Opinion
No. 04-08-00020-CV
Delivered and Filed: April 30, 2008.
Appealed from the 63rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas, Trial Court No. 26879, Honorable Thomas F. Lee, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: KAREN ANGELINI, Justice, SANDEE BRYAN MARION, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Yvette Arledge, D'Anne Arledge, Shane Arledge, Shawn Hughes, Sol E. Arledge, Jr., Individually, and as Independent Executor of the Estate of Willie Dorothy Arledge, Carl Brite, and Evelyn Brite appeal from the trial court's denial of their request for a temporary injunction against Juanita Francis Ricks, Trustee of the Ricks Family Trust, Juanita Ricks, Individually and as Independent Executrix of the Estate of Milton Ricks, and Joe Ricks. Because we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the temporary injunction, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Arledges, Brites, and Rickses own contiguous tracts of land on a peninsula that extends into Lake Amistad, near Del Rio, Texas, in Val Verde County. None of the parties live on the properties. The Arledges and Brites can access their properties only by a road that crosses the Rickses' property. When a dispute arose in November 2007 over access to the properties, the Rickses locked their gate to the Arledges and Brites. The Arledges and Brites contend they have used the road across the Rickses' property by verbal agreement with the previous owner since 1969, when Lake Amistad was created and its waters cut off all other routes to the properties. The Rickses, however, who bought the 675-acre tract in 1974, contend they have no knowledge of a previous agreement for use of the road and never granted permission for the Arledges or Brites to travel unimpeded across the Rickses' land. They assert no easement or other right exists requiring them to allow the Arledges and Brites to cross their land. The Rickses acknowledge it is their intention to restrict travel over the road across their property.
The Arledges and Brites sued the Rickses, seeking: (1) a permanent injunction prohibiting the Rickses from preventing them from using the road to access their property; (2) declaratory relief in the form of an order recognizing an easement across the Rickses' property; (3) injunctive relief prohibiting the Rickses from leasing Arledge or Brite property for hunting; and (4) damages for wildlife taken and profits realized from past hunting leases on their property they allege the Rickses leased. The Arledges and Brites also sought a temporary injunction for the unimpeded use of the road across the Rickses' land. This interlocutory appeal is from the trial court's denial of that temporary injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Wu v. City of San Antonio, 216 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.). We review the grant or denial of a temporary injunction for a clear abuse of discretion without addressing the merits of the underlying case. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993); Ireland v. Franklin, 950 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). An appellate court will uphold the trial court's judgment unless the trial court's action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. In an appeal from an order granting or denying a request for a temporary injunction, appellate review is confined to the validity of the order that grants or denies the injunctive relief. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). We may neither substitute our judgment for that of the trial court nor consider the merits of the lawsuit. Id. Rather, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor, and determine whether the order was so arbitrary as to exceed the bounds of reasonable discretion. Id.
DISCUSSION
To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; City of San Antonio v. Vakey, 123 S.W.3d 497, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. Canteen Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Props., Inc., 773 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
The trial court, in its order denying the temporary injunction, indicated that it did not find "probable, imminent, and irreparable injury will result to the Plaintiffs in the interim if no temporary injunction is granted." The Arledges and Brites are absentee landowners whose enjoyment of the land consists of modest stipends from grazing leases and infrequent visits for hunting and recreation. Yvette Arledge testified her family received, at the time of trial, $600 per year from a rancher who grazes his cattle on the Arledges' 128 acres. This same rancher also leases from the Rickses and the Rickses have not denied him access to the property. Yvette also testified she travels the road to their property "maybe once every couple of years." She indicated a cousin hunted on the property in November 2007. Arledge and Joe Ricks both testified that Ricks had agreed to open his gate to the Arledges and Brites if they called ahead of their arrival.
Temporary injunctive relief is not available if the injury is one of inconvenience. Long v. Long, 814 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ); Trada Partners VI, LP v. Vogt, No. 04-06-00723-CV, 2007 WL 163181 at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio January 24, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). While inconvenient, the Arledges and Brites have at least limited access to their property during the pendency of their lawsuit. Because their infrequent use will not be entirely prohibited in the interim, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the temporary injunction.
CONCLUSION
We overrule the Arledges' and Brites' challenge to the trial court's finding that no probable, imminent, and irreparable injury would result during the pendency of their lawsuit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive of this appeal, we do not address the Arledges' and Brites' two remaining issues. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.