Opinion
Case No. CV04-251-S-BLW.
August 13, 2004
ORDER
Pending before the Court is the review of Plaintiff's Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint) in order to determine whether it is subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff has also submitted a motion requesting in forma pauperis filing status for his lawsuit (Docket No. 1).
Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court has determined that Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal without prejudice because Plaintiff must first challenge his parole revocation through a state court habeas proceeding prior to filing a civil rights claim. Because the case is subject to dismissal, the pending motion is moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the following Defendants: (1) the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole; (2) Olivia Craven, the Director of the Commission; and (3) Jeannie Crockett, a hearing officer for the Parole Commission. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied a parole hearing on his parole eligibility date. He further alleges that he was denied a fair parole hearing in December of 2003. He also claims that Olivia Craven submitted false information about his parole eligibility date in a prior federal court lawsuit, CV00-117-S-EJL, that was dismissed in March of 2003.
In support of Plaintiff's allegations, he submitted a document dated February 15, 1993, entitled "Primary Review," describing his sentence for aggravated assault as a minimum of ten (10) years and a maximum of twenty (20) years. The parole eligibility date is listed as March 1999. The Primary Review also describes Plaintiff's sentence for kidnaping as a minimum of fifteen (15) years and a maximum of twenty-five (25) years. The parole eligibility date for the kidnaping sentence is listed as March of 2004. Complaint, Exhibit A. Plaintiff also submitted an "Amended Primary Review" dated August 1, 2003, describing a a ten (10) year minimum sentence for the kidnaping sentence and a parole eligibility date for this sentence as March 13, 1999.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants fraudulently denied him a parole hearing on the date he was first eligible. He requests damages for the alleged failure to provide a parole hearing and the denial of parole.
II. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
A. Standard of Law for Summary Dismissal
The Court is required to review complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof which states a claim that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
B. Heck v. Humphrey
Plaintiff's allegations against the Parole Commission and its members fall within the procedural bar set forth in Heck v. Humphrey. This case requires that a civil rights challenge to defects in a parol hearing be preceded by a court determination, invalidating the parole revocation.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court considered a prisoner's § 1983 claim for damages which alleged that prosecutors and police officers had engaged in misconduct in investigating and prosecuting his case. Therein, the Court reasoned that to recognize such a claim would "expand opportunities for collateral attack" and might risk "the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction[s]." Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 484-85, 114 S. Ct. 2364. 2371-72 (1994). Thus, the Supreme Court held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id., 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S. Ct. at 2372.
In Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit extended the Heck holding to a lawsuit in which the defendant challenged the wrongful denial of parole due to false information being placed in his prison file.
The court stated that
[w]e have no difficulty in concluding that a challenge to the procedures used in the denial of parole necessarily implicates the validity of the denial of parole, and therefore, the prisoner's continuing confinement. Few things implicate the validity of continued confinement more directly than the allegedly improper denial of parole. This is true whether that denial is alleged to be improper based upon procedural defects in the parole hearing or upon allegations that parole was improperly denied on the merits. Appellant's civil claim for damages amounts to a collateral attack on his denial of parole and subsequent incarceration. Heck does not permit this.Butterfield, 120 F.3d at 1024.
Based on the foregoing case law, Plaintiff will be able to bring his civil rights claim only after showing that the parole denial has been successfully challenged through a habeas proceeding. Prior to bringing a federal habeas corpus action, Plaintiff must first show that his claims have been exhausted in state court, or in other words, that he has fully and fairly presented each of his constitutional claims to the Idaho Supreme Court in a procedurally proper manner. This Court cannot consider habeas corpus claims which have not been exhausted in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action that is dependent upon a prior state court action to invalidate a conviction, sentence or parole revocation does not begin to run until the conviction, sentence or parole revocation is reversed, expunged or declared invalid, because the § 1983 cause of action does not arise until the state court action is completed. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 489, 114 S. Ct. at 2373-74.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice to re-filing it. Because the Complaint is subject to dismissal, the request for in forma pauperis filing status is moot.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice to re-filing.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Docket No. 1) is MOOT.