Opinion
B322877
02-07-2024
AGUSTINA ARELLANO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Krissman &Silver, Jarod A. Krissman, Ian C. Deady, Kathie Sierra; Law Office of Robert H. Pourvali and Robert H. Pourvali for Plaintiff and Appellant. Ballard Rosenberg Golper &Savitt, Linda Miller Savitt, John J. Manier, and Jessica A. Gomez for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 20STCV46432, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Krissman &Silver, Jarod A. Krissman, Ian C. Deady, Kathie Sierra; Law Office of Robert H. Pourvali and Robert H. Pourvali for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ballard Rosenberg Golper &Savitt, Linda Miller Savitt, John J. Manier, and Jessica A. Gomez for Defendants and Respondents.
LAVIN, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Agustina Arellano worked as a janitor for a parish of defendant Archdiocese of Los Angeles (Archdiocese) when one of the parish's associate pastors sexually assaulted her while she was cleaning his living quarters. Arellano was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression and declared permanently unfit to resume working for the parish.
This defendant is also referred to as, and judgment was entered in favor of, The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, a corporation sole.
Arellano sued the Archdiocese, the St. Rose of Lima Church (Church), and the St. Rose of Lima School (School) (collectively, defendants) for constructive wrongful termination in violation of public policy (constructive termination). The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding the sexual assault did not give rise to a wrongful termination claim because it was only a single incident of misconduct. In any event, the court found, defendants did not knowingly permit or intentionally create any intolerable working conditions that led to Arellano's work disabilities. Arellano appeals. We conclude triable issues exist as to whether the sexual assault was sufficient to create intolerable working conditions and whether the associate pastor represented defendants such that they can be held liable for constructive termination. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Parish
The Church and the School comprise the St. Rose of Lima Parish, which is in Maywood, California. Although the Parish controls its day-to-day operations, it is governed by the Archdiocese, which is responsible for appointing and removing priests assigned to the parishes under its jurisdiction.
Throughout this opinion, we collectively refer to the Church and the School as the "Parish."
At the time of the events leading to this case, Father Dario Miranda was the Parish's head pastor, and Father Primitivo Gonzalez (Father Gonzalez) and Father Martin Rodriguez (Father Rodriguez) were the Parish's associate pastors. As the head pastor, Father Miranda supervised Father Gonzalez and Father Rodriguez. Father Miranda also supervised the School's principal, Laura Guzman, and the Parish's business administrator, Victoria Pulido, and he oversaw all aspects of the School's and Church's operations, including making personnel decisions. Father Miranda had "final say on all decisions relating to the day to day operations" of the Parish.
Father Miranda was the "highest authority at the [P]arish on taking action to address grievances by employees." In Father Miranda's absence, the Parish's associate pastors generally would oversee "leadership of the [P]arish," including "dealing with and acting on" employee grievances.
Around 2006, the Archdiocese appointed Father Gonzalez, an "extern priest" from Mexico, as an associate pastor at the Parish. Father Gonzalez had to go through a "long, complicated" approval process before being appointed to the Parish. Specifically, he was required to provide a letter from the bishop where he lived, attesting that he was "a person of sound moral character," that he had never been accused of "sexual misconduct" or "inappropriate behavior with minors," and that he did not have issues with alcohol abuse. Father Gonzalez passed a background check and, before the incident giving rise to this case, he was a priest in good standing with no known prior incidents of sexual misconduct.
"Extern priests" are priests that come from a different diocese, including dioceses from other countries.
According to Monsignor James Halley (Monsignor Halley), the Archdiocese's Vicar for Clergy, who was responsible for assigning and removing priests from the Archdiocese's parishes, Father Gonzalez was not "limited in any way ... in the full exercise of his duties as an associate pastor." Father Miranda testified, however, that Father Gonzalez did not create, or have any input concerning, the Archdiocese's or the Parish's "policies, practices, or procedures." According to Father Miranda, Father Gonzalez had no "administrative duties related to the running of the Parish or the School, such as hiring, firing, interviewing prospective employees, resolving employee complaints or disputes, or supervising employees' work duties." Although Father Gonzalez was the "alternate signer" for the Parish's bank account, he "only signed off on minor expenses, such as bills for office supplies, petty cash, and other miscellaneous expenses."
2. Arellano's Employment and the Sexual Assault
Around 2015, the Parish hired Arellano to work as a janitor at the School and the Church. Arellano reported directly to Pulido and Guzman. She did not report to the Parish's pastors. Arellano was responsible for cleaning the Church's and the School's premises.
On July 30, 2019, Arellano was assigned to clean the Church's rectory, where Father Gonzalez lived. While Arellano was cleaning the bathroom, Father Gonzalez approached her from behind and touched her wrist. When Arellano turned around, Father Gonzalez touched her breast. Arellano tried to back away from Father Gonzalez, but she ran into a wall. Father Gonzalez then put his hands on the wall, pressed his body against Arellano, and tried to kiss her. Arellano moved her head from side to side and stood on her toes to prevent Father Gonzalez from kissing her, but he grabbed her neck, pulled down her blouse and bra, and put his mouth on her breasts. While Father Gonzalez pinned Arellano against the wall, he told her that he wanted to "go to bed" with her. He then grabbed one of Arellano's wrists, pulled down his pants, and rubbed his body against hers. As Father Gonzalez tried to remove Arellano's pants, she broke free and left his living quarters.
At the time Father Gonzalez assaulted Arellano, Father Miranda was in Mexico.
3. The Investigation
On August 6, 2019, Arellano told Pulido that Father Gonzalez had sexually assaulted her about a week earlier. Arellano asked Pulido to keep the incident confidential until Father Miranda returned from his trip abroad. Pulido advised Arellano to write down her account of Father Gonzalez's assault if she did not want to recall the incident orally when she met with Father Miranda. Pulido also told Arellano she would no longer have to work near Father Gonzalez.
On August 12, 2019, Arellano reported the incident to Father Miranda. He told Arellano that he was "really sorry" and that he "did not expect that something like [that] would happen in his parish." Father Miranda promised to report the incident to the Archdiocese and to encourage other parishioners to come forward if they "had gone through something like that."
On August 13, 2019, Father Miranda reported the incident to Monsignor Halley. The next day, Monsignor Halley issued a decree, announcing that the Archdiocese was investigating whether Father Gonzalez "violated the sixth commandment of the Decalogue with an adult female." That same day, Monsignor Halley and Father Miranda interviewed Father Gonzalez. When asked about Arellano's allegations, Father Gonzalez admitted that he "did it." Monsignor Halley immediately withdrew Gonzalez's "priestly faculties," excluded Father Gonzalez from "sacred ministry in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles," and ordered Father Gonzalez to vacate his living quarters at the Church. Father Gonzalez left the Parish on August 15 or 16, 2019.
On August 21, 2019, the Archdiocese reported Father Gonzalez's assault to the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, which opened a criminal investigation.
On October 16, 2019, the Archdiocese issued a decree, announcing it had closed its preliminary investigation into Arellano's allegations against Father Gonzalez. The Archdiocese's oversight board recommended that Father Gonzalez "remain out of ministry."
Father Gonzalez passed away in August 2020.
4. Arellano's Workplace Disabilities
Arellano continued to work at the Parish for about three months after she was assaulted by Father Gonzalez. Pulido routinely checked on Arellano, and Pulido and Father Miranda refurbished and repainted Father Gonzalez's former living quarters to make Arellano feel more comfortable working in that space.
In August 2019, Arellano began attending weekly counseling sessions with a therapist who was referred to her by the Archdiocese. In November 2019, the therapist diagnosed Arellano with PTSD and placed her on a six-month leave of absence from work. According to the therapist, Arellano was experiencing "debilitating anxiety on a daily basis which ... created impairments in her ability to work." The therapist extended Arellano's leave of absence several times.
In December 2020, Arellano began receiving monthly treatment from a psychiatrist, who diagnosed her with PTSD and major depressive illness stemming from Father Gonzalez's assault. In August 2021, the psychiatrist declared that Arellano was "temporarily totally disabled," and he continued to extend her leave of absence until May 2022, when he opined that she would "never be able to return to work at the Los Angeles Archdiocese."
5. The Lawsuit
Arellano sued the Archdiocese, the Church, and the School for constructive wrongful termination in violation of public policy (constructive termination).
Defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued Arellano could not prevail on her claim for constructive termination because she was still employed by the Church. Defendants also argued they did not "knowingly or intentionally create or permit intolerable working conditions" because they had no reason to know Father Gonzalez was likely to engage in sexual misconduct and they promptly took remedial action after Arellano reported Father Gonzalez sexually assaulted her.
Arellano opposed summary judgment. She argued Father Gonzalez created an intolerable working condition at the Church. Because Father Gonzalez was an associate pastor of the Parish and the Parish's head pastor was away at the time of the assault, Father Gonzalez "effectively represented the Archbishop," the Church, and the School when he assaulted Arellano, thereby rendering defendants liable for her constructive termination.
The court granted defendants' summary judgment motion. It rejected defendants' argument that Arellano could not prevail on a constructive termination claim because she had yet to resign or be terminated from her position at the Parish. Nevertheless, the court found, it was undisputed that defendants did not knowingly permit or intentionally create intolerable working conditions. Specifically, the court found Father Gonzalez's sexual assault, by itself, could not create an intolerable working condition because it was an isolated incident. The court also found it was undisputed that defendants had no reason to know Father Gonzalez would sexually assault Arellano and that they took prompt remedial action to address her complaint.
Defendants do not challenge this finding on appeal.
The court entered judgment in defendants' favor.
Arellano appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Principles of Summary Judgment and Standard of Review
A court may grant summary judgment where no triable issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476 (Merrill).) Defendants who move for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's claim cannot be established or that there exists a complete defense to the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendants make a sufficient showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence establishing a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) A triable issue of fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)
We independently review a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 860.) We liberally construe the evidence in favor of the opposing party and resolve all doubts about the evidence in that party's favor. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) We consider all evidence the parties submit in connection with the motion, except that which the court properly excluded. (Merrill, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 476.)
2. Constructive Termination
An employee may sue her employer for constructive termination when the employer's conduct "effectively forces the employee to resign." (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1244 (Turner).) "[A]n employee cannot simply 'quit and sue,' claiming he or she was constructively discharged. The conditions giving rise to the resignation must be sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer." (Id. at p. 1246.) The key question is "whether the resignation was coerced, not whether it was simply one rational option for the employee." (Ibid.)
The "focus in a constructive discharge case is the employer's knowledge and conduct in forcing the employee to resign in light of the intolerable working conditions." (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) Thus, the "employee's resignation must be employer-coerced, not caused by the voluntary action of the employee or matters beyond the employer's reasonable control." (Id. at p. 1248.) In other words, "the employer must either deliberately create the intolerable working conditions that trigger the resignation or, at a minimum, must know about them and fail to remedy the situation in order to force the employee to resign." (Id. at pp. 1249-1250.)
In short, to establish a claim for constructive termination, the employee must prove: (1) the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted (2) working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee's resignation (3) that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable employee in the same position would be compelled to resign. (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)
3. Analysis
Arellano contends the court erred in granting summary judgment because triable issues of fact exist as to whether defendants intentionally created or knowingly permitted intolerable working conditions that led to her being declared permanently unfit to return to work for the Parish. Specifically, Arellano argues there are triable issues as to: (1) whether Father Gonzalez "effectively represented" the Archdiocese and the Parish when he assaulted her; and (2) whether the assault, by itself, was sufficient to create intolerable working conditions. Both of these arguments have merit.
3.1. A triable issue exists as to whether Father Gonzalez "effectively represented" defendants and thereby intentionally created or knowingly permitted the conditions that led to Arellano's workplace disabilities.
The court found defendants did not knowingly permit or intentionally create intolerable working conditions because the Parish and the Archdiocese had no reason to know Father Gonzalez would sexually assault Arellano and they took immediate remedial action, including ordering Father Gonzalez to leave the Parish, after Arellano reported the incident. Arellano doesn't dispute the facts underlying the court's findings, but she argues a reasonable jury nevertheless could find defendants liable for constructive termination because Father Gonzalez represented the Parish and the Archdiocese when he assaulted her.
In Turner, the court held that to establish a claim for constructive termination, the requisite knowledge or intent must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who "effectively represent the employer," such as its "officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory employees." (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) Here, Arellano presented evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Father Gonzalez "effectively represented" defendants when he sexually assaulted her.
Father Gonzalez was one of the Parish's associate pastors, and Father Miranda was its head pastor. Monsignor Halley testified that a parish's head pastor is the parish's "highest authority . . . on taking action to address grievances by employees," and that when the head pastor is unavailable, the associate pastor "fulfills that role." Monsignor Halley also testified that Father Gonzalez was not "limited in any way" in the exercise of his duties as an associate pastor. At the time Father Gonzalez sexually assaulted Arellano, Father Miranda was travelling abroad. Thus, a jury or other trier of fact could find the Parish leadership was in the hands of its associate pastors-i.e., Father Gonzalez and Father Rodriguez-when Father Gonzalez attacked Arellano. Additionally, Father Miranda and Pulido testified that Father Gonzalez was appointed to be an "officer" of the Parish. And Pulido testified that Father Gonzalez, Father Miranda, and the Archbishop were the only persons authorized to sign on the Parish's bank accounts.
To be sure, defendants presented evidence that Father Gonzalez's responsibilities as an associate pastor of the Parish were limited. For instance, Father Miranda testified that he (Father Miranda) had "final say on all decisions relating to the day-to-day operations of the Parish and the School," and that Father Gonzalez did not have any "administrative duties," such as the authority to hire, fire, supervise, or discipline Parish employees. Father Miranda also testified that, as an "alternate signor" for the Parish's bank account, Father Gonzalez only signed off on "minor expenses." But such evidence creates a disputed issue of fact concerning the scope of Father Gonzalez's authority as a representative of defendants. That dispute should be resolved by the jury or other trier of fact. (See White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 567 [the scope of an employee's discretion and authority is a question of fact that must be decided on a case-by-case basis].)
Because there is a triable issue concerning whether Father Gonzalez "effectively represented" defendants, and was not merely acting as an employee of defendants, when he assaulted Arellano (see Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251), we reject defendants' argument that they cannot be held liable for Father Gonzalez's assault because it occurred outside the scope of his employment. (See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296 [hospital was not liable to patient for various torts committed by ultrasound technician under doctrine of respondeat superior because the underlying conduct occurred outside the scope of the technician's employment].)
Defendants argue that, even assuming Father Gonzalez "effectively represented" the Archdiocese and the Parish, Arellano failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he intentionally created or knowingly permitted intolerable working conditions. Specifically, defendants argue Arellano's evidence only supports an inference that Father Gonzalez intended to assault her; it does not support a finding that he assaulted her for the purpose of creating an intolerable working environment. This argument lacks merit.
A plaintiff is not required to present direct evidence of the employer's intent to create intolerable working conditions. (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1249.) Rather, a plaintiff may present evidence from which a trier of fact could infer the employer intended to create the intolerable conditions or knew of the intolerable conditions and failed to remedy the situation. (Id. at pp. 1249-1250.) Father Gonzalez admitted he assaulted Arellano, and Arellano presented evidence that the assault caused her work disabilities-i.e., her PTSD and depression diagnoses-that prevent her from returning to work at the Parish. Thus, there is, at minimum, a triable issue of fact as to whether Father Gonzalez intended to create the underlying working conditions-i.e., his sexual assault-that led to Arellano's workplace disabilities that preclude her from returning to work.
We also reject defendants' argument that Arellano's decision to continue to work for the Parish for several months after Father Gonzalez assaulted her forecloses any claim that defendants knowingly permitted the intolerable conditions that led to her work disabilities. As we just explained, Arellano presented evidence from which a trier of fact could find Father Gonzalez, one of defendants' representatives, intentionally created intolerable working conditions when he sexually assaulted her. She was not required to also show defendants knowingly permitted such conduct to occur. (See Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251 [employer must intentionally create or knowingly permit intolerable working conditions].) And while the length of time between the occurrence of the alleged intolerable working condition and the employee's resignation is relevant in determining whether the employee was wrongfully terminated, it is not dispositive. (Id. at p. 1254 ["The length of time the plaintiff remained on the job may be one relevant factor in determining the intolerability of employment conditions from the standpoint of a reasonable person."].) Here, a trier of fact could find that although Arellano continued to work at the Parish immediately following Father Gonzalez's assault, it was reasonable for her to eventually stop working there because that incident was the cause of her debilitating workplace disabilities. (See id. at p. 1246 [the conditions leading to the employee's resignation must be extraordinary and egregious to overcome a reasonable employee's desire to keep the job in question].)
3.2. A triable issue exists as to whether Father Gonzalez's sexual assault created an intolerable working condition that would compel a reasonable employee to resign or stop working.
Arellano next contends the court erred in finding Father's sexual assault did not create an intolerable working condition that would compel a reasonable employee to resign or stop working because it was only a single incident of misconduct.
In Turner, the California Supreme Court explained that to give rise to a claim for constructive termination, the working conditions must be "unusually 'aggravated' or amount to a 'continuous pattern' before the situation will be deemed intolerable." (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247.) In a footnote, the court explained that, while no such conduct had been alleged in that case, "[i]n some circumstances, a single intolerable incident, such as a crime of violence against an employee by an employer, or an employer's ultimatum that an employee commit a crime, may constitute a constructive discharge ..." because such conduct "potentially could be found 'aggravated.'" (Ibid., fn. 3, italics added.)
In this case, the court found that while Father Gonzalez's sexual assault was "reprehensible," it could not, by itself, establish a constructive termination claim because it was only a single incident of misconduct. In doing so, the court expressly declined to follow Turner's "single intolerable incident" language, explaining that the Supreme Court's statement was dicta and unsupported by citations to authority.
Contrary to the court's ruling, Father Gonzalez's sexual assault could support a claim for constructive termination. While the "single intolerable incident" language in Turner may be dicta, it is well-settled that" 'statements of the Supreme Court should be considered persuasive.'" (Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1169, quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Board of Education (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 823, 835.) Indeed, the Supreme Court in Turner thoroughly analyzed the elements of a constructive termination claim, including what constitutes intolerable working conditions. (Hubbard, at p. 1169 ["When the Supreme Court has conducted a thorough analysis of the issues and such analysis reflects compelling logic, its dictum should be followed."].) Further, nothing in Turner suggests the Supreme Court inadvertently, or without adequate consideration, drafted the "single intolerable incident" language. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we conclude that under Turner, a single incident of intolerable conduct may support a constructive termination claim, so long as the incident is sufficiently aggravated. (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, fn. 3.)
On appeal, defendants don't dispute that a single incident of misconduct could, in certain circumstances, result in a constructive termination.
Here, Arellano presented evidence that would support a finding that Father Gonzalez's sexual assault was sufficiently aggravated to be an intolerable working condition. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Arellano (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037), a trier of fact could find that Father Gonzalez committed a crime of violence against her (see Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, fn. 3). Father Gonzalez approached Arellano from behind and groped her breasts without consent. He then pinned her against a wall, pulled down her blouse and bra, and put his mouth directly on her breasts. He also removed his pants, rubbed his body against Arellano, told her that he wanted to have sex with her, and tried to kiss her mouth before she was able to escape. As defendants concede, Father Gonzalez's "sexual assault itself surely constitutes an intolerable incident."
Arellano also presented evidence from which a trier of fact could find a reasonable employee who experienced such intolerable working conditions would be compelled to resign or stop working. Arellano attended therapy sessions to address Father Gonzalez's assault, and the therapist eventually diagnosed her with PTSD and placed her on a leave of absence. A psychiatrist later diagnosed Arellano with depression (and reconfirmed the therapist's PTSD diagnosis) as a result of Father Gonzalez's assault and determined that Arellano would never be able to return to work at the Parish.
3.3. Conclusion
In sum, triable issues exist as to whether defendants- through Father Gonzalez's sexual assault-knowingly permitted or intentionally created intolerable working conditions that led to Arellano's workplace disabilities that preclude her from returning to work. Accordingly, the court should have denied defendants' summary judgment motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Arellano shall recover her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: EDMON, P. J. ADAMS, J.