Opinion
CV 15-01236-PHX-GMS (MHB)
01-19-2022
Jonathan Andrew Arias, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents.
TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Michelle H. Burns United States Magistrate Judge
Pending upon referral before this Court (Doc. 64), is Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 61.) Respondents have filed a Response. (Doc. 62.) Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Doc. 63.)
“This Court” will refer to the referral Court, and “the Court” will refer to the presiding District Court.
Petitioner filed his habeas petition on July 2, 2015, raising two claims: (1) his sentence to natural life for offenses committed when Petitioner was a juvenile violated the United States Constitution as set forth in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and (2) he was not sentenced in accordance with the provisions of his plea agreement. (Doc. 1 at 6-7.) The proceedings were initially stayed by the Court in order to await the result of Petitioner's state court proceeding and a decision in the U.S. Supreme Court case Montgomery v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). (Doc. 16.) After Montgomery was decided, the parties briefed the issues raised in Petitioner's habeas petition, and on August 26, 2016, this Court filed a Report and Recommendation recommending the granting of Petitioner's Miller claim and an order that he be released from custody unless the state re-sentenced him in a manner compliant with Miller (Doc. 40). The parties filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Docs. 42, 45.)
The Supreme Court, in Miller, recognized for the first time that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole, without consideration of certain factors relating to youth, is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Meanwhile, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking review of the Arizona Court of Appeals' denial of his Miller claim. On October 31, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the Arizona Court of Appeals' ruling, and remanded the case to the Arizona Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Montgomery. (Doc. 46-2.) On remand, the state waived its right to file supplemental briefing and entered into a stipulation that Petitioner should be re-sentenced in light of the decision in Montgomery and the order of remand by the U.S. Supreme Court. (Doc. 57-2.) In light of this stipulation and the Arizona Court of Appeals' acceptance of the stipulation, Petitioner conceded that his habeas petition was moot and voluntarily withdrew it before the Court ruled on the pending Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 57.) The Court granted the motion on March 2, 2018. (Doc. 58.)
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021). Relying on that decision, the state requested that the trial court - where Petitioner's re-sentencing was pending - relieve it of the stipulation entered into in the Arizona Court of Appeals, and vacate the re-sentencing that was ordered as a result. (Doc. 60-5.) On November 10, 2021, the trial court granted the state's request, vacated the re-sentencing, and dismissed Petitioner's post-conviction proceedings. (Doc. 60-8.)
On November 17, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner states that the Rule gives the court discretion to “relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for various reasons, including fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party, or any other reason that justifies relief.” Payton v. Davis, 906 F.3d 812, 818 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Petitioner argues that the state's actions in first stipulating to re-sentencing, which led to Petitioner dismissing his habeas proceeding, and then reneging on the agreement to a re-sentencing constitutes the kind of misconduct that justifies reopening his habeas proceeding.
Respondents in their Response, assert that Petitioner's motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), based upon fraud or misconduct, carries with it a one-year jurisdictional time limit from the date of judgment. See, Rule 60(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. As the date of judgment in this matter was March 2, 2018, (doc. 59), Respondents assert that Petitioner's motion is untimely. Respondents, however, take no position on whether or not the Court should choose to exercise its discretion and consider whether Petitioner is entitled to relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6), “should [Petitioner] choose to raise such a claim for the first time in his reply.” In support, Respondents cite: Glenn K. Jackson, Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the “district court had discretion to consider [a new] issue even if it was raised in a reply brief); see e.g., S.E.C. v. Worthen, 98 F.3d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a district court may relieve a party of a judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application”); Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Rule 60(b)(6) is a grand reservoir of equitable power, and it affords courts the discretion and power to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner in his Reply disputes that relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is time-barred, asserting that the one-year time limit applied to Rule 60(b)(3) is a non-jurisdictional claim processing rule that may be waived in certain circumstances, citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210-12 (2007) (it was improper for courts to use the term “jurisdictional” to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56 (2004); Penny v. United States, 870 F.3d 459, 462 (6th Cir. 2017). Even if time-barred, Petitioner agrees that the Court may alternatively grant relief, as Respondents suggest, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), under its “grand reservoir of equitable power, ” citing Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1135.
Given that Respondents do not object to the motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) or (6), and given the circumstances and procedural posture of this case, this Court will recommend that Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 61) be GRANTED
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order that Respondents may file a motion for reconsideration of this Court's Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 40), based solely upon the issue of whether the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021) would effect the conclusions reached by this Court, and that the Court refer the motion to this Court for consideration of whether to issue an amended Report and Recommendation.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.
Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.