Opinion
17483-21
01-26-2024
ARDAN HOLDINGS, LLC, ARDAN INVESTORS, LLC, TAX MATTERS PARTNER, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER
MARK V. HOLMES JUDGE
This case is set for trial at a special session of the Court starting at 10:00 a.m., on Monday, February 26, 2024, in Columbia, South Carolina. The case arises from a contested donation of a conservation easement. The parties have filed a large number of discovery and other pretrial motions:
• petitioner's motion for an order to show cause under Rule 91(f) and respondent's response;
• respondent's motion to review the sufficiency of petitioner's answers or objections to respondent's requests for admission;
• respondent's motion to compel responses to interrogatories;
• respondent's motion to compel production of documents;
• petitioner's motion to impose sanctions;
• petitioner's motion to review the sufficiency of respondent's answers or objections to petitioner's requests for admission;
• petitioner's motion to compel answers to interrogatories;
• petitioner's motion to compel production of documents;
• petitioner's motion to enforce subpoena; and
• petitioner's motion for leave to file response to response to motion for order to show cause why proposed facts and evidence should not be accepted as established pursuant to Rule 91(f).
We'll discuss each one. The parties are fully aware of the facts, so in the interest of speedily ruling on these motions we will not recite them in this order.
Rule 91(f) motion and response
Rule 91(f) requires us to issue an order to show cause why proposed facts should not be deemed stipulated. Parties typically invoke it when there's been a breakdown of the stipulation process. Petitioner here moved for an order to show cause, which we granted because the rule requires us to do so. There hasn't been a breakdown of the stipulation process here, just an ordinary dispute about the stipulation's language.
Many of the contested proposed stipulations and responses are about the meaning of stipulation language that "X is included in Exhibit Y." The Court does not regard such stipulations as pointless in a conservation-easement case because the regulations have numerous formal requirements for what must be in a deed or appraisal or other paperwork. But it also doesn't regard such statements as definitive proof precluding the admission of evidence to the contrary. For example, the regulation requires a description of the property in the appraisal. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(i)(A). We read petitioner's proposed stipulation 2.b as establishing only that he complied with this formal requirement, not that its description of the property is accurate or incontestable. And all of respondent's objections to proposed stipulations 1-3 are similar. With this construction we overrule respondent's objection and will deem these proposed stipulations as established.
Respondent explained his objections to proposed stipulations 4-21 and 23-31 This makes them "genuinely controverted or doubtful" issues of fact under Rule 91(f)(4). We will therefore not deem them stipulated.
Proposed stipulation 22 is an outlier. Respondent objects to this one because he's already admitted its truth in his response to an earlier request for admission. That admission makes it a fact "that should not be in dispute," Rule 91(a), not one that is objectionable.
Respondent's motion to review RFAs
Respondent asked us to review the sufficiency of petitioner's responses to 15 of his requests for admission. RFAs 10-18 all ask about information regarding the activity (or lack of activity) of Mack Powell and Rhonda Fortson regarding the possible disposition, development, and financing of the subject property. To all these requests petitioner replied that Powell and Fortson were represented by separate counsel.
The Court does not think this a valid objection. Powell and Forton are the children of the woman who herself inherited the property back in 1960. They contributed the property to Ardan. They received an interest in the partnership. They received K-1s from the partnership. The requests all seek admissions regarding their use of the property. They share a common interest in this case with Ardan and their partners. That means that under our Rule 90(c), petitioner was under an obligation to make "reasonable inquiry" to them to admit or deny the request. That these two partners are represented by their own counsel does not make asking them questions unreasonable. And, given the importance of valuing the property to this case, asking them about any uses or possible sales of the property for years before Ardan was organized is likewise not a reasonable objection.
RFAs 32 and 51 seek an admission that core samples taken by AquaFUSION and described in the Capps Report were destroyed. Petitioner's response to RFA 32 shows that petitioner did ask the testing company that received the samples about their whereabouts and was told that they were either destroyed in testing or discarded. Petitioner's response to RFA 51 states that petitioner doesn't have the core samples and refers to RFA 32. This is the only information cited by petitioner and the Court sees no reason to regard petitioner's responses to these RFAs as "unable to admit or deny" as other than evasive under the circumstances. Under Rule 90(e) we will deem these matters admitted.
