Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-CV-00812
10-11-2022
VILAS ARGUETA, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.
MARIANI, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On May 23, 2022, this civil rights action was initiated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, by the filing of a complaint in the related action, Bran v. United States, on behalf a purported class of prisoners. (Doc. 1). The complaint named Defendants the United States, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, J. Meyers, the National Gang Unit Agency, and S.I.S. (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). On June 8, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Vilas Argueta (“Argueta”) elected to proceed with this civil rights action by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a Prisoner Trust Fund Account statement. (Doc. 4; Doc. 5). For the reasons provided herein, it is respectfully recommended that Argueta's complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice. (Doc. 1).
I. Background and Procedural History
On June 8, 2022, Argueta, proceeding pro se, elected to proceed with this action, which was initiated by the filing of the complaint in the related action Bran v. United States, No. 3:22-CV-00755, by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Prisoner Trust Fund Account statement, and motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. 1; Doc. 4; Doc. 5; Doc. 6). Upon review of Argueta's Prisoner Trust Fund Account statement, which revealed a balance of $1,646.93, the Court denied the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on July 12, 2022. (Doc. 5; Doc. 7). The Court instructed Argueta to submit payment of the applicable filing and administrative fees in the total amount of $402.00, on or before Wednesday, August 10, 2022, and warned Argueta that failure to timely submit full payment of the applicable filing fees will result in a recommendation that this case be dismissed. (Doc. 7, at 1). Having received no payment or response, the Court issued an Order directing Argueta to show cause as to why his case should not be dismissed for failing to pay the required filing fee of $402.00. (Doc. 9). In addition, the Court ordered Argueta to show cause as to why the Court should not recommend dismissal of this matter for failure to prosecute. (Doc. 9, at 1). As of the date of this recommendation, Argueta has failed to pay the filing fee or to respond to the Order to show cause.
II. Discussion
By failing to pay the required filing fee or respond to the Court's Orders, it appears that Argueta has abandoned this action. Argueta's failure to comply with the Court's Orders “makes adjudication of the case impossible.” See Azubuko v. Bell Nat'l Org., 243 Fed.Appx. 728, 729 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 Fed.Appx. 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding the dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for failure to amend his complaint); Figueroa v. U.S., No. 1:13-cv-230, 2013 WL 4813369, at *2, *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013) (dismissing a pro se plaintiff's complaint for failure to maintain an address with the court). Thus, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that an action may be involuntarily dismissed “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Further, the rule permits sua sponte dismissals by the court. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1988) (same). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an inherent power, governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31; see also Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1992). Specifically, a plaintiff's failure to comply with a court order constitutes a failure to prosecute his action, and therefore his action is subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). A court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is committed to the court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). In evaluating whether an action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, a court must balance six factors”
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party ... was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Poulis factors are not “a magic formula whereby the decision to dismiss or not to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint becomes a mechanical calculation ....” Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373. No one factor is determinative and not all of the Poulis factors must be met to warrant dismissal. Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373; Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). Instead, the decision must be made in the context of the court's extended contact with the litigant. Dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriately labeled a “drastic sanction,” however, because it is “deemed to be an adjudication on the merits, barring any further action between the parties.” Sebrell ex rel. Sebrell v. Phila. Police Dep't, 159 Fed.Appx. 371, 373 (3d Cir. 2005) (not precedential) (citing Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1992); Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). In light of this framework, the Court finds that a careful assessment of the Poulis factors in the case at bar weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action.
