No. 13-06-184-CR
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed October 4, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
On appeal from the 138th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices RODRIGUEZ and GARZA.
Memorandum Opinion by NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ, Justice.
Appellant, Danny Arguelles, by one point of error, contends the trial court erred in revoking his community supervision when, immediately following the revocation hearing, defense counsel questioned appellant's competency. We affirm. I. Background Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 2003). The trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment, but suspended the imposition of appellant's sentence and placed him on community supervision for eight years. As part of his plea agreement, the trial court ordered appellant to a term of confinement and treatment in a substance abuse felony punishment facility (SAFPF). The State filed a motion to revoke appellant's community supervision. At the revocation hearing, appellant testified that he received a Social Security monthly payment of $552. Appellant testified he received this benefit because a doctor stated "it [the reason for receiving Social Security benefits] was mental" and because he cannot read. This benefit ended when appellant began his detention and treatment at SAFPF. Appellant further testified that while at SAFPF a doctor prescribed Prozac for his depression due to his mother's death. He testified that in 2003, because of his depression, he began seeing psychologists and psychiatrists. Appellant also testified that he did not suffer from hallucinations, such as seeing things not there or hearing voices. Appellant testified that he understood that the State had requested revocation of his probation. He stated that he understood some of the events occurring at the hearing, but that he was "not really sure what [was] going on." Finally, appellant testified that the school district he attended in Florida placed him in special education classes until he dropped out in the ninth grade. Having heard appellant's testimony and the State's evidence regarding the alleged violations, the trial court revoked appellant's community supervision. When the revocation hearing concluded, the trial court asked for an update on appellant's upcoming trial on a separate matter. The following exchange then occurred:
The Court: One second. So, bottom line, are we announcing ready and we need to pick a jury?
Defense Counsel: The problem I am having right now — and just out of an abundance of caution — I would like to ask for a couple of weeks. I am going to try to prolong this trial as long as I have to. I was ready to try it this week. I will probably have to go to the Social Security to make sure that he is not borderline incompetent, because I know — as an officer of this Court I will advise the Court that I have spoken to the defendant's wife for half an hour last Thursday. I spoke to the defendant on four or five occasions. I spoke to the defendant's father twice and I was never made aware that he had any alleged mental defect or at least any indication that he qualified for Social Security benefits. Because, knowing Social Security, they deny most claims. So there has to be something of substance for Social Security to have allowed a claim, and I was totally unaware that he was receiving SSI benefits for his mental disorder.
The Court: What says the State? Obviously, he was sentenced to ten years TDC this morning, so he is not going anywhere.
. . . .
The Court: All right. We are back on the record. It is my understanding that the defense at this time is requesting a brief continuance of two weeks.
Defense Counsel: I am asking for two weeks, Your Honor, again, just to ascertain the issue of the defendants. Not — I don't think it's an issue. But, just to retrieve some information from Social Security and verify some of the information that Mr. Arguelles may have given at his hearing. And once I do that, then I will be in a position to proceed forward on it.
State Counsel: Your Honor, the State is under the understanding — although, we are certainly sympathetic to any competency issue, we are saying he is very competent. He appears to be competent from the limited interaction I've had with him. However, every competency issue, I think should be investigated. So, for that reason we are not opposed.
Appellant concedes the State's evidence proved that appellant violated a term of his probation. See Davila v. State, 794 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no pet.) ("The general rule is that if one violation of probation conditions is supported by evidence, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support the other violations.") (citing Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980)).
The trial court is referring to appellant's upcoming trial.
Defense counsel is referring to appellant and a co-defendant in the upcoming trial.
