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Arendt v. Price

Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
Feb 12, 2015
2015 Ohio 528 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)

Opinion

No. 101710

02-12-2015

SUE ARENDT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT v. ANGELIQUE PRICE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Bradley Hull 30195 Chagrin Boulevard Suite 110-N Pepper Pike, Ohio 44124 FOR APPELLEE Angelique Price, pro se 1483 Atcheson Street Columbus, Ohio 43203


JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-13-817921
BEFORE: Boyle, J., Celebrezze, A.J., and Jones, J.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Bradley Hull
30195 Chagrin Boulevard
Suite 110-N
Pepper Pike, Ohio 44124

FOR APPELLEE

Angelique Price, pro se
1483 Atcheson Street
Columbus, Ohio 43203
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Sue Arendt ("lessor"), appeals from the trial court's award of damages in connection with its partial granting of Arendt's motion for default judgment against defendant-appellee, Angelique Price ("lessee"). Arendt raises several arguments as to why she is entitled to more damages under lease agreements between herself and Price. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.

Procedural History and Facts

{¶2} In November 2013, Arendt filed the underlying action against Price, alleging that Price entered into a written lease agreement with Arendt on October 12, 2012, and that under the terms of the lease, Price "was liable for the payment of rent in a monthly amount of $1,022.32." Arendt further alleged that Price breached the lease agreement by failing to pay the monthly rent amount and by causing "significant damage to the premises" located at 223 Oxford Oak Drive in Blacklick, Ohio. In the complaint, Arendt sought actual damages in the amount of $23,365.49, incidental damages, consequential damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and court costs. Arendt attached a copy of the lease agreement to the complaint, which identified the start date of the lease as October 12, 2012.

{¶3} On March 18, 2014, Arendt moved for default judgment after Price failed to answer or otherwise defend the complaint served upon her. In her motion, Arendt sought money damages in the amount of $30,276.50, plus incidental damages, consequential damages, damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages, interest, attorney fees, and court costs.

{¶4} The trial court set the matter for a default hearing on March 25, 2014. On that day, the trial court continued the default hearing until April 23, 2014, ordering Arendt to provide Price notice of the new hearing and time.

{¶5} Three days later, Price, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The trial court struck the motion as being untimely, out of rule, and without permission of the court. The trial court further noted that Price failed to serve a copy of her motion on Arendt as required under Civ.R. 5.

{¶6} The trial court held the default hearing on April 23, 2014. According to the record, Price failed to appear for the hearing but Arendt, her counsel, and her property manager appeared and met with the court. The court heard testimony and considered exhibits offered by Arendt. Following the hearing, the court issued a detailed memorandum of opinion and order, setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court granted Arendt's motion for default judgment in part, entering final judgment for Arendt and against Price in the amount of $7,263.74, plus statutory interest on the outstanding principal balance from the date of judgment, and costs.

{¶7} From this decision, Arendt appeals, raising the following five assignments of error:

I. The trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff-appellant was precluded from seeking lease damages incurred prior to October 12, 2012, when the complaint put defendant-appellee Angelique Price on notice that she was in default of rental obligations prior to October 12, 2012.



II. The trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff-appellant was precluded from seeking property damages based upon estimates for work to be performed.



III. The trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff-appellant was precluded from pursuing lease agreement damages when the subject lease agreement put defendant-appellee on notice that any default by her in performance of the terms of said lease could cause substantial damage to plaintiff-appellant.



IV. The trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff-appellant was precluded from pursuing various miscellaneous damages.



V. The trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff-appellant was precluded from pursuing punitive damages.

Standard of Review

{¶8} We review a trial court's decision to grant a motion for default judgment under an abuse of discretion. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Courey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92798, 2010-Ohio-246, ¶ 22. "But unlike the initial decision to grant a default judgment, 'the determination of the kind and maximum amount of damages that may be awarded is not committed to the discretion of the trial court, but is subject to the mandates of Civ.R. 55(C) and Civ.R. 54(C).'" Dye v. Smith, 189 Ohio App.3d 116, 2010-Ohio-3539, 937 N.E.2d 628, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.), quoting Natl. City Bank v. Shuman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21484, 2003-Ohio-6116, ¶ 6. Thus, "the question of whether a trial court's grant of default judgment complies with Civ.R. 55(C) and Civ.R. 54(C) is one of law, which we review de novo." Id.; see also Masny v. Vallo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84938, 2005-Ohio-2178, ¶ 15.

Allegations of Complaint

{¶9} In her first assignment of error, Arendt argues that the trial court erred in limiting her award of damages solely to the time period governing the lease attached to the complaint. She contends that the trial court should have allowed her to recover lease damages for Price's default of rental obligations prior to October 12, 2012. Similarly, Arendt argues in her fourth assignment of error that the trial court should have allowed her to recover miscellaneous damages related to Price's actions prior to the October 12, 2012 lease date. We find no merit to her arguments.

{¶10} The award of default judgment is governed under Civ.R. 55 and provides that "[i]n all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(C)." Dye at ¶ 8. And under Civ.R. 54(C), "[a] judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment."

The primary purpose of Civ.R. 54(C)'s limitations on default judgment is to ensure that defendants are clearly notified of the maximum potential liability to
which they are exposed, so that they may make an informed, rational choice to either: (1) enable a default judgment by not responding, or (2) invest the time and expense involved in defending an action.
Shuman at ¶ 11. Recognizing this principle, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that a trial court abuses its discretion if it awards default judgment on matters that were not specifically pled in the complaint. See, e.g., Dye at ¶ 9 (trial court erred in entering a default judgment against two defendants for damages that the complaint did not specifically plead that those defendants caused) Shuman at ¶ 2, 8 (court erred in granting bank a default judgment and awarding damages against a guarantor on a line of credit because complaint only contained demand for judgment against borrower and not against guarantor); Masny at ¶ 16 (recognizing that trial court's award of more damages than sought in the complaint "contravened the spirit of Civ.R. 54(C)").

{¶11} Here, the trial court properly applied the law and found that Arendt was only entitled to recover damages on the claim that she pled in her complaint. Specifically, in its findings as to actual damages, the trial court noted that Arendt claimed solely a breach of contract of the lease entered into on October 12, 2012, and therefore "the court may not look back to any earlier lease agreements to award damages incurred prior to the commencement of the October 12, 2012 lease." Applying the same reasoning, the trial court properly excluded any expenses prior to the October 2012 lease, including an overdraft fee of $118 incurred in January 2011.

{¶12} Arendt claims, however, that the complaint contained "a short and plain statement indicating that she was entitled to relief under the Original Lease, Lease Addendum, and Lease Addendum 2." But Arendt fails to identify where in the complaint such statement exists. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Nor do we find such a statement in the complaint. To the contrary, the complaint specifically identifies only one lease — the written rental agreement entered into between the parties on October 12, 2012 and attached to the complaint (Lease Addendum 2). We therefore find Arendt's arguments baseless.

{¶13} The first and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

Damages Award

{¶14} In her second assignment of error, Arendt argues that the trial court erred in finding that she was not entitled to recover damages related to the estimates that she provided.

{¶15} Relying on receipts submitted from Lowe's Home Center, Inc., the court awarded Arendt $2,608.10 for property damage repair costs. The court, however, refused to award her additional damages based on "undated estimates for painting and carpet replacement." Arendt argues that "Ohio law expressly permits trial courts to award damages based upon estimates for work to be performed," and therefore the trial court erred in not awarding her the full amount. But Arendt's argument misapplies the law.

{¶16} While a trier of fact may choose to award damages based on estimates provided, there is no mandate that a trier of fact award such amount. See Sotnyk v. Guilleno, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1198, 2014-Ohio-3514 (recognizing that the trial court did not err in awarding only half the amount stated in the estimates for repairs after considering evidence submitted on hearing for damages; trial court as trier of fact determines property damages). Here, the trial court obviously found the undated estimates not to be credible evidence — a determination that rests within its discretion. Indeed, the weight accorded the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 81, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). And an appellant's disagreement with the trier of fact as to the appropriate amount of damages is not grounds for reversal. Sotnyk at ¶ 11.

{¶17} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

Liquidated Damages

{¶18} In her third assignment of error, Arendt argues that the trial court erred in finding that she was not entitled to liquidated damages under the lease agreement. We disagree.

{¶19} This court has previously explained the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses in contracts as follows:

Liquidated damages clauses in contracts are enforceable if they meet various conditions; otherwise, they are unenforceable as penalties for non-performance. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 27, 12 Ohio B. 23, 465 N.E.2d 392, outlines the enforceability test for liquidated damages provisions. First, the amount of actual damages must be uncertain and difficult to prove. Second, the amount of stipulated damages must be reasonable and proportionate to the contract as a whole. Third, the parties' intent to stipulate to damages must be clear and unambiguous. See also Lake Ridge Academy v. Carney (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 376, 613 N.E.2d 183.
Carter v. CPR Staffing, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94671, 2010-Ohio-6026, ¶ 16.

{¶20} Arendt argues that, upon Price's breach of the lease, she is entitled to "Lease Agreement Damages" in the amount of one year sum of lease payments under the agreement. In support of this claim, she relies on the following provision, which she characterizes as an enforceable, stipulated liquidated damages provision: "Thus, Lessee is aware that Lessor may suffer severe financial damage in the event that Lessee abandons or is evicted from the residence." (Emphasis sic.)

{¶21} But as the trial court properly noted, neither this provision, nor any other reference in the lease, mentions "Lease Agreement Damages" in the amount of $12,267.84 — the equivalent of one year's rental payments. As stated above, to be enforceable and valid, a liquidated damages provision requires, among other things, an amount of stipulated damages that are reasonable and proportionate to the contract as a whole. Here, the lease fails to set forth any liquidated damages amount, and therefore the trial court properly concluded that it could not impose such a term as a result of Price's breach.

{¶22} The third assignment of error is overruled.

Punitive Damages

{¶23} In her final assignment of error, Arendt argues that the trial court erred in failing to award her punitive damages under the lease. Arendt argues that her broad request for punitive damages in the complaint entitled her to recover the same upon Price's default. We disagree.

{¶24} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that "[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable." Carney, 66 Ohio St.3d at 381, 613 N.E.2d 183. The rationale behind this principle is that the sole purpose of contract damages is to compensate the nonbreaching party for losses suffered as a result of the breach. Id.

{¶25} The trial court declined to award Arendt $10,000 in punitive damages, recognizing that the complaint "sounds only in contract." We agree with the trial court that Arendt's complaint pled a breach of contract claim and not an independent tort claim. As for Arendt's allegation in the complaint that Price "caused significant damage to the Premises," this statement related to Price's breach under the lease agreement. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to award punitive damages.

{¶26} The final assignment of error is overruled.

{¶27} Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., A.J., and
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR


Summaries of

Arendt v. Price

Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
Feb 12, 2015
2015 Ohio 528 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)
Case details for

Arendt v. Price

Case Details

Full title:SUE ARENDT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT v. ANGELIQUE PRICE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

Court:Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

Date published: Feb 12, 2015

Citations

2015 Ohio 528 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)