Opinion
December 21, 1951. Rehearing Denied January 15, 1952.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, George E. Holt, J.
Anderson Nadeau, Miami, for appellant.
Robert C. Lane, Miami, and Boardman, Bolles Kates, Miami, for appellee.
This appeal is from a final decree of divorce wherein the sums of $250 per month as permanent alimony, and permanent attorneys' fees of $1000, in addition to a temporary fee of $500, were allowed.
The appeal does not question that part of the decree granting the divorce, but is limited to assignments of error, based upon the amounts allowed for permanent alimony and for temporary and permanent attorneys' fees.
A prior divorce proceeding was instituted on the 22nd day of July, 1949, and progressed to the point where temporary alimony and attorneys' fees were allowed. The same counsel represented Mrs. Armour in each case. In the first case a temporary fee of $1000 was allowed and the husband paid the wife $2500 at the time of the reconciliation and the dismissal of the first suit.
The parties were married on August 14, 1947, and there were no children as a result of this marriage. The present action was instituted on March 14, 1951. The appellant complains: (1) that the amount of alimony of $250 per month for an unlimited time is too much and is unreasonable in view of the abilities and necessities of the parties, and (2) that the amount of $1000 as a permanent fee in the proceeding below is excessive in view of the fact that the wife had already been awarded $1000 in the first suit and $500 as a temporary fee in the second suit, and the sum of $250 in this court for services rendered, or to be rendered on this appeal.
There seems to be little, if any, dispute about the facts as to the necessities of the parties and their abilities. Each of them must live. The high cost of living affects one as much as it does the other. Prior to her marriage the wife was engaged in the real estate business and earned approximately $3500 per year and lived on that amount. She is still capable of earning that amount, or at least, she has shown no reason why she cannot engage in the same activity and earn that amount.
The husband prior to his marriage had been engaged as a funeral director and sold his business and moved to Florida. After moving to Florida, he was engaged as a real estate salesman. In 1950 it appears that he had capital assets of about $78,000. For the years 1948, 1949 and 1950 his gross earnings were $3,262, $3,869 and $2,006 for the respective years. It, therefore, appears that the wife is able to earn as much, if not more than the husband.
In view of these facts, we think that $250 per month as an award for permanent alimony is excessive and the same should be reduced to $150 per month.
With reference to the amount allowed and awarded for permanent attorneys' fees, this second divorce suit should be considered as a continuation of the first suit. The same attorneys represented the same parties. The first suit was dismissed after the payment of $1000 for attorneys' fees and the sum of $2500 to the wife. The successful prosecution of the second suit involved no unusual legal questions and no unusual amount of time. The amount awarded as a temporary fee should be taken into consideration in making an award for a permanent fee. Even eliminating the $1000, which had been paid as attorneys' fees in the first suit, an award of $1500 for the services rendered in the second suit, which includes temporary and permanent fees, is excessive, and should be reduced by the sum of $500. In other words, the permanent fee in this second suit should be $500 instead of $1000 and this would still leave an attorneys' fee in the second suit of $1000 in addition to the $250 heretofore allowed by this court for services in connection with this appeal. See Riesner v. Riesner, 136 Fla. 129, 186 So. 669; Brunner v. Brunner, 159 Fla. 762, 32 So.2d 736; Schuberth v. Schuberth, Fla., 52 So.2d 332.
There has also been filed a petition for additional attorneys' fees for services to be rendered in this appeal. In view of what we have said and as there appears no sufficient justification for any additional award of attorneys' fees, the said petition is denied, and the decree is reversed in the particulars herein set forth for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.