Opinion
CV176071329
08-20-2018
Timothy ARLAND v. EASTERN COMPUTER EXCHANGE, INC.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Markle, J.
The plaintiff moves for judgment on count one of the plaintiff’s amended complaint on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Illinois default judgment is valid and enforceable in Connecticut.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Timothy Arland, in an amended complaint dated February 8, 2018, alleges the following facts. On or about March 31, 2015, the defendant, Eastern Computer Exchange, Inc., a Connecticut corporation, hired the plaintiff to perform sales and consulting services. The plaintiff was an Illinois resident and was directed to sell the defendant’s products and services in Illinois. On June 4, 2016, the plaintiff resigned. At the time of his resignation, the defendant owed the plaintiff $44,741.80 in reimbursable travel and business expenses and paid time off. The defendant did not compensate the plaintiff for those expenses.
Consequently, on September 29, 2016, the plaintiff brought an action in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois to recover the unpaid expenses and attorneys fees. On January 10, 2017, a default judgment in the amount of $55,081.86 was entered against the defendant. The judgment remains unsatisfied.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff instituted this action by way of a one-count complaint filed on June 15, 2017. The plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint on February 8, 2018, to include two additional claims: breach of contract (count two); and unjust enrichment (count three). The defendant filed its appearance on July 28, 2017, and filed its amended answer on April 13, 2018. On March 6, 2018, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on count one of his amended complaint, on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the default judgment in Illinois is entitled to full faith and credit in Connecticut. A memorandum of law in support and exhibits accompanied the motion. On April 17, 2018, the defendant filed its memorandum of law in opposition to the motion and exhibits. On May 14, 2018, the court heard oral argument at short calendar.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). "To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts ... which contradict those stated in the movant’s affidavits and documents." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut, 167 Conn.App. 347, 358, 143 A.3d 638 (2016).
The plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Illinois default judgment is enforceable in Connecticut. The defendant, in opposing the plaintiff’s motion, attempts to collaterally attack the Illinois judgment on two grounds: (1) the Illinois judgment was obtained by its failure to appear; (2) the plaintiff did not follow the procedure to domesticate a foreign judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-605; and (3) that the Illinois court ignored the mandatory arbitration and Connecticut choice of law provisions in the agreement, thus, lacking authority to enter a default judgment.
General Statutes § 52-605(a) provides: "A judgment creditor shall file, with a certified copy of a foreign judgment, in the court in which enforcement of such judgment is sought, a certification that the judgment was not obtained by default in appearance or by confession of judgment, that it is unsatisfied in whole or in part, the amount remaining unpaid and that the enforcement of such judgment has not been stayed and setting forth the name and last-known address of the judgment debtor."
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the ... judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1. "[T]he full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land." Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998). "[T]he judgment of another state must be presumed valid, and the burden of proving a lack of jurisdiction rests heavily upon the assailant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 214 Conn. 52, 57, 570 A.2d 687 (1990). "[T]he party attacking the judgment bears the burden of proof regardless of whether the judgment at issue was rendered after a full trial on the merits or after an ex parte proceeding." Id. "In order to mount a successful collateral attack on the [foreign] judgment, the [defendant] must establish that the [foreign] judgment is void, not merely voidable ... Broadly stated, this would require proof of the lack of a legally organized court or tribunal; lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, or both; or want of power to grant the relief contained in the judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J. Corda Construction, Inc. v. Zaleski Corp., 98 Conn.App. 518, 523, 911 A.2d 309 (2006). Additionally, there must be sufficient process in the foreign action to put the defendant on notice of the cause of action against it in the foreign jurisdiction. See Tri-State Tank Corp. v. Higganum Heating, Inc., 45 Conn.App. 798, 800, 699 A.2d 201 (1997).
As to the defendant’s first argument, Illinois law allows its courts to enter default judgment by a defendant’s failure to appear. 735 Ill.Comp.Stat. Ann. 5/2-1301(d) (West 2016). Because neither party disputes that the defendant did not appear in the Illinois action, the Illinois court could and did enter a default judgment against it. As to the second argument, the plaintiff need not use § 52-605 to domesticate the Illinois judgment because General Statutes § 52-607 preserves the right of a party to domesticate a judgment through a common-law action. Business Alliance Capital Corp. v. Fuselier, 88 Conn.App. 731, 735 n.1, 871 A.2d 1051 (2005). The plaintiff is using a common-law action here, complying with § 52-607. As to the defendant’s third argument, the Illinois court was not bound to look at a contract that was not raised before it. Had the defendant appeared in the Illinois action and raised the issue, the Illinois court may have enforced the arbitration clause. However, because the defendant did not appear and did not demand enforcement of the contract’s provisions, the Illinois court was not required to enforce the provisions. See American Service Ins. Co. v. Chicago, 404 Ill.App.3d 769, 779, 343 Ill.Dec. 707, 935 N.E.2d 715 (2010) (trial court has discretion and not required to ask plaintiff to present proof of factual allegations of complaint in default judgment proceedings). Thus, the defendant has failed to demonstrate an issue of material fact to preclude the court from entering summary judgment for the plaintiff.
