The importance of the statutory definition of the crime with respect to whether specific intent is an element has been addressed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79 (1965), that court said: "* * * A given crime may consist of an act combined with a general intent or, on the other hand, it may consist of an act combined with a specific intent to commit the act, depending entirely upon the particular statute which defines the offense under consideration. Where the statute defining the crime includes a specific intent as an ingredient of its criminality, such specific intent is essential and must be established with the same certainty as any other material element of the crime."

Specific intent is an integral part of the crime and "must be established with the same certainty as any other material element of the crime." Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 219, 402 P.2d 79, 80 (1965). For example, in Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo. 1982), the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit the crime of escape.

[7,8] Section 18-3-202(1)(e) requires evidence of the specific intent to do serious bodily harm.See People v. Walker, 189 Colo. 545, 542 P.2d 128 (1975); People v. Prante, 177 Colo. 243, 493 P.2d 108 (1972);see also Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79 (1965). Material elements of the offenses alleged in a delinquency petition must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

[9-11] The intent with which the act is committed is the gist of the offense. Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79 (1965). This court in Shreeves v. People, 126 Colo. 413, 249 P.2d 1020 (1952), quoted People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 P. 152, with approval, stating:

C.R.S. 1963, 40-2-34. Also see Moyer v. People, 165 Colo. 583, 440 P.2d 783 (1968) and Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 403 P.2d 79 (1965). Defendant contends that this essential element was not proven and therefore his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon cannot be sustained.

The crime for which defendant was convicted requires evidence of defendant's "present ability" to commit an assault on the victim and specific intent to murder. Moyer v. People, 165 Colo. 583, 440 P.2d 783 (1968); Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79 (1965); Peterson v. People, 133 Colo. 516, 297 P.2d 529 (1956); Shreeves v. People, 126 Colo. 413, 249 P.2d 1020 (1952); Horton v. People, 47 Colo. 252, 107 P. 257 (1910). C.R.S. 1963, 40-2-34; C.R.S. 1963, 40-2-33.

Defendant's second contention is that the People have failed to prove the existence of a specific intent, which is incumbent upon the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79; Shreeves v. People, 126 Colo. 413, 249 P.2d 102. Reviewing all the evidence, we conclude that there was evidence sufficient to submit to the jury of defendant's specific intent to do great bodily injury.

In Colorado, as elsewhere, the specific intent to do bodily injury is indeed a necessary and essential element of the proof of the charge made here and it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79; Shreeves v. People, 126 Colo. 413, 249 P.2d 1020. This intent, however, need not be proved by direct substantive evidence. Because the state of mind of the assailant in a crime such as this is ordinarily concealed from the fact finder, intent or the lack thereof is usually discerned from the circumstances surrounding the occurrence.

We deem it unnecessary to restate the basic principles which require such a conclusion and merely refer to the following decisions of the Court which deal with the problem of instructions where specific intent is an ingredient of the crime charged, as contrasted with a general criminal intent. Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 101, 465 P.2d 112; Gonzales v.People, 166 Colo. 557, 445 P.2d 74; Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79; Shreeves v. People, 126 Colo. 413, 249 P.2d 1020; Funk v. People, 90 Colo. 167, 7 P.2d 823. Other alleged errors need not be considered in view of our disposition on insufficient jury instructions.

This entire line of argument we regard to be without merit. In our view the evidence does show, prima facie, and intent on the part of the defendant to murder both Caldwell and Stratton. Moreover, instruction No. 12 concerning specific intent which was given the jury does meet the requirements of Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 402 P.2d 79. The reasoning of counsel that the failure of the district attorney to produce a spent bullet suggests that the defendant was perhaps firing blanks or at the best only firing warning shots in the air is rejected as to finely spun and not supported by the record. [4,5] Error is also predicated on the ruling by the trial court that the testimony regarding the finding of the safe constituted admissible evidence.