II. Incompetency
Appellant now contends the trial court erred in revoking his community supervision because, during this exchange, the trial court learned that appellant "may not have been competent at the time." We construe appellant's complaint as challenging the trial court's decision to not "suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial" and to not conduct a competency inquiry. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b)-(c) (Vernon 2006); see McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (finding a bona fide doubt was not raised in the trial court's mind during a revocation hearing, thus, the trial court was not required to conduct a competency inquiry). A. Standard of Review
We review a decision whether to conduct a competency inquiry under an abuse of discretion standard. See Garcia v. State, 595 S.W.2d 538, 541-42 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Salahud-Din v. State, 206 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref'd). A trial court is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion if the decision was "arbitrary or unreasonable" without regard to "guiding rules and principles." Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)). B. Law
It is a violation of due process to convict a person while he is incompetent to stand trial. McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 709. "A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (1)-(2) (Vernon 2006). When evidence suggests the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court conducts an informal competency inquiry to determine whether some evidence would support the defendant's incompetency to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(c); McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 710-11 (explaining the requirements of each step in a claim of incompetence); Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (en banc); Salahud-din v. State, 206 S.W.3d at 208. "Evidence sufficient to prompt a competency hearing or inquiry must raise a `bona fide doubt' in the mind of the trial judge to the defendant's competency to stand trial." Salahud-din, 206 S.W.3d at 208. If a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency is raised in the court's mind, it is required to hold an informal competency inquiry. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b); Alcott, 51 S.W.3d at 601; Salahud-din, 206 S.W.3d at 207-208. A bona fide doubt is raised if the evidence indicates recent severe mental illness, at least moderate mental retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant. Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (en banc) ; Salahud-din, 206 S.W.3d at 208. The question, then, before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it did not conduct a competency inquiry. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b); Alcott, 51 S.W.3d at 601. III. Analysis
Here, neither the trial court, the State, nor defense counsel raised the issue of appellant's incompetency during the revocation hearing. Appellant contends a bona fide doubt as to his competence was raised after the revocation hearing when defense counsel stated he needed two weeks to investigate whether his client was "borderline incompetent." Defense counsel's concern was expressed only after the revocation hearing was concluded and only in regard to an upcoming trial. Nonetheless, even had the concern been expressed during the revocation hearing, a statement that the defendant may be incompetent is not sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt that would require a competency inquiry. See McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 711 (noting defendant's "naked assertion, `I am incompetent,'" is insufficient to warrant a competency inquiry or competency hearing without supporting evidence or facts). Therefore, defense counsel's comment, without specific supporting evidence that raised a bona fide doubt in the trial court's mind regarding appellant's competency, i.e., a present ability to consult with counsel or a rational understanding of the proceeding against him, would not require the trial court to "suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial" and to conduct a competency inquiry. Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006); McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 711; Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 394 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (finding evidence of incompetency must be "specific and illustrative of a present inability to communicate with the defendant."); see, e.g., Mata v. State, 632 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) ("The evidence must cause the court a bona fide doubt that the defendant has a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or that he lacks an understanding of the proceedings against him"). Moreover, appellant's testimony that he (1) received Social Security benefits, (2) was placed in special education classes, (3) suffered from depression, (4) took prescription medication, and (5) was unable to read did not raise a bona fide doubt that he was competent. These facts are not based on recent severe mental illness, at least moderate mental retardation, or truly bizarre acts. See Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 625. Also, appellant's testimony is not sufficient to create a bona fide doubt that appellant lacked the present ability to communicate with counsel or the ability to understand the legal proceedings. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (1)-(2); Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 393 ("A competency hearing is not required unless the evidence is sufficient to create a bona fide doubt in the mind of the judge whether the defendant meets the test of legal competence."). In this case, although appellant testified he was "not really sure what [was] going on," he testified lucidly on his own behalf, and he understood questions directed to him from defense counsel and the State. Appellant was also able to carry on a dialogue without explanation. During his testimony, appellant was coherent and alert. He testified that he did not suffer from hallucinations. Defense counsel also acknowledged he had spoken to appellant's family members and to the appellant on several occasions, and he was not aware that appellant had "any alleged mental defect." This contradicts appellant's incompetency claim because it shows that he had the present ability to communicate with his counsel and he understood the legal proceedings against him. Because the trial court followed guiding principles and did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion by not suggesting a competency inquiry. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b), (c). We overrule appellant's sole point of error. IV. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.