General Statutes § 52-607 provides: "The right of a judgment creditor to proceed by an action on the judgment or a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint instead of proceeding under sections 52-604 to 52-609, inclusive, remains unimpaired."
In fact, the plaintiff could not use § 52-605(a) to domesticate the foreign judgment because he obtained the foreign judgment by default, making § 52-605(a) inoperable. Thus, § 52-607 is the plaintiff’s only way to domesticate his judgment, which he is complying with through this action.
Nevertheless, at summary judgment, the burden is on the plaintiff to make "out a prima facie case that the [foreign] court properly had exercised personal jurisdiction." Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 367, 2 A.3d 902 (2010). "Although the burden of setting aside [a foreign default] judgment rests upon the party against whom it is sought to be enforced ... where the personal jurisdiction issue is resolved on summary judgment, it is the moving party’s burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and an entitlement to prevail as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 370. Thus, the issue is whether the Illinois court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
I.
"To determine whether a foreign court lacked jurisdiction, we look to the law of the foreign state." Business Alliance Capital Corp. v. Fuselier, supra, 88 Conn.App. 737. "In determining whether an Illinois court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, Illinois courts employ a two-prong analysis to evaluate whether the facts of the case meet the requirements for (1) personal jurisdiction under the Illinois long-arm statute (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2006) ) and (2) due process under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions." Hanson v. Ahmed, 382 Ill.App.3d 941, 943, 321 Ill.Dec. 475, 889 N.E.2d 740 (2008).
The Illinois long-arm statute provides in relevant part: "A court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States." 735 Ill.Comp.Stat. Ann. 5/2-209(c) (West 2016). In interpreting this statute, Illinois courts state "[courts] need examine only due process considerations under the federal and state constitutions." Aasonn, LLC v. Delaney, 2011 IL App. (2d) 101125, ¶ 12, 356 Ill.Dec. 550, 961 N.E.2d 939 (2011). Further, although Illinois courts have observed that the Illinois constitution might provide greater due process protections than the federal Constitution, no Illinois court has come to such a holding. See, e.g., Russell v. SNFA, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 33, 370 Ill.Dec. 12, 987 N.E.2d 778 (2013). Thus, when the federal constitution concludes that a defendant has sufficient contacts with Illinois to warrant judicial actions against it, the Illinois long-arm statute and the Illinois Constitution are also satisfied.
"In all cases involving a nonresident defendant, before a court may subject the defendant to a judgment in personam, due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum State such that maintenance of the suit there does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. SNFA, supra, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 34, 370 Ill.Dec. 12, 987 N.E.2d 778. "Two types of personal jurisdiction are subject to the due process analysis: specific and general. Specific jurisdiction is case-specific. That is, specific jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state." Aspen American Ins. Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 2017 IL 121281, ¶ 14, 418 Ill.Dec. 282, 90 N.E.3d 440 (2017). Here, no party disputes the defendant is subject to specific jurisdiction for its alleged contacts with Illinois.
"Specific jurisdiction requires a showing that the defendant purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the cause of action arose out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state." Russell v. SNFA, supra, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 40, 370 Ill.Dec. 12, 987 N.E.2d 778. In other words, specific jurisdiction "requires (1) the corporate, nonresident defendant [to] have minimum contacts with Illinois in that (a) it purposefully directed its activities at this state and (b) plaintiffs’ claims arose from or related to those contacts with. Illinois ... and (2) it must be reasonable for Illinois to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant." (Citation omitted.) Young v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 IL App. (4th) 170177, ¶ 29, 418 Ill.Dec. 489, 90 N.E.3d 647 (2017), appeal denied, 420 Ill.Dec. 43, 95 N.E.3d 506 (Ill. 2018).
In the present case, the Illinois court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The parties negotiated the plaintiff’s employment between Illinois and Connecticut and the plaintiff’s resume listed his previous employers as businesses located in Illinois. Further, the offer of employment letter from the defendant, dated March 16, 2015, states the plaintiff would "be based in our Mid-West office," "collect end user/customer requirements," and would receive additional compensation "for helping open up and drive revenue for Eastern ... [in the] Chicago area." Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant purposefully directed its activities of increasing business, promoting its services, and generating revenue through the plaintiff at Illinois. Further, the plaintiffs’ claims are related to the defendant’s contacts in Illinois. The plaintiff claims reimbursement for his expenses in performing work for the defendant in furtherance of the defendant’s interest in Illinois. Therefore, the defendant had sufficient contacts with Illinois and an injury arising from those contacts that an Illinois court had personal jurisdiction over it. See Aasonn, LLC v. Delaney, supra, 2011 IL App. (2d) 101125, ¶ 24, 356 Ill.Dec. 550, 961 N.E.2d 939 (Illinois court had specific personal jurisdiction over foreign corporation when it continued working with Illinois resident, contract entered into in Illinois, and contract performance substantially performed in Illinois).
