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Armor Elevator v. Hinton

213 Ga. App. 27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
Armor Elevator v. Hinton

29 Citing cases

  1. Reliance Ins. of Ill. v. Richfield Hospitality

    92 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2000)   Cited 19 times

    "It is axiomatic that an action for negligence cannot be maintained if the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a legal duty." Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga. App. 27, 443 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1994). A legal duty can arise by operation of law or by contract between the parties.

  2. Fair v. CV Underground, LLC

    340 Ga. App. 790 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 15 times

    Brown v. All-Tech Investment Group , 265 Ga.App. 889, 897 (2) (a) (i), 595 S.E.2d 517 (2003). See also Anderson , 273 Ga. at 117-118 (4), 537 S.E.2d 345 ; Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton , 213 Ga.App. 27, 30 (2), 443 S.E.2d 670 (1994) ("[I]n personal injury cases, an injured party may not recover as a third-party beneficiary for failure to perform a duty imposed by a contract unless it is apparent from the language of the agreement that the contracting parties intended to confer a direct benefit upon the plaintiff to protect him from physical injury.") (citations and punctuation omitted).In this case, the service contract provides that IPC agreed, as an independent contractor "to provide ... Interior/Exterior Security" and "on-site security and public safety services" for the Underground Atlanta property according to a specified manpower schedule.

  3. The Med. Ctr. Hosp. Auth. v. Cavender. Securitas Sec. Serv.

    331 Ga. App. 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that prior criminal incidents did not make foreseeable a shooter’s entry into a hospital after the death of his mother

    As we have held, however, an injured invitee may not recover against the security company for negligent performance if the contract is silent as to the parties' intent to confer that benefit. Id. (citing Anderson, 273 Ga. at 117–118(4), 537 S.E.2d 345; Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga.App. 27, 30(2), 443 S.E.2d 670 (1994)). See also CDP Event Svs. v. Atcheson, 289 Ga.App. 183, 185(1), 656 S.E.2d 537 (2008) (same).

  4. Brown v. All-Tech Investment Group, Inc.

    265 Ga. App. 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that the defendant day-trading firms were entitled to summary judgment in an action brought by victims of a work-place mass shooting because there was no evidence that the shooting spree was a reasonably foreseeable outcome of the firms’ actions

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga. App. 27, 30(2) ( 443 S.E.2d 670) (1994). We recognize that whenever a premises owner contracts with a private security company the parties may expect the security services provided to benefit invitees who visit the property.

  5. FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton

    240 Ga. App. 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that security service hired by residential housing complex had tort duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 stemming from both O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 and contract with property manager to protect tenants

    Further, Boone made certain admissions against interest which create a jury question as to his exercise of ordinary care. (d) Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga. App. 27, 30 (2) ( 443 S.E.2d 670) (1994) (" Armor"), does not control under the facts of this case, because the contract in this case expressly stated "any other parties," so that the tenants were the express third party beneficiaries of the contract, while in Armor invitees were not third party beneficiaries. Further, in that case, PSI had no general duty to inspect and to warn others of the condition of the premises, while in this case, inspection and prevention were Corporate Security Services' primary duties.

  6. Moorehead v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.

    1:19-cv-5155-MLB (N.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2021)

    For an individual to be a third-party beneficiary of a contract, “it must clearly appear from the contract that [the contract] was intended for his benefit.” Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 443 S.E.2d 670, 672 (Ga.Ct.App. 1994). “[T]he mere fact that [a party] would benefit from performance of the contract is insufficient” to make that person a third-party beneficiary of the contract. Kaesemeyer v. Angiogenix, Inc., 629 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Ga.Ct.App. 2006).

  7. Anderson v. Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games

    273 Ga. 113 (Ga. 2000)   Cited 56 times
    Finding that evidence that the ACOG derived financial benefits for pecuniary gain from the businesses that occupied Centennial Olympic Park, and that those businesses "gained untold advertising and promotional value due to their conspicuous presence in the Park," was relevant and admissible to the extent that it showed ACOG made the venue available to the public for free for the purpose of conducting a for-profit activity intended to involve the public

    4. Under the uncontroverted facts in this case, any duty Borg-Warner and ADI, the two security services companies, may have owed appellants arose not by operation of law but by contract.Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga. App. 27 (2) ( 443 S.E.2d 670) (1994). As recognized in Armor Elevator Co.,

  8. Thurman v. Applebrook Country Dayschool

    278 Ga. 784 (Ga. 2004)   Cited 11 times

    Wallace, supra; Laite, supra. See also Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga.App. 27 (1) ( 443 SE2d 670) (1994); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Mitcham, 127 Ga.App. 102 ( 192 SE2d 549) (1972). That being so, it cannot be said that Dr. Miller's testimony misled or confused the jury with regard to the standard of care.

  9. Healthcare Staffing, Inc. v. Edwards

    360 Ga. App. 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 5 times
    Concluding that borrowed servant doctrine did not apply where contract between health facility and healthcare personnel contractor did not give health facility exclusive right to discharge contractor’s employees, but merely allowed health facility to request removal of contractor’s personnel

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton , 213 Ga. App. 27, 30 (2), 443 S.E.2d 670 (1994). On appeal, appellees contend that "[t]he promise of [HCS] to Gateway was to hire and lease qualified people to provide services to individuals such as [the Patients].

  10. Davidson v. Meticulously Clean Sweepers, Llc.

    329 Ga. App. 640 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 8 times
    Considering first whether the defendant was negligent, then applying Section 324A

    Maddox v. Cumberland Distrib. Svcs., 236 Ga.App. 170, 171(1), 511 S.E.2d 270 (1999) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that in personal injury cases against independent contractors, “ ‘an injured party may not recover as a third-party beneficiary for failure to perform a duty imposed by a contract unless it is apparent from the language of the agreement that the contracting parties intended to confer a direct benefit upon the plaintiff to protect him from physical injury.’ ” Anderson v. Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games, 273 Ga. 113, 117–118(4), 537 S.E.2d 345 (2000), quoting Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga.App. 27, 30(2), 443 S.E.2d 670 (1994). And this Court has held, following Anderson, that a trial court erred in denying summary judgment to a janitorial service when the contract between the service and the owner of the supermarket in which a plaintiff fell contained “nothing ... that shows [the parties'] mutual intent to confer a direct benefit upon third parties.”