B. Poulis Factor Analysis
1. Plaintiff's Personal Responsibility
Looking to the Poulis factors, the Court finds that a consideration of the first factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, shows that the delays in this case are entirely attributable to Argueta. Because Argueta is a pro se litigant, he is solely responsible for prosecuting his claim. See Hoxworth v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1992). “As a general rule, a pro se litigant is responsible for his failure to comply with court orders.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential); see also Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191; Winston v. Lindsey, Civ. No. 09-224, 2011 WL 6000991, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011) (concluding that a pro se litigant “bears all of the responsibility for any failure to prosecute his claims”). Argueta has failed to abide by Court Orders and neglected to litigate this case. specifically, Argueta failed to pay the required filing fee of $402.00 despite being directed to do so by the Court. (Doc. 7, at 1; Doc. 9, at 1). Additionally, Argueta was specifically warned that his failure to pay the filing fee or respond to the Orders may result in the dismissal of this action. (Doc. 7, at 1; Doc. 9, at 1). As of the date of this Memorandum, Argueta has failed to comply with either directive. Accordingly, the first Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
2. Prejudice to the Moving Party
As for the second Poulis factor, a finding of prejudice does not require “irremediable harm.” Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994). Rather, “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to [effectively prepare] a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, the Court finds that Argueta's failure to respond to the Court's Orders has frustrated and delayed resolution of this action. Going forward, such failure to litigate would prejudice Defendants, who without timely responses by Argueta could not seek a timely resolution of the case. Accordingly, the Court finds that the second Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
3. History of Dilatoriness
“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874; see also Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (per curium) (finding a history of dilatory conduct where the plaintiff repeatedly requested stays and failed to comply with court-mandated deadlines). Conversely, “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a history of dilatoriness.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). In deciding whether a history of dilatory conduct exists, this Court must evaluate “a party's problematic acts . . . in light of its behavior over the life of the case.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Here, Argueta has not only failed to respond to the Court's Orders, but the time to do so has passed and he has never paid the required filing fee. (Doc. 7, at 1; Doc. 9, at 1). Argueta has not communicated with the Court since he filed the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Prisoner Trust Fund Account statement, and motion to appoint counsel on June 8, 2022. (Doc. 4; Doc. 5; Doc. 6). Accordingly, Argueta's actions demonstrate a history of dilatoriness that weighs in favor of dismissal.
4. Willful Conduct or Bad Faith
The fourth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider whether Argueta's conduct reflects mere inadvertence or negligence, as opposed to “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875-76. “Under this factor, the District Court must consider whether the conduct was the type of willful or contumacious behavior which [can be] characterized as flagrant bad faith.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262 (quotation omitted). Here, Argueta's failure to abide by multiple Orders by the Court and failure to pay the filing fee “demonstrate[s] a willful disregard for procedural rules and court directives.” Gilyard v. Dauphin Cty. Work Release, No. 10-1657, 2010 WL 5060236, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2010). Thus, the fourth Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
5. Availability of Alternative Sanctions
The fifth Poulis factor examines the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. 747 F.2d at 868. Generally, “sanctions less than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant, such as [Shehadeh], is proceeding pro se.” See Lopez, 435 F. App' x at 116; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (per curium); Nowland v. Lucas, No. 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012) (“This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion.”). Here, Argueta is proceeding pro se, and given Argueta's refusal or inability to pay the filing fee, there is no evidence to suggest that paying monetary sanctions will remedy Argueta's deficiencies. Therefore, monetary sanctions would not be effective in this case. Moreover, Argueta's failure to respond to Court Orders leads to an inference that further orders to him would not be effective. Accordingly, the fifth Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
6. Meritoriousness of Plaintiff's Claims
The final Poulis factor enjoins the Court to consider the meritoriousness of Argueta's claims. 747 F.2d at 868. A claim is deemed meritorious when “the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff ....” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. “Generally, in determining whether a plaintiff's claim is meritorious, [courts] use the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70). Here, assuming for the sake of argument that Argueta's claims have merit, consideration of this factor cannot save his case because he is now wholly noncompliant with his obligations as a litigation. See Silbermonn v. Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr., No. 1:20-CV-00393, 2021 WL 1705228, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1700351 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2021) (dismissing complaint for failure to prosecute where plaintiff failed to pay the required filing fee or respond to the Court's order to show case).
7. Balancing the Poulis factors
To reiterate, when weighing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” that automatically warrants dismissal for failure to prosecute. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. Quite the contrary, the Court is guided by the Third Circuit's warning that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373.
Here, on balance, the Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal of this action for lack of prosecution. As it is apparent to the Court that Argueta has made no effort to prosecute his case as evidenced by his failure to pay the required filing fee or otherwise respond to the Court's Orders, it is recommended that Argueta's complaint be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Silbermonn, 2021 WL 1705228, at *3.
III. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Argueta's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED for failure to prosecute and that the Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated October 11, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.