Opinion
Case No. 19-cv-01328-EMC
02-10-2020
JAIME ARIAS-MALDONADO, Plaintiff, v. SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH FURTHER LEAVE TO AMEND
Docket No. 17-1
Jaime Arias-Maldonado, formerly an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, commenced this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing a "motion to safeguard civil rights of pretrial detainee," Docket No. 1, and other miscellaneous documents.
The Court conducted an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed the pleading with leave to amend. Docket No. 16. The Court explained that Mr. Arias-Maldonado's several filings were difficult to understand but focused on criminal charges pending against Mr. Arias-Maldonado and appeared to seek federal court authorization to represent himself in state court criminal proceedings and for pro per privileges at the jail. Id. at 2-3. The Court determined that the Younger abstention doctrine required the dismissal of Mr. Arias-Maldonado's claims seeking interference in the state court criminal proceedings against him. Id. at 4-5 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). The Court permitted Mr. Arias-Maldonado to file an amended complaint to attempt to allege a claim for a denial of the constitutional right of access to the courts. Id. at 5.
Mr. Arias-Maldonado filed an amended complaint that again pertains mostly to his efforts to obtain pro per status and his representation in his state court criminal cases. Although those general subject matters can be understood from the amended complaint, the allegations are too confused for this Court to determine that a claim is stated against any defendant for a violation of Mr. Arias-Maldonado's federal constitutional rights. Leave to amend will be granted so that Mr. Arias-Maldonado may file a second amended complaint to attempt to allege his claims in a more coherent manner.
As the Court explained in the order of dismissal with leave to amend:
Inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The Ninth Circuit has "traditionally differentiated between two types of access to court claims: those involving prisoners' right[s] to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners' rights to litigate without active interference." Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir.2011) (emphasis in source), overruled on other grounds as stated by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015).Docket No. 16 at 5-6.
To allege a claim for denial of access to the courts of the first sort (i.e., denial of affirmative assistance), a plaintiff must allege facts showing that there was an inadequacy in the prison's legal access program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 350-51. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the inadequacy hindered him in presenting a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. See id. at 355. Examples of impermissible hindrances include: a prisoner whose complaint was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement of which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known; and a prisoner who had "suffered arguably actionable harm" that he wished to bring to the attention of the court, but was so stymied by the inadequacies of the prison's services that he was unable even to file a complaint. See id. at 351.
To allege a claim for a violation of the right to litigate without active interference, the plaintiff must identify the interference and allege that he has suffered an actual injury, such as the dismissal of his pending action. See Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103-04. Additionally, the "underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation." Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The underlying cause of action must be described by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant, id. at 416, and to the court in a prisoner action that must be screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
A § 1983 claim for a denial of, or interference with, the right to self-representation recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), may exist. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 1989). In Taylor, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Faretta right included a "right of access to law books, witnesses, and other tools necessary to prepare a defense," id., but the Supreme Court later cast doubt on the existence of a claim of interference with one's self-representation right when it held that "Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant," and does not clearly establish a right of access to a law library, Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005). Assuming arguendo that a § 1983 claim may exist based on an interference with a criminal defendant's Faretta right, a plaintiff must allege how he was harmed by any interference with the Faretta right. See generally Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1049; see, e.g., id. (only damages would be available for the denial of the right to meaningful self-representation if claim was proven because the harm resulting from the asserted denial of the right to meaningful self-representation "has been substantially remedied" by the reversal of the conviction).
For both a denial-of-access-to-the-courts and any Faretta claim, a plaintiff must allege the particular ways in which the defendants interfered with the right and how the plaintiff was harmed. Mr. Arias-Maldonado's amended complaint does not contain that information. Part of the problem is that Mr. Arias-Maldonado heavily emphasizes the failure to follow local jail rules and state court protocols for pro per litigants. But the failure to follow jail and state court rules are largely irrelevant to the federal constitutional analysis, as the federal right does not depend on what the state court requires or the county jail provides for a pro per litigant. For example, Mr. Maldonado mentions some sort of requirement for a 28-day period prior to termination of pro per status and a right to a hearing upon request regarding that termination, see Docket No. 17-1 at 9, but those are not federal constitutional requirements. In his second amended complaint, Mr. Arias-Maldonado must specifically describe what each defendant did to violate his federal constitutional rights and the resulting harm.
The status of his criminal cases also may present obstacles to a § 1983 action.
Mr. Arias-Maldonado reports that he was found not guilty in one of his cases, see Docket No. 18, so it is not clear what the actual harm would have been with respect to that criminal case.
He does not allege the status of his other criminal case, but must do so in his second amended complaint. If that case is still pending or resulted in a conviction that has not been overturned, Mr. Arias-Maldonado's claims might be precluded by the Heck rule. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action for damages for a wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that conviction or sentence or other decision already has been determined to be wrongful. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). A conviction or sentence may be determined to be wrongful by, for example, being reversed on appeal or being set aside when a state or federal court issues a writ of habeas corpus. See id. The Heck rule also prevents a person from bringing an action that--even if it does not directly challenge the conviction or other decision--would imply that the conviction or other decision was invalid. The practical importance of the Heck rule is that plaintiffs cannot attack their convictions or sentences in a civil rights action for damages and instead must have successfully attacked the decision before filing the civil rights action for damages. The Heck rule requires dismissal of a case where the conviction has occurred. When the action is brought by a pretrial detainee and the criminal proceedings are still pending, the action will be stayed rather than dismissed if it would, if successful, "impugn an anticipated future conviction." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007).
The amended complaint also has numerous conclusory and confusing allegations that further impede the Court's ability to determine that a claim is stated. For example, Mr. Arias-Maldonado alleges that a San Jose police officer and detective "nearly unchallenged, impartially testified and knowingly withheld material evidence to Arias-Maldonado' prejudice." Docket No. 17-1 at 23. The allegation that the police "withheld material evidence" is a conclusory allegation that alone is insufficient; Mr. Arias-Maldonado needs to allege facts to explain what that evidence consisted of so that it can be determined whether it was actually material. The quoted allegation appears to be self-contradictory as it alleges the police testified impartially and did something wrong (i.e., withheld material evidence). Mr. Arias-Maldonado must strive in his next pleading to be much clearer in meaning.
Leave to amend is granted so that Mr. Arias-Maldonado may file a second amended complaint to attempt to allege facts, if he has them, that plausibly show that defendants violated his right of access to the courts and his Faretta right. For each claim of denial of access to the courts or interference with the Faretta right to self-representation, he must allege enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. If he contends that there have been several violations of his federal constitutional rights, Mr. Arias-Maldonado must allege each one separately. Mr. Arias-Maldonado also must link one or more defendants to any access to the courts claim, as explained in the order of dismissal with leave to amend. See Docket No. 16 at 6-7.
For the foregoing reasons, the amended complaint is dismissed because it does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Further leave to amend is granted so that Mr. Arias-Maldonado may file a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint must be filed no later than March 13, 2020, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order. Failure to file the second amended complaint by the deadline will result in the dismissal of the action.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: February 10, 2020
/s/_________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge