Opinion
Case No. 2:04 CV 394.
July 26, 2005
ORDER
Defendant Tracy Armstrong moves to dismiss this action on three grounds: for want of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, lack of standing under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (ERISA), and for improper venue under 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Because it is unclear from the parties' briefing whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, the Plaintiff is ordered to file an Amended Complaint that addresses the problems discussed below.
Plaintiff Jennifer Armstrong brought this case seeking a one-half interest in her father's ERISA pension. She claims that her father made clear that she would share in his pension with her sister. Her Complaint states that the form that the plan participant, James Armstrong, filled out listed Jennifer Armstrong below Tracy Armstrong, and that the plan administrator denied her claim on that basis. She claims that the distribution is sent to the first name listed on a form, and that the plan administrator acknowledged that this is a common error by pensioners when filling out the necessary forms. Plaintiff brought this case against Tracy Armstrong and Defendant FCIU Pension Plan, National Industrial Pension Fund. FCIU was Dismissed without prejudice on March 24, 2005. This dismissal significantly changed the posture of the case. As discussed below, without FCIU in the picture, it is unclear what claims can be brought.
The main issue facing the Court is whether or not we have subject matter jurisdiction, either through diversity or through federal question jurisdiction. The Complaint makes no mention of the amount in controversy, but Defendant Tracy Armstrong has provided an affidavit stating that the amount of the remaining balance of the benefits is approximately $61,550. Thus, a one-half interest is worth $30,775. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any evidence, or even a good faith allegation, to contradict the Defendant's asserted value of this claim. The party seeking jurisdiction in this Court must establish such jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). Since diversity jurisdiction requires that damages exceed $75,000, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the amount in controversy in this case confers diversity jurisdiction on this Court.
Lack of diversity may not be a problem, however, if there is another basis for subject matter jurisdiction. The Complaint lists ERISA as a possible source of jurisdiction, but Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss makes no mention of this possibility. She might have omitted this reference for good reason, as it appears that there is no possible ERISA claim against the remaining Defendant, Tracy Armstrong. The only claim against Tracy Armstrong asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint is that she breached her fiduciary duty to Jennifer Armstrong by not sharing the proceeds of the pension fund. A fiduciary is subject to suit in this Court under ERISA, but Tracy Armstrong is not a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA. The fiduciary duty standards imposed by ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1105, are enforceable in civil damage actions only against parties who are fiduciaries under the ERISA statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). A person is a fiduciary for purposes of ERISA to the extent that he or she exercises discretion over the management of plan assets, renders investment advice for a fee or exercises discretionary control over the administration of a plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
It is clear from the allegations of the Complaint that Tracy Armstrong satisfies none of the requirements of § 1002(21)(A). Without Defendant being a fiduciary, it does not appear that Plaintiff can maintain a claim under ERISA. See, e.g., Thornton v. Evans, 692 f.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1982). And if she is not bringing an ERISA claim, it is unclear what claim she is bringing, and whether there is a federal question before the Court. In addition to raising jurisdictional questions, this uncertainty makes it impossible for this Court to evaluate the Defendant's other grounds for dismissal or transfer. These concerns, combined with the Court's continuing obligation to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the disputes coming before it, Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1055 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted), leads the Court to believe that it would be more appropriate to order the Defendant to file an Amended Complaint that more clearly states the basis for jurisdiction and that reflects the fact that FCIU is no longer a party to this suit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); 6 C. Wright, A. Miller M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1473 (1998).
Thus, Plaintiff is ORDERED to file an Amended Complaint by September 1, 2005. If she fails to do so by that date, the case will be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without further order. The Defendant's pending Motion [Docket No. 9] is DENIED with leave to re-file.