126 S.E.2d 442); International Brotherhood v. Newman, 116 Ga. App. 590, 592 ( 158 S.E.2d 298); Horton v. Nichols, 117 Ga. App. 748 ( 162 S.E.2d 208). Accordingly, the conflicting testimony as to the material alterations makes a question for jury determination, and the lower court erred in granting summary judgment.
Judgment reversed. Hall, P. J., and Deen, J., concur.