On appeal, we affirmed in part, but remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of considering two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Armstrong v. Kemna, (Armstrong I), 365 F.3d 622, 630-31 (8th Cir. 2004). On remand, the district court again denied habeas relief.
The Eighth Circuit found Petitioner's overriding complaint to be that, "his out-of-state witnesses did not testify at his trial, but should have." Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit then remanded the matter to this Court, to review Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in light of Missouri and Wisconsin's adoption of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without the State in Criminal Proceedings (Uniform Act).
The Court takes its background section from the Eighth Circuit opinion remanding this case for further review of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2004). On January 6, 1996, Petitioner William Armstrong and several companions, including Petitioner's brother, Solomon Armstrong ("Solomon"), Charles Brown ("Brown"), and Antwon Hamilton ("Hamilton"), traveled from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Hayti Heights, Missouri. That evening, the group went to a bar.
Warden Roper appeals the district court's ruling that Worthington's attorneys were ineffective during the penalty phase because they failed to investigate adequately his social history and medical history, including his family's background, and pursue a psychological mitigation strategy based on expert testimony. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions, Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004), "including its application of the standards of review imposed by AEDPA," Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 605 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2002). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.
The district court denied Armstrong's application, and this court remanded for the district court to consider Armstrong's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2004) ( Armstrong I). The district court found Armstrong's counsel acted reasonably and again denied Armstrong's application. On appeal, this court found Armstrong's counsel did not exercise reasonable diligence and remanded for the district court to determine whether counsel's errors prejudiced Armstrong.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). When a petitioner's claim has not been "adjudicated on the merits," a federal court cannot apply the deferential AEDPA standards. Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (stating a condition precedent to applying AEDPA's standard of review is that the state court adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits). In an appeal from the denial of federal habeas relief, we review de novo the district court's legal conclusions and for clear error its factual findings.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.Id. at 687; see also Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 2004) (reasserting Strickland standard). Thus, Strickland requires a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice. However, "a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."
When a state court has not addressed an issue, a federal court cannot apply the deferential AEDPA standard. Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d 1025, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2005); Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004). Regardless, we conclude that the Iowa Court of Appeals did in fact rule that Page was represented by counsel during the pretrial proceedings.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). 371 F.3d at 458, 469 (8th Cir. 2004); Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004) (when a state court has not addressed an issue, a federal court cannot apply the deferential AEDPA standard). Cox asserts that the district court erred in reviewing this claim under the deferential standard of AEDPA. Cox misconstrues the relevant precedents.
In terms of the trial court's alleged error, "a trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a continuance." Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). The trial court heard petitioner's request for a continuance the morning of trial. (Doc. 9, Ex. 2 at 5).