RFAs 48, 49, 58, and 59 all seek admissions that there haven't been various studies of the uses and resources of the subject property other than the AquaFUSION report that respondent knows about. Petitioner denied each of these. Respondent argues that a bare denial is insufficient under Rule 90(c), but that's true only if good faith requires a denial be qualified or partial. The Court sees no reason why petitioner's denials fall within either of those exceptions.
Respondent's motion to compel responses to interrogatories
Respondent served petitioner with 26 numbered interrogatories. Rule 71(a) limits parties to 25 but doesn't count interrogatories about expert witnesses. One of respondent's interrogatories is about petitioner's experts, so it looked on the surface as if respondent had complied.
Petitioner disagreed. It inserted extra numerals in its response, counting all the way to 81. But it stopped answering any after "new" 25.
This is an unusual response, but we take this to mean that petitioner objects to most of respondent's interrogatories as too numerous. We also note that a reasonable level of civil dialogue and commitment to the Court's ideal of informal and efficient discovery would have obviated the need for the Court to slog through this motion.
Counting interrogatories is hard. Our Rule, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a)(1), from which we copied it, tells us only that "discrete subparts" of a single numbered interrogatory count as separate interrogatories. This has led to a profusion of trial-court attempts to find some verbal formula to give content to the concept of "discrete subpart." (There is a good catalog in Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., 315 F.R.D. 191, 197-99 (E.D. Tex. 2016). None has been entirely successful, which has in turn led to the Justice Stewart approach: We know it when we see it. Banks v. Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms & Doorkeeper, 222 F.R.D. 7, 10 n.4 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676 (Stewart J., concurring) (stating, as to pornography, "I know it when I see it")).
We will look for whether subparts "are logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary question" in the interrogatory, Erfindergemeinschaft at 196 (citations omitted), but always with an eye to the "pragmatic approach" of reconciling the competing purposes of the limit: using interrogatories to get a complete answer, but not multiplying interrogatories so much as to needlessly raise the cost of litigation. Id. at 196-97.
Let's first consider interrogatory number 1:
Describe any activity(s) taken between January 1, 1960, and the date of the Easement donation, by any person and/or entity, with respect to the use or potential future use of the Property as a mine. The response to this Interrogatory includes, but is not limited to, operating a working mine, leasing the Property to a mining operation, and making any efforts to lease the Property to a mining business, to secure mining permits, or to obtain capital to fund a mining business.
Petitioner renumbered this interrogatory to make it into five:
[1] Describe any activity(s) taken between January 1, 1960, and the date of the Easement donation, by any person and/or entity, with respect to the use or potential future use of the Property as a mine. The response to this Interrogatory includes, but is not limited to, operating a working mine, [2] leasing the Property to a mining operation, and [3] making any efforts to lease the Property to a mining business, [4] to secure mining permits, or to [5] obtain capital to fund a mining business.
A similar go-forth-and-multiply approach yielded the total of 81 newly renumbered interrogatories, which petitioner stopped answering after approximately midway through what respondent had numbered as his interrogatory number 7. Even in those 6 ½ that petitioner chose to answer, it sometimes gave crabbed responses.
Again, turn to the response to interrogatory 1 (or interrogatories 1 - 5 in petitioner's renumbering:
RESPONSE: Petitioner objects to the 57-year scope of this interrogatory and unlimited scope of "any person and/or entity". Mrs. McLanahan died in 2007 and Mr. Powell and Ms. Fortson were her only two heirs under her will. To the extent Petitioner has knowledge, Petitioner responds as follows:
[1] operating a working mine (1960-12/29/17)
Petitioner is not aware of either the Estate of Mrs. Jimmie McLanahan, Mr. Powell, or Ms. Fortson operating a working mine on the property. Petitioner did not undertake any activity to operate a working mine on the property before 2017. In 2017, Ardan Holdings began investigating the feasibility of operating a working mine, including hiring and obtaining reports from AquaFUSION who in turn obtained drilling and testing, and Capps Geoscience who prepared a resource valuation report, both previously provided to Respondent and included in the Stipulation of Facts as Exhibits 37-J and 38-J.
[2] leasing to a mining operation (1960-12/29/17)
Petitioner provided a Full Certificate of Title in 2017 showing fee simple title to the property to Respondent and included it as proposed Exhibit 48-J to Petitioner's Rule 91(f) motion. On page 3 of that document, section "(bb) NOTE: portions of the property of Jimmie McLanahan, f/k/a Jimmie McLanahan Fortson, were leased to [g]ranite companies many years ago. All the recorded leases appear to have expired or been released." Accordingly, it appears there were some prior leases "many years ago" and none were in place in 2017, when Petitioner was formed. Upon information and belief, all mining leases occurred before Ms. Fortson and Mr. Powell inherited the property following Mrs. McLanahan's death in 2007. Petitioner does not have possession of any recorded leases, but as those would be in the public record they would already be available to Respondent.
[3] efforts to lease to mining business (1960-12/29/17)
Petitioner is not aware of any efforts to lease the property to a mining business by the Estate of Mrs. Jimmie McLanahan, Mr. Powell, or Ms. Fortson from 2007-2017. Petitioner did not undertake any activity to lease the property to a mining business in 2017.
[4] efforts to secure mining permits (1960-12/29/17)
As there appears to have been prior leases to "granite companies" whose leases were recorded, there may have been mining permits secured for the property during this 57-year time period. Petitioner is not aware of any efforts to secure mining permits for the property by the Estate of Mrs. Jimmie McLanahan, Mr. Powell, or Ms. Fortson from 2007-2017. Petitioner inquired whether mining permits could be obtained for the property. See Capps report generally and sections 10.2 "Permitting" and Appendix G, Georgia Mining Act: 391-3-3-.02 Permits. Amended "(6) Exemption. Tunnels, shafts, and dimension stone quarries are by law exempted from the provision of the Act."
[5] efforts to obtain capital to fund a mining business (1960-12/29/17)
Petitioner is not aware of any efforts to obtain capital to fund a mining business by the Estate of Mrs. Jimmie McLanahan, Mr. Powell, or Ms. Fortson from 2007-2017. Petitioner solicited investors via the PPM in 2017 to raise funds for a dimension stone quarry had the development strategy been selected.
Some of these responses, such as the response to renumbered [5], are perfectly adequate. Some are limited to what petitioner has "knowledge of" rather than, as our Rule requires, what a party is able to learn through "reasonable inquiry" and "readily obtainable information." Rule 71(b).
With this example and explanation of our exasperation with petitioner's approach in mind, we rule as follows (in all cases using respondent's numbers):
Int. 1 - This is a single interrogatory. Respondent evidently suspects the subject property was never or only in the past used as a mine. He reasonably includes in this interrogatory actual mining by the property owner, leasing to an operating mine, getting permits to mine, etc. Petitioner will have to try again and answer this one fully.
Int. 2 - Petitioner's response is adequate.
Int. 3 - This is a single interrogatory on the subject of whether mineral rights were severed. Petitioner's response is adequate.
Int. 4 - This one asks for "any and all business activities" of six individuals or entities in calendar year 2017. Petitioner is actually correct that, as respondent chose to phrase it, this interrogatory has six discrete subparts; namely, each of the six entities or individuals, each of whose business activities in 2017 may have not been limited to activity with each other or with the subject property. Petitioner's objection that it is also overbroad is also well-taken. Business activities having nothing to do with the subject property are well outside the scope of discovery, which we limit to "the subject matter involved in the pending case." Rule 70(b). Petitioner did not stand on this objection but answered it in relevant part. This
response is adequate, except for the portion of the interrogatory asking about Powell and Fortson. Petitioner still has to answer about their activity as it relates to the subject property despite their separate representation.
Int. 5 - This response is inadequate. As we held above, the separate representation of Powell and Fortson is not a valid reason for petitioner's failure to make an inquiry about them.
Int. 6 - This one again asks about "any and all business activities" of six named individuals or entities. Our ruling is the same as for Interrogatory 4 - the breadth of respondent's phrasing does make it six interrogatories, and it is too broad as phrased. This response is also adequate, except for the portion of the interrogatory asking about Powell and Fortson. Petitioner still has to answer about their activity as it relates to the subject property despite their separate representation.
Int. 7 - This is a single interrogatory that asks about what activities were conducted on the subject property in the years leading up to Ardan's formation. It is obviously aimed at discoverable information about the value and highest and best use of the property. Petitioner needs to answer it completely.
Ints. 8-15 - Each of these is a single interrogatory that petitioner needs to answer completely. The subject matter of each is singular; petitioner's suggested renumbering just reflects respondent's understandable goal of pinning petitioner's position down on each of the discrete subjects each of these interrogatories addresses.
Ints. 16-24, and 26. These do exceed the 25 interrogatory limit. Petitioner need not answer them.
Int. 25 - this seeks the identity of petitioner's testifying experts. The pretrial order sets the deadline for this disclosure as January 26, 2024.
Respondent's motion to compel production of documents
Respondent served petitioner with 62 document-production requests. Petitioner produced thousands of pages of documents that it had not already produced. Its response to many of the requests was to point to previous document productions already made in informal discovery.
Respondent has four objections.
The first is that petitioner produced a 5,254-page "mass of documents." Inasmuch as this is a multimillion-dollar case of some complexity, this is not an unusual quantity. Inasmuch as the production was done in electronic and searchable form, it is not in an unreasonable format. And, inasmuch as respondent's requests included one (Request 41) that asked for "all correspondence, emails, communications, notes or other documents that may relate in any way to the Easement Transaction . . .," petitioner is quite right that one gets what one asks for. We overrule this objection.
Respondent next objects to petitioner's nonproduction of documents in the hands of third parties. Rule 91(a)(1) limits the scope of document requests to those in the "possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the request is served." We have long construed this to mean that a party "has the legal right to obtain the document." Zaentz v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 469, 474 (1979) (quoting 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, sec. 2210 at 621 (1970)). We overrule this objection.
Respondent objects next to four requests for which petitioner did not produce any documents. Request 1 sought all documents "used in the preparation or response to, any Interrogatory served upon Petitioner. We agree with petitioner that this is not a request that describes the documents sought with "reasonable particularity." See Rule 72(b). We also agree with petitioner that it seeks to reveal the mental impressions of counsel in preparing for trial, and thus falls within the work-product privilege. Request 3 sought transfer tax forms. Petitioner replied that it had none. Respondent gives no particular reason for why this is an inadequate response, except that respondent doesn't believe it. Request 24 sought "all documentation of Strategic Seek One, LLC's capital accounts, including all financial statements and general ledgers, for 2014-2021". Petitioner adequately responds that it has produced all the records relating to the easement; Strategic Seek One apparently has other business operations and respondent has made no showing that those other operations are related to "the subject matter of this case." See Rule 70(b). We also agree that Request 60, which asks for all documents after the filing of the tax return relating to various crimes and civil causes of action, would not be included in the set of documents "relating to the subject matter" here. They also appear more likely than not to seek records protected by the work-product privilege.
That leaves respondent's objection to petitioner's response to Request 8, which requests all drilling samples and reports about them. We have already, in our ruling regarding deemed admissions, deemed admitted that to the best of petitioner's knowledge all prelitigation core samples were destroyed. If petitioner's experts have taken newer core samples, they would presumptively be protected from disclosure under Rule 70(c)(3).
We'll therefore deny this motion.
Petitioner's motion to impose sanctions
In this motion, petitioner wants us to issue an order deeming admitted its first 41 requests for admission because respondent filed his response to them one day late.
The problem is that petitioner served respondent with two "First Request for Admissions"-one on December 1 and one on December 4. The one served on December 4 included the same 41 RFAs that it had served the previous Friday, but added a few more.
We think it was reasonable for respondent to count the 30 days he had to respond from the date of service of the slightly longer version on December 4, which looks like a superseding amendment or revised brief that we occasionally receive. His response to that filing was timely.
Petitioner's motion to review RFAs
In this motion petitioner challenges the first 41 of respondent's 44 responses to its RFAs. It challenges their timeliness, which we've just ruled on. It also asserts that all the responses are "evasive." Pet. Mot. to Review the Sufficiency of Ans. or Obj. to Req. for Ad., ¶ 22, Jan. 12, 2024. We disagree as well with this universal objection, given that the actual responses show perhaps too much precision, not evasiveness.
Onto the more specific objections.
The first arises from RFAs 1-3, 16-18, and 24. What these all have in common is petitioner's intent to nail down that the individuals who signed the appraisal had various objective qualifications-for example, that they were licensed or members of the Appraisal Institute. We don't understand petitioner's objection to RFA 24, because it is an admission that the Appraisal Institute's website shows Thomas Wingard as a member. Perhaps respondent wants to reserve the possibility that the Institute posts inaccurate information, but we don't think this phrasing is evasive. It's just persnickety. All respondent's other responses to this group of RFAs note that petitioner used the limiting phrase "at the time the Appraisal was prepared." Knowledge of the appraiser's qualifications at a particular time is not ordinarily in respondent's knowledge, and the responses state that respondent checked out the internet to see what he could admit gleaned from his reading of the government website involved. These responses are adequate.
Petitioner's objections to respondent's responses to RFAs 4, 7-8, 19, and 22- 23 are likewise misplaced. These responses are not evasive, they too are just persnickety. When an RFA asks a party to admit facts about an appraiser's education and training, and there has been no documentary or testimonial backup, it invites just what respondent did here - answer with a statement that he doesn't have information or knowledge of the facts asked to be admitted.
Petitioner wins on RFAs 5 and 20. These ask respondent to admit that neither of petitioner's qualified appraisers were prohibited from practicing before the IRS. This is knowledge that is within respondent's ken. Respondent does kind of admit that these appraisers were not prohibited, but in a semantically awkward way: "Respondent does not contest that [the appraiser] was prohibited from practicing before the IRS." Pet. Mot. to Review the Sufficiency of Ans. or Obj. to Req. for Ad., ¶ 29, Jan. 12, 2024. This is either intentionally awkward, in which case it's evasive, or is intended to mean its opposite. We read "does not contest" in this context as synonymous with "admits," and will deem both RFA 5 and 20 admitted.
Petitioner also wins on RFAs 6 and 21. These RFAs sought admissions that petitioner's appraisers regularly performed appraisals for compensation. Respondent in each case admits in the course of several paragraphs that they are "general real estate appraisers." We understand that respondent wants to assert that they are not skilled in appraising real estate used in mining operations, but that's not what the RFA asks for. We will deem both RFAs admitted.
Petitioners next challenges respondent's responses to RFAs 12, 14, 28, and 30. Respondent actually admits RFAs 12 and 28 and adequately explains why he can't answer the other two. We will deem RFAs 12 and 28 admitted.
Respondent wins on RFAs 15 and 31. These are not evasive; they are plain denials.
Petitioner's final challenge arises from RFAs 32, and 39-41. Respondent adequately explains his denial of RFAs 32, 39, and 41. He admits RFA 40, which (as with so much of these discovery disputes) confuses proof of petitioner's having met the formal requirements of a qualified appraisal with the substantive accuracy of the statements made in that appraisal.
Petitioner's motion to compel answers to interrogatories (dkt. entry 82)
Petitioner filed two "motions to compel discovery" on the same day. One is directed at interrogatories, the other to document production. To reduce the confusion this might cause to the Court's docket clerks, we include a reference to the specific docket entry number.
Petitioner objects to several of respondent's answers to its interrogatories.
We look at each.
Interrogatories 1 and 16 are contention interrogatories. Petitioner wants to pin down, to the specific subsection of the Code and regulations, where respondent thinks petitioner's deduction fails. Contention interrogatories are acceptable, and in his answer to interrogatory 16 respondent provides a long list of requirements for a conservation-easement deduction that he regards as still at issue. This is at a reasonable level of specification.
Interrogatories 2 and 3 concern the chain of title and whether Ardan made a valid transfer. It's quite clear that respondent thinks it possible that Ardan was conveying something it didn't own. This is an understandable and triable issue. Respondent's answers to these interrogatories may not be what petitioner wants, but they are adequate.
Respondent accurately states that he concedes the points in interrogatories 4 and 10 that the easement meets the perpetuity requirement.
Respondent gave detailed answers to interrogatories 13 and 14. We conclude that they are made in good faith and reasonably complete. That's all Rule 71(b) requires.
Respondent also gave a detailed answer to interrogatory 15. We stress again, as we have throughout this lengthy order, that we understand that there is a distinction between meeting the formal requirement of filling out a form completely and filling it out accurately. Respondent's answer reflects this distinction. The accuracy of the entries on petitioner's form 8283 remains triable.
Petitioner's motion to compel production of documents (dkt. entry 81)
This motion is directed at requests for the production of documents 2-4 that are relevant to the question of supervisory approval of penalties in the FPAA under Code section 6751. What documents respondent produced were heavily redacted. We understand the high probability that some of the redactions are legitimately aimed at preserving privileged information. Some probably have nothing to do with penalty approval. But that's some, not all.
This is a situation that calls for an in camera review.
We do recognize that at least one other division of our Court has shielded internal IRS communications from even in camera review. But this is an area committed to the discretion of each judge. And we are also very much aware of the situation that came to light in LakePoint Land II, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-11, at *10-11 (finding that the government attorneys failed to timely make the Court aware of a backdated signature on a penalty Lead Sheet). We'll give petitioner a chance to find out.
Petitioner's motion to enforce subpoena
Petitioner served a subpoena on The Appraisal and Consultant Group, Inc. on December 19, 2023. It sought only the information a party opponent is entitled to receive from a testifying expert under Rule 70(c)(4)(B). ACG did not appear at the hearing before Judge Siegel to contest the subpoena. Respondent apparently does not dispute that ACG is supplying his testifying expert.
We will therefore grant this motion.
Petitioner's motion for leave to file another motion for leave to file response to response to motion for order to show cause why proposed facts and evidence should not be accepted as established pursuant to rule 91(f)
Petitioner filed another pretrial motion this Tuesday to argue some more about its Rule 91(f) motion. The Court must observe that the parties in this case have not been litigating the pretrial phase of this case entirely in the informal, reasonable, and cost-efficient way our rules and customs encourage. We can rule on this motion by observing that it is not provided for in the pretrial order that set deadlines in this case with an eye to making sure it can be tried on time late next month. "When you are travelling on a road, there must be an end; but when astray, your wanderings are limitless." Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Letters from a Stoic 37 (Richard Mott Gummere trans., 2016).
It is therefore
ORDERED that petitioner's December 22, 2023 motion for order to show cause why proposed facts and evidence should not be accepted as established pursuant to Rule 91(f) is granted and paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 22 of the parties' stipulation of facts (attached as exhibit A to its motion) are accepted as established and the order to show cause issued by the Court on December 28, 2023 is to that extent made absolute. It is, as to all other paragraphs, discharged. It is also
ORDERED that respondent's January 11, 2024 motion to review the sufficiency of answers or objections to request for admissions is granted as to RFAs 10-18, and petitioner shall on or before February 2, 2024 serve on respondent's counsel answers to those requests. It is also
ORDERED that respondent's January 11, 2024 motion to review the sufficiency of answers or objections to request for admissions is granted as to RFAs 32 and 51 and those requests are deemed admitted. It is also
ORDERED that respondent's January 11, 2024 motion to review the sufficiency of answers or objections to request for admissions is denied as to RFAs 48, 49, 58, and 59. It is also
ORDERED that respondent's January 11, 2024 motion to compel responses to interrogatories is granted only as to interrogatories 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7-15 and petitioner shall on or before February 2, 2024 serve on respondent's counsel complete answers to those interrogatories. Respondent's motion is otherwise denied. It is also
ORDERED that respondent's January 12, 2024 motion to compel production of documents is denied. It is also
ORDERED that petitioner's January 9, 2024 motion to impose sanctions is denied. It is also
ORDERED that petitioner's January 12, 2024 motion to review the sufficiency of answers or objections to request for admissions is granted as to RFAs 5, 6, 12, 20, 21, 28, and 40 but is otherwise denied. It is also
ORDERED that petitioner's January 12, 2024 motion to compel discovery (docket entry 82) is denied. It is also
ORDERED that petitioner's January 12, 2024 motion to compel discovery (docket entry 81) is granted as to requests 2-4. Respondent shall, on or before February 2, 2024, submit the documents listed in his responses to requests 2 and 4 to the Court for an in camera review. Respondent shall submit these documents in two sets, one redacted and one unredacted, both in double-sealed envelopes marked "FOR JUDGE'S EYES ONLY." Respondent shall also include a copy of his privilege log. Respondent must submit only documents that he redacted in his production to petitioner. It is also
ORDERED that petitioner's January 19, 2024 motion to enforce subpoena is granted, and The Appraisal & Consultant Group, Inc. shall on or before February 2, 2024 produce to petitioner's counsel the documents described in the subpoena served on it on December 19, 2023. It is also
ORDERED that the clerk of the court is directed to provide additional service to:
The Appraisal & Consulting Group, Inc.
9082 Independence Avenue
Daphne, AL 36526
It is also
ORDERED that petitioner's January 23, 2024 motion for leave, etc., is denied.