Prosecutors should be allowed wide latitude in their exhortations to the jury. Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986); Varner v. State, 418 So.2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982). The conduct by the accused during the trial is a proper subject of comment.
Id. at 556. The Commonwealth also cites Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (value of stolen item established when box containing stolen item is marked with price tag and admitted into evidence); Watson v. State, 415 So.2d 128, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (testimony of department store employee concerning contents of price tag not hearsay); Kowalczk v. State, 394 S.E.2d 594, 595 (Ga. App. 1990) (testimony of store manager as to actual retail price of stolen merchandise sufficient to establish value); People v. Drake, 475 N.E.2d 1018, 1020-22 (Ill. App.2d 1985) (information shown on stickers attached to stolen items admissible and competent evidence);Lauder, 195 A.2d at 611 (price tags admissible where tag is attached at time of arrest and similar tags are attached to other articles throughout store); Lacy v. State, 432 So.2d 1205, 1206 (Miss. 1983) (adopting judicial notice rationale of State v. White, supra, in holding price tags not inadmissible on hearsay grounds when tags attached at time of theft, no reduced price sale in progress at store, and witnes
Orr v. State, 462 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984).’" Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)."
"[P]rosecutors are to be allowed wide latitude in their exhortations to the jury." Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala.Crim.App.1986).
However, he failed to plead any facts to support this conclusory allegation. It is well settled that statements of counsel are not evidence, see, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (“The prosecutor's statements are not evidence.”), and Mashburn failed to plead any facts indicating that the nine statements by the prosecutor that he believed were improper actually had any impact on the jury at all, much less that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a different verdict but for hearing those nine statements.
’ ”Albarran v. State, 96 So.3d 131, 183 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala.Crim.App.1986)). Contrary to Scheuing's argument, the prosecutor's comment was not factually and legally incorrect and did not relieve the State of its burden to present evidence.
However, he failed to plead any facts to support this conclusory allegation. It is well settled that statements of counsel are not evidence, see, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (“The prosecutor's statements are not evidence.”),
Orr v. State, 462 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Ala.Cr.App.1984).” “ ‘Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).’ ”Jackson v. State, 791 So.2d 979, 1030 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), cert. denied, Ex parte Jackson, 791 So.2d 1043 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, Jackson v. Alabama, 532 U.S. 934, 121 S.Ct. 1387, 149 L.Ed.2d 311 (2001).
Orr v. State, 462 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Ala.Cr.App.1984).”Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala.Crim.App.1986).
Orr v. State, 462 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Ala.Cr.App.1984).” Armstrong v. State, 516 So.2d 806, 809 (Ala.Crim.App.1986).