Litigating in Illinois would be reasonable and not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Innovative Garage Door Co. v. High Ranking Domains, LLC, 2012 IL App. (2d) 120117, ¶ 34, 367 Ill.Dec. 163, 981 N.E.2d 488 (2012). "A defendant who purposefully directed his activities at a forum must present a compelling case to defeat jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In determining whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in Illinois, "the Supreme Court has outlined five factors to consider: (1) the burden on the defendant of defending the action in the forum state, (2) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the action, and (5) the shared interests of the several states in advancing fundamental social policies." Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP v. East Chicago, 401 Ill.App.3d 947, 955, 343 Ill.Dec. 23, 934 N.E.2d 23 (2010). Here, (1) the burden on the defendant to litigate in Illinois was not so heavy when it purposefully directed its activities at Illinois; (2) Illinois had an interest in providing the justice to the plaintiff, an Illinois citizen; (3) the plaintiff is a citizen of Illinois and worked there while employed by the defendant and had a significant interest in obtaining relief; (4) there was nothing to show that Illinois resolving this dispute would be inefficient; and (5) Illinois and Connecticut have shared interests in ensuring a fair trial for the defendant and compensation to the plaintiff, thus making this factor moot. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Illinois. Accordingly, the Illinois court had specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
II
Having personal jurisdiction does not end the analysis. For a foreign judgment to be validly recognized, there must also be sufficient process in the foreign action to put the defendant on notice of the cause of action against it in the foreign jurisdiction. See Tri-State Tank Corp. v. Higganum Heating, Inc., supra, 45 Conn.App. 800.
The Illinois service of process statute provides in relevant part: "A private corporation may be served (1) by leaving a copy of the process with its registered agent or any officer or agent of the corporation found anywhere in the State; or (2) in any other manner now or hereafter permitted by law." 735 Ill.Comp.Stat. Ann. 5/2-204 (West 2014). Another statute further provides in relevant part: "(a) Personal service of summons may be made upon any party outside the State. If upon a citizen or resident of this State or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, it shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons within this State ... (b) The service of summons shall be made in like manner as service within this State, by any person over 18 years of age not a party to the action. No order of court is required. An affidavit of the server shall be filed stating the time, manner and place of service. The court may consider the affidavit, or any other competent proofs, in determining whether service has been properly made. (c) No default shall be entered until the expiration of at least 30 days after service." 735 Ill.Comp.Stat. Ann. 5/2-208 (West 2016). Strict compliance with section 5/2-208 is required to obtain personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state party. In re Marriage of Lewis, 213 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1045, 157 Ill.Dec. 782, 572 N.E.2d 1246 (1991).
In the present case, the plaintiff concedes that Anne Monaghan, the individual who accepted service of process in the Illinois action on behalf of the defendant, was not a registered agent for service. Accordingly, she must qualify as the defendant’s agent within the meaning of section 5/2-208.
"For service of process on a corporation to be effectively made upon an agent of defendant, such agent must have actual authority to accept service on behalf of the corporation." Dei v. Tumara Food Mart, Inc., 406 Ill.App.3d 856, 862, 347 Ill.Dec. 51, 941 N.E.2d 920 (2010). Thus, "[s]ervice on a secretary or receptionist who [understands] the purport of the service of summons may be service on the corporation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Island Terrace Apartments v. Keystone Service Co., 35 Ill.App.3d 95, 99, 341 N.E.2d 41 (1975).
Accordingly, in the present case, the affidavit of service states that the marshal asked Monaghan if she was authorized to accept service on behalf of the defendant, and she responded in the affirmative. Further, the summons listed the defendant’s name and address. Thus, Monaghan acted as a responsible agent for the defendant. See Cleeland v. Gilbert, 334 Ill.App.3d 297, 301, 266 Ill.Dec. 382, 774 N.E.2d 821 (2002), as modified on denial of reh’g (September 11, 2002) (proper service on corporation because summons clearly identified corporation as defendant and person who received service was responsible agent of corporation). Further, the defendant has not provided evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Monaghan’s authority to accept service. See Professional Therapy Services, Inc. v. Signature Corp., 223 Ill.App.3d 902, 911, 166 Ill.Dec. 269, 585 N.E.2d 1291 (1992) (service proper on agent of corporation because defendant did not overcome burden showing otherwise). Therefore, the defendant was properly served under Illinois law.
Lastly, the default judgment was validly entered. Section 5/2-209(c) does not allow a default until at least thirty days after service on the defendant. According to the affidavit of service, the defendant was served on October 3, 2016. The default judgment was not entered until January 10, 2017, which is more than thirty days after the date of service. It was also signed by Judge McGrath. Thus, the plaintiff complied with section 5/2-209(c).
Accordingly, the Illinois judgment is valid and binding on Connecticut courts. The defendant has not met its high burden of showing a void judgment. Thus, the judgment is domesticated and enforceable in Connecticut.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, having met its burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact that the Illinois judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on count one of his amended complaint is granted.