Opinion
No. 1781 C.D. 2011
03-20-2012
Dameion L. Armour, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Dameion L. Armour petitions pro se for review of the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), affirming the referee's decision to deny compensation benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law) because he voluntarily terminated his employment without necessitous and compelling reason. We affirm.
Pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(b), an employee is ineligible for compensation for any week in which his unemployment is due to "voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . ."
Armour was also assessed, inter alia, somewhat significant fraud overpayments under various sections of Title IV of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Act of June 30, 2008, P.L. 110-252, as amended, Sections 4001-4007, 26 U.S.C. § 3304 Note. Those assessments were affirmed by the referee and Board but are not at issue here due to Armour's failure to properly preserve any contention related thereto. Specifically, the only mention of these assessments appears in the conclusion of Armour's brief, wherein he states: "At the very least I hope that if the Court doesn't reinstate my Unemployment Benefits it would at least consider waiving the over payment fraud charges." Armour's appellate brief at 9.
According to the referee's pertinent findings of fact, which the Board adopted as its own on appeal, Armour was last employed by The Callos Companies (Employer), a temporary employment agency. At the time of his separation from employment on September 22, 2010, Armour was working for Employer's client, Ilsia. At some point after September 22, 2010, Armour was arrested and incarcerated for a 10-day period in Ohio. As a result, Armour did not report to work and he did not inform Employer of his arrest and incarceration. Furthermore, after his release, Armour did not return to work or contact Employer to advise it of his availability for work. Employer would have had work available to Armour at that time. Consequently, Employer concluded that Armour had voluntarily terminated his employment by abandoning his job.
Amour actually testified that the name of the company was "Ilsca."
Employer's witness testified that one of its employees had left a voicemail message for Armour on September 28 to find out if something was amiss but the call was never returned. The same witness also testified that Amour did not contact Employer until April 27, 2011, which is apparently around the time that the Notice of Determination denying benefits was issued. Finally, this witness further noted that its policy manual required employees to call as soon as they knew that they would miss work and to contact employer monthly to inquire about available work.
Armour's subsequent claim for benefits was denied. After a hearing, the referee rendered the above findings and based thereon, concluded that Amour, by failing to take any precautions or measures to preserve his job, abandoned his job without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Benefits were denied and the Board affirmed on appeal. This appeal followed.
The Board has not filed a brief.
On appeal, Armour essentially argues that he could not contact Employer while he was in jail because he did not have Employer's phone number or address and Employer would not accept a collect call. As he did at the hearing, he also avers that when he was released, he talked to a co-worker from Ilsca who led him to believe it would be futile to contact employer. Specifically, he states:
Once I was released I gat in touch with Caleb Dyer. Caleb worked at Ilsco through Callos with me. Caleb is who drove me to work because my drivers license are suspended. Caleb told me that he no longer worked for Ilsco because he missed a couple of days of work due to transportation problems. Caleb said, "he called Callos spoke to Sharanda." Sharanda told him that since he missed 2 days without informing Callos of his issues that he had to wait 6 months to reapply with Callos. After Caleb told me that what would make me think that I still had my job. . . .Armour's appellate brief at 8A (grammatical errors not noted). In addition, in noting that he failed to follow Employer's policies in the past without repercussion, he seems to be suggesting that he was led to believe that his actions were proper in the present circumstances. These arguments lack merit.
Armour takes issue with other matters, such as whether his last day of work was September 20 or 22. Due to the fact that these various contentions have no bearing on his eligibility for benefits, we decline to address them. --------
Section 402(b) of the Law provides that one who leaves his employment voluntarily must show a necessitous and compelling cause in order to qualify for benefits. Brown v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 780 A.2d 885 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). In order to show the requisite cause, the claimant must demonstrate that circumstances existed which produced real and substantial pressure to terminate employment; similar circumstances would cause a reasonable person to terminate employment; the claimant acted with ordinary common sense; and the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve his employment. Id.
Here, we discern no error. Armour clearly failed to take reasonable steps to preserve his employment. Indeed, he didn't take any steps to preserve his job. Accepting Armour's assertion that he could not get in touch with Employer while incarcerated, there was nothing to prevent him from contacting employer upon his release to determine whether work would still be available to him. Not only is such minimal effort demanded by common sense and professional courtesy, but was required under Employer's policies as well. Here, Armour does not dispute that he did not contact Employer until April 2011, more than seven months after his last day on the job. The Board and referee did not err in concluding such conduct demonstrates an intent to abandon employment.
The order of the Board is affirmed.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of March, 2012, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is affirmed.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge