Opinion
No. IP99-0391-C-M/S
July 21, 2003.
Charles R Clark Beasley Gilkison Retherford Buckles Clark Muncie, IN, David B Rodes Goldberg Persky Jennings White, Pittsburgh, PA, Bart A Karwath Barnes Thornburg, Indianapolis, IN
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT SEVEN OF PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants', ABB, Inc. (f/k/a ABB Power T D Company, Inc.), Asea Brown Boveri, Inc., and the Employee Benefit Committee of ABB, Inc. (collectively "ABB"),
Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Seven of Plaintiffs', Carol Arena, et al. ("Plaintiffs"), Second Amended Complaint (Statute of Limitations). Count Seven, the only active count in the case, alleges that ABB violated the "anti-cutback" provision of § 204(g) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g). According to ABB, Count Seven is untimely. The parties have fully briefed their arguments, and the motion is now ripe for ruling.
I. BACKGROUND A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although the material facts relevant to the resolution of this motion are not contested, some brief background information is necessary to frame the issue before the Court. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges a series of age discrimination and ERISA violations. Id. At this point in the litigation, the only active claim in the case is a class claim contained in Count Seven of the Second Amended Complaint. See Joint Motion to Vacate Pretrial Conference and Trial, Doc. No. 132. On September 16, 2002, the Court, upon stipulation by the parties, certified the action as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) with respect to the claims raised by Counts Seven and Eight of the Second Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 95. The class consists of:
All persons who were participants in the Asea Brown Boveri, Inc. Cash Balance Plan (the "Plan") as of January 1, 1992, and who:
(1) had been participants in a predecessor plan that offered a Special Early Retirement Pension ("SERP"), and met the age and service requirements for a SERP
(a) on or before the applicable effective date of the 1994 amendments to the Plan (the "Effective Date"); or
(b) after the Effective Date;
and after the Effective Date were involuntarily separated from ABB under circumstances meeting the pre-amendment requirements for a SERP; or
(2) had been participants in a predecessor plan that offered a SERP or other subsidized early retirement benefit, and
(a) met the pre-amendment requirements for a SERP or other subsidized early retirement benefit after January 1, 1992; or
(b) are still employed by ABB, are not yet eligible for Normal Retirement under the Plan, and may hereafter meet the pre-amendment requirements for a SERP or other subsidized early retirement benefit.
Doc. No. 95.
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1. The Pre-1994 Plan
The instant litigation stems from certain amendments made to ABB's Cash Balance Pension Plan (the "Plan") in 1994. On January 1, 1992, ABB created the Plan for it and its affiliates. Def.'s Brief in Supp. of Second Mot. for Summary Judgment at 9. Upon creation of the Plan, a number of predecessor plans were merged into it and the assets and liabilities of those predecessor plans were transferred to it. Id. One benefit contained in the predecessor plans that carried over to the Plan was the Special Early Retirement Pension benefit ("SERP"). Id. The SERP provision provided benefits to plan participants who satisfied certain age, service, and eligibility requirements and whose employment was "terminated as a result of a Permanent Job Separation." See Plan §§ 4.08, 4.09 4.10. In particular, § 4.08 of the Plan provided in relevant part:
(a) Eligibility. An Active Member who meets the following conditions shall be eligible for the immediate benefits provided under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of this Section 4.08:
(1) The Member was in employment . . . on December 31, 1991; and,
(2) The Member was an employee of ABB Power T D Company Inc. at a Covered Location as of December 31, 1991 (including employees who were transferred to a Covered Location on or prior to December 31, 1991) and participated in either the Prior T D Plan or the Prior ABB Plan . . . and,
(3) The Member incurs a Permanent Job Separation in a calendar year in which the Member has attained, or would have attained by December 31 of such year had he remained in active employment, one of the following age and service conditions.
— age 50 with 25 or more years of Vesting Service — age 51 with 22 or more years of Vesting Service — age 52 with 19 or more years of Vesting Service — age 53 with 16 or more years of Vesting Service — age 54 with 13 or more years of Vesting Service — age 55 with 10 or more years of Vesting Service . . .
Def.'s Appx. at Tab 3 (Vol. I), Plan § 4.08 (emphasis added). Individuals who met the eligibility requirements of § 4.08(a) would receive certain early retirement benefits detailed in (b), (c), and (d) of § 4.08. Id. Sections 4.09 and 4.10 of the Plan contained similar early retirement benefit provisions for different groups of employees. Id. The Plan defined "Permanent Job Separation" ("PJS") as the termination of an employee "through no fault of his own for lack of work for reasons associated with the business for whom an Employer or Affiliated Entity determines there is no reasonable expectation of recall." Id. § 1.41.
2. UThe 1994 Amendments
On May 6, 1994, ABB's Employee Benefits Committee (the "Benefits Committee") officially adopted amendments to the Plan that inter alia eliminated the SERP benefit in §§ 4.08, 4.09 4.10 of the Plan for all non-represented salaried employees. The amendment was effective June 1, 1994 ("June Amendment"). On May 13, 1994, ABB gave written notice to all affected plan participants of the June Amendment and its effective date.
On August 23, 1994, the Benefits Committee officially adopted amendments to the Plan that inter alia eliminated the PJS Benefit in §§ 4.08, 4.09 4.10 of the Plan for all non-represented hourly employees. The amendment was effective August 31, 1994 ("August Amendment"). On August 15, 1994, ABB gave written notice to all affected plan participants of the August Amendment and its effective date.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). See also United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which she relies. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case, one on which [it] would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
III. DISCUSSION
Count Seven alleges that ABB violated § 204(g) of ERISA, the "anti-cutback" provision. Section 204(g) of ERISA provides, in relevant part:
(1) The accrued benefit of a participant under a plan may not be decreased by an amendment of the Plan . . .
(2) For purposes of Paragraph (1), a plan amendment which has the effect of —
(A) eliminating or reducing an early retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy . . .
with respect of benefits attributable to service before the amendment shall be treated as reducing accrued benefits. In the case of a retirement-type subsidy, the preceding sentence shall apply only with respect to a participant who satisfies (either before or after the amendment) the pre-amendment conditions for the subsidy . . .29 U.S.C. § 1054(g). According to Plaintiffs, the Special Early Retirement Pension provision provided in the ABB Cash Balance Plan constitutes "an early retirement benefit" and/or "a retirement-type subsidy" within the meaning of § 204(g) of ERISA. Second Amended Comp. ¶¶ 42-46. In addition, Plaintiffs assert that ABB's 1994 Amendments, which had the effect of eliminating the Special Early Retirement Pension provisions, reduced Plaintiffs' accrued benefits in contravention of § 204(g). Id.
In this motion, ABB argues that the claims in Count Seven are time-barred. According to ABB, the appropriate statute of limitations to apply is Indiana's two-year statute of limitations for claims involving a "privilege" of employment relating to an unwritten employment contract. IND. CODE § 34-11-2-1. Furthermore, ABB maintains that the anti-cutback claims accrued in 1994 when the Plan amendments became effective (for non-represented salaried workers, the amendments became effective on June 1, 1994, and for non-represented hourly workers, the amendments became effective on August 31, 1994). If ABB is correct that the cause of action accrued in 1994 and that the two-year statute of limitations applies, the March 1999 filing of the complaint would be untimely.
The parties also contest the merits of Count Seven in separate, cross-motions for summary judgment.
IND. CODE § 34-11-2-1 provides: An action relating to the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment except actions based upon a written contract (including, but not limited to, hiring or the failure to hire, suspension, discharge, discipline, promotion, demotion, retirement, wages, or salary) must be brought within two (2) years of the date of the act or omission complained of.
Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs disagree with ABB's position, and assert that: (1) Indiana's ten-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts is the most analogous statute of limitations; and (2) the cause of action did not begin to accrue until October 29, 2002, when ABB formally denied Plaintiffs' request for the SERP benefits. Each issue will be addressed in turn.
IND. CODE § 34-11-1-2 provides: An action upon contracts in writing other than those for the payment of money . . . must be commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrues.
A. CHARACTERIZING THE CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiffs brought this anti-cutback suit under ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Congress did not provide a specific statute of limitations for these suits. "In the absence of a governing federal provision, `the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.'" Cent. States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Jordan, 873 F.2d 149, 152 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). See also Teumer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 1994). When adopting a state time limitation, a court must first properly characterize the essence of the claim to determine which limitation is most appropriate. "The characterization of a particular action for the purpose of selecting the most appropriate state statute of limitations is ultimately a question of federal law." Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1983). Although Indiana case law may provide a useful guide on the characterization issue, the interpretations of Indiana courts do not dictate the actions of this Court. See Jordan, 873 F.2d at 154 ("Even if [state] law had been clear on this subject, the interpretations of the [state] courts do not predetermine the actions of this [federal] court."). See also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace Agric. Implement Workers of Am. (UAW) v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966).
ABB relies heavily on Indiana law to support its claim that the two-year statute of limitations for actions on privileges of employment not based upon a written contract governs the anti-cutback claim. According to ABB, the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision in Kemper v. Warren Petroleum Corp., Inc. controls the Court's resolution of this issue. See Kemper v. Warren Petroleum Corp., Inc., 451 N.E.2d 1115 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983). In Kemper, the plaintiff, who was employed pursuant to an oral employment contract, was discharged by the defendant. See id. at 1116. When he attained the age of sixty-five, the plaintiff contacted the defendant and requested payment pursuant to the defendant's pension plan. See id. The defendant denied the plaintiff's request, maintaining that he had violated a condition subsequent of the pension. See id. The plaintiff subsequently brought suit, and the trial court dismissed the action as time-barred by IND. CODE 34-1-2-1.5 (now IND. CODE 34-11-2-1). See id.
IND. CODE 34-1-2-1.5 is identical to its current version (IND. CODE 34-11-2-1) in all material respects.
The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. See id. at 1117. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the contract at issue was the written pension plan, not the oral employment contract, and accordingly, Indiana's ten-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied. See id. The court of appeals rejected plaintiff's arguments, and affirmed the trial court:
In this case, the specific dispute involves a pension plan. The pension plan is a "privilege" of [plaintiff's] employment and concerns his "retirement." The "privilege" of employment, although written, does not negate the fact [sic] the privilege arose out of [plaintiff's] oral employment contract with [defendant]. When an action concerns a privilege of employment and the employment was undeniably the result of an oral contract, I.C. 34-1-2-1.5 controls.Id.
At least four Indiana cases have favorably cited to Kemper's analysis. See Majd Pour v. Basic Am. Medical, Inc., 555 N.E.2d 155 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990) (concluding that letter constituted a written employment contract, and distinguishing Kemper because Kemper involved an oral employment contract); Indiana v. Puckett, 531 N.E.2d 518 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988) (holding that I.C. 34-1-2-1.5 applied in suit for payment for job-related injuries because dispute arose out of employment relationship); Peake v. Int'l Harvester Co., 489 N.E.2d 102 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986) (two-year statute of limitations applicable in suit for benefits under a written collective bargaining agreement because employment contract was oral). See also Miller v. Int'l Harvester Co., 811 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1987) (in a diversity suit applying Indiana law, two-year statute of limitations period barred plaintiff's claim for pension benefits because claim directly related to privilege of employment).
Plaintiffs suggest that a number of ERISA cases support their position that this suit should be characterized as an action on a written contract. Unfortunately, it appears that the Seventh Circuit has not considered the precise issue before the Court: in an ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) action for alleged anti-cutback violations arising in Indiana, whether Indiana's two-year statute of limitations governing actions relating to employment disputes not based on written contracts applies, or whether Indiana's ten-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts applies. However, as Plaintiffs argue, the Seventh Circuit has provided some guidance on the issue, albeit in different types of ERISA cases that borrowed statutes of limitations from other states.
For example, in Jenkins, an ERISA action under 502(a)(1)(B), the plaintiff filed suit for pension benefits after the denial of his appeal for benefits under the company's pension plan. See Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 249. In selecting the most appropriate statute of limitations to apply, the Seventh Circuit first concluded that the action should not be characterized as a labor law dispute because the plaintiff did not challenge the terms of the collective bargaining agreement — he simply sought benefits under his employee pension benefit plan. See id. at 251. Thus, the court rejected the defendant's arguments that it should apply the statute of limitations from § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. See id.
Having ruled out any labor law limitations period, the court still had to choose between Illinois' five-year statute of limitations for actions on unwritten contracts and its ten-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts. See id. at 253. The court concluded that the action was most properly characterized as one on a written contract:
The employee pension benefit plan under which the appellant is seeking to recover is a written document. The individual employment contracts of the defendant's former employers and the actual employment periods themselves will need to be introduced for the [plaintiff] to properly explain his work history and qualify as a covered employee beneficiary under the terms of the Plan. Nevertheless, the action is based on the written contract pension plan . . .Id.
Six years after Jenkins, the Seventh Circuit faced another borrowing issue in an ERISA case. See Jordan, 873 F.2d 149. In Jordan, the plaintiff, a pension trust, brought suit to recover delinquent employer payments from the defendant. See id. at 150-51. As in Jenkins, the court was confronted with the choice between Illinois' five-year statute of limitations for actions on oral contracts and its ten-year limit for suits on written contracts. See id. at 153-54. Emphasizing that interpretations of the Illinois courts do not bind federal courts, the Seventh Circuit held that the "national interests" underlying ERISA dictated that the "action should be characterized as a suit upon a written contract." Id. at 154. The court explained:
The overriding policy consideration in this case is the integrity of the Pension Fund and its ability to pay its beneficiaries. The Pension Fund must rely on self-reporting by employers. It may take time for the Pension Fund to discover irregularities in employer contributions. Characterizing this action as an action on a written contract contributes to the stability of pension funds and will encourage employers to meet their obligations.Id.
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar result in two recent ERISA cases. See Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Daill v. Sheet Metal Workers' Local 73 Pension Fund, 100 F.2d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1996) (in an action by pension fund participant against pension fund to recover pension benefits, the court observed: "Both parties are correct that the most analogous Illinois statute of limitations is the 10-year limitations period for suits pertaining to written contracts.") (emphasis added). In Lumpkin, the plaintiffs brought suit under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to recover lost benefits allegedly due them under a pension plan. See Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 451-52. Choosing again between Illinois' statute of limitations for actions on oral contracts and actions on written contracts, the Seventh Circuit held that the suit was based on a written contract:
Presumably the pension plan in this case is at least written in part, so that the Illinois ten-year statute of limitations applies . . .
As explained above, as a matter of federal policy the longer statute of limitations should apply, because the plaintiffs' claims are for vested pension benefits that have allegedly become due to them over a period of years. To truncate the available period for claims by applying the shorter statute of limitations would fly in the face of ERISA. Pension benefits vest and accrue throughout the career of the employee. They are often paid out over a period of several decades. Moreover, the difference between the two statutes of limitations may be explained by the fact that parties to a written contract can demonstrate the existence of their bargained-for-exchange over a longer period of time, for the agreement is evidence by the writing. An oral contract, on the other hand, if not important enough to memorialize in writing, is less deserving of legal protection over time, and liability may be harder to prove, presumably because the parties must rely on memory to recollect the terms of the oral agreement in court.Id. at 465. See also Wilkens v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 299 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir. 2002) ("We agree with [plaintiff] that her ERISA benefits claim is an action based on a written contract governed by the five year statute of limitations . . ."); Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643, 648 (9th Cir. 2000) ("California's statute of limitations for suits on written contracts . . . provides the applicable statute of limitations for an ERISA cause of action based on a claim for benefits under a written contractual policy in California.").
ABB maintains that Jenkins, Jordan, Lumpkin and Daill are distinguishable from the instant case because the Seventh Circuit was borrowing limitations periods from Illinois law in those cases, and Illinois does not have a special limitation period for claims relating to the privileges and terms of employment. While it is true that Illinois does not have a special limitation period for claims relating to privileges of employment, Illinois does have a shorter limitation period for actions on oral contracts. In all four of the aforementioned ERISA cases, the Seventh Circuit characterized the suits as actions on written contracts rather than suits on oral contracts. All four cases, like this one, involved ERISA claims that were at least partially based on oral negotiations or oral employment contracts. However, the Seventh Circuit still characterized the suits as actions on the written pension plans, which are themselves contracts. See Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 253 ("The individual employment contracts . . . will need to be introduced . . . Nevertheless, the action is based on the written contract pension provision) (emphasis added). See also Teumer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Benefit plans themselves are contracts between employee and employer."); Meade v. Pension Appeals and Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1992) (ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim) ("Ohio does have an analogous statute of limitations that is applicable to written contracts, and the Plan at issue in this case constitutes a written contract."); Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Amer., 942 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Missouri's ten-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts in ERISA benefits suit under § 1132(a)(1)(B)).
ABB's reliance on ERISA cases from other circuits is misplaced. See Def.'s Reply at 4, 8-9. The cases are distinguishable because none of those courts was choosing between characterizing a suit as one on a written or an oral contract. In fact, neither ABB nor the Court has identified any cases that characterize an ERISA claim as an action on an oral contract, which this Court would have to do to rule in ABB's favor on the issue. See IND. CODE 34-11-2-1 (not applicable to suits on written contracts). Instead, the case law cited by ABB involved courts choosing between the limitations periods for actions on contracts and the periods for different substantive claims. See e.g., Lang v. Aetna Life Insur. Co., 196 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 1999) (choosing between Utah's statute of limitations for actions on written insurance contracts and its general limitation period for written contracts); Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (selecting between Minnesota's statute of limitations for wage claims and its general statute of limitations for contracts); Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying Maryland's limitation period for contracts actions to § 1132 suit); Ahnert v. Delco Elec. Corp., 982 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.Ind. 1997) (selecting between Indiana's ten-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts and Indiana's two-year limitation period governing retaliatory discharge claims); Gray v. Greyhound Ret. and Disability Trust, 730 F. Supp. 415 (M.D.Fla. 1990) (choosing between Florida's five-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts and its two-year statute for actions to recover wages); Estate of Grant v. U.S. News World Report, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 342 (D.C. D.C. 1986) (choosing between the District of Columbia's statute of limitations for actions on simple contracts and limitations period for actions on contracts under seal).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs claim that employee benefits due to them under their written pension plan were improperly eliminated. As both parties agree, the outcome of this case turns on the interpretation and legal import of the written provisions in the pension plan in light of the requirements of § 204(g) of ERISA. See Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Regarding Count Seven. The oral employment contracts between the Plaintiffs and ABB are secondary and not in dispute. See id. The thrust of Count Seven requires the Court to examine the Special Early Retirement Provision, which is in written form, and decide whether or not ABB's elimination of the provision from the pension plan violates ERISA. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the cause of action is most accurately characterized as a suit on a written contract.
In addition, the rationale underlying the shorter limitations period for employment disputes relating to oral contracts is not implicated in this case. As Judge Posner explained, "The obvious reason for a short statute of limitations for disputes over terms, conditions, and privileges of employment not based on a written contract is that it is too easy for an employee to make claims against his employer based on alleged oral understandings and too hard for the employer to disprove these claims when they relate to the remote past." Miller, 811 F.2d at 1152. Those concerns are simply not present in the instant case because the dispute centers on provisions of a written pension plan.
Federal policy also favors application of the longer limitations period. ERISA was enacted to ensure that employees would receive promised pension benefits upon retirement. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375, 100 S.Ct. 1723, 1733, 64 L.Ed. 354 (1980). The Seventh Circuit described the policies underlying ERISA this way:
First and foremost, the dispute in this case arose in the shadow of ERISA, the complex, comprehensive federal statute passed by Congress to protect the pension rights of employees. Thus the dispute here arose between one party, the plaintiff employees, whose right to pension benefits has been explicitly protected by Congress in the enactment of a comprehensive legislative scheme, and the defendant, a corporation whose liability for such pension benefits is contested under ERISA . . .Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 454. Prior to 1984, ERISA did not protect early retirement benefits. However, Congress considered the benefits to be important enough that it amended § 204(g) in 1984 to explicitly include early retirement benefits within the ambit of "accrued benefits," making early retirement benefits protected benefits under § 204(g). See Retirement Equity Act, Pub.L. No. 98-397; Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1996). To apply the shorter limitations period would "fly in the face of ERISA," Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 465, and flout the Congressional intent evidenced by the 1984 amendment of § 204(g).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the action is most appropriately characterized as an action on a written contract. The most analogous Indiana statute of limitations is the ten-year limitations period for suits pertaining to written contracts. To the extent that Kemper is to the contrary, it is not binding on the Court because characterization is ultimately a question of federal law, and the analysis used by the Seventh Circuit in the Illinois ERISA cases is controlling. See Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 465 ("That case is distinguishable because it involved purely a matter of state law. The application of a state statute of limitations to a federal cause of action is ultimately a question of federal law.") (citation omitted).
B. ACCRUAL DATE
The Court's conclusion that Indiana's ten-year statute of limitation for actions on written contracts governs this suit moots the parties' arguments about when the action accrued. The cause of action accrued, at the earliest, when ABB officially adopted the June and August Amendments in 1994. See Daill, 100 F.3d at 66-67; Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1182, 1185 (3d Cir. 1992). See also Carey v. Int'l Btd. of Elec. Workers Local 363 Pension Plan, 201 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1999); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Beckham, 138 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 1998). The Plaintiffs filed their complaint in March 1999, well within the ten-year limitations period. Thus, the Court concludes that Count Seven was timely filed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Seven of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Statute of Limitations).