Armstrong v. Kemna

15 Citing cases

  1. Armstrong v. Kemna

    534 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2008)   Cited 126 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that failure of counsel to utilize the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases (the "Uniform Act") was deficient

    On appeal, we affirmed in part, but remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of considering two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Armstrong v. Kemna, (Armstrong I), 365 F.3d 622, 630-31 (8th Cir. 2004). On remand, the district court again denied habeas relief.

  2. Armstrong v. Kemna

    Case No. 4:98CV2086 JCH (E.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2009)

    The Eighth Circuit found Petitioner's overriding complaint to be that, "his out-of-state witnesses did not testify at his trial, but should have." Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit then remanded the matter to this Court, to review Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in light of Missouri and Wisconsin's adoption of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without the State in Criminal Proceedings (Uniform Act).

  3. Armstrong v. Kemna

    Case No. 4:98CV2086 JCH (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2005)

    The Court takes its background section from the Eighth Circuit opinion remanding this case for further review of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2004). On January 6, 1996, Petitioner William Armstrong and several companions, including Petitioner's brother, Solomon Armstrong ("Solomon"), Charles Brown ("Brown"), and Antwon Hamilton ("Hamilton"), traveled from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Hayti Heights, Missouri. That evening, the group went to a bar.

  4. Worthington v. Roper

    631 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 2011)   Cited 262 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that state court's no-prejudice determination was not unreasonable where defense counsel did not call defendant's father to testify about the defendant's abusive childhood but the jury heard similar evidence from his aunt and other witnesses

    Warden Roper appeals the district court's ruling that Worthington's attorneys were ineffective during the penalty phase because they failed to investigate adequately his social history and medical history, including his family's background, and pursue a psychological mitigation strategy based on expert testimony. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions, Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004), "including its application of the standards of review imposed by AEDPA," Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 605 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2002). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.

  5. Armstrong v. Kemna

    590 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2010)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that the credibility of a criminal defendant's brother as an uncalled trial witness must be evaluated for purposes of Strickland prejudice with full awareness of their close personal relationship and the inherent bias which flows therefrom

    The district court denied Armstrong's application, and this court remanded for the district court to consider Armstrong's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2004) ( Armstrong I). The district court found Armstrong's counsel acted reasonably and again denied Armstrong's application. On appeal, this court found Armstrong's counsel did not exercise reasonable diligence and remanded for the district court to determine whether counsel's errors prejudiced Armstrong.

  6. Pfau v. Ault

    409 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2005)   Cited 62 times
    Holding that when the issue of state court adjudication was unclear, we would give the petitioner the benefit of the doubt and review the claim de novo

    28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). When a petitioner's claim has not been "adjudicated on the merits," a federal court cannot apply the deferential AEDPA standards. Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (stating a condition precedent to applying AEDPA's standard of review is that the state court adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits). In an appeal from the denial of federal habeas relief, we review de novo the district court's legal conclusions and for clear error its factual findings.

  7. Sillick v. Ault

    358 F. Supp. 2d 738 (N.D. Iowa 2005)   Cited 8 times
    Rejecting identical claim

    This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.Id. at 687; see also Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 2004) (reasserting Strickland standard). Thus, Strickland requires a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice. However, "a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."

  8. Page v. Burger

    406 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2005)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding that state court reasonably decided that the defendant waived his Faretta request where the defendant, inter alia, “wrote a note to [appointed counsel] requesting that [appointed counsel] take over the entire trial”

    When a state court has not addressed an issue, a federal court cannot apply the deferential AEDPA standard. Cox v. Burger, 398 F.3d 1025, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2005); Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004). Regardless, we conclude that the Iowa Court of Appeals did in fact rule that Page was represented by counsel during the pretrial proceedings.

  9. Cox v. Burger

    398 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2005)   Cited 163 times
    Holding that a claim is "fairly presented" when the petitioner refers "to a specific federal constitutional right, a particular constitutional provision, a federal constitutional case, or a state case raising a pertinent federal constitutional issue"

    Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). 371 F.3d at 458, 469 (8th Cir. 2004); Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004) (when a state court has not addressed an issue, a federal court cannot apply the deferential AEDPA standard). Cox asserts that the district court erred in reviewing this claim under the deferential standard of AEDPA. Cox misconstrues the relevant precedents.

  10. Ford v. Wallace

    No. 4:15-CV-137 CAS (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2017)

    In terms of the trial court's alleged error, "a trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a continuance." Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). The trial court heard petitioner's request for a continuance the morning of trial. (Doc. 9, Ex. 2 at 5).