Opinion
NNHCV166066564S
07-09-2019
Thomas ARCIUOLO et al. v. TOMTEC, INC. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Wahla, J.
The defendants, Tomtec, Inc. and Thomas Astle, filed this motion for reconsideration of the court’s September 25, 2018, order, where it modified a previous order to deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress and General Statutes § 31-51q claims. The court hereby grants the motion and modifies its original order to grant the defendants summary judgment for the reasons set forth below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case has a complex and layered procedural history. In their revised complaint, the plaintiffs- Thomas Arciuolo, William Harris, George Mancini, and Howard Tomlin- allege they initially brought this matter against the defendants- Tomtec, Inc. (Tomtec) and Thomas Astle- before the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. Thereafter, having exhausted their administrative remedies, the plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court, District of Connecticut. It was later remanded to Superior Court. The plaintiffs commenced the present state court action against the defendants on November 22, 2016. The plaintiffs’ revised twenty-count complaint asserted counts sounding in breach of contract, promissory estoppel, a hostile work environment in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge in violation of General Statutes § 31-51q.
The substantive allegations of the complaint are not relevant to the defendants’ motion. Further discussion of the plaintiffs’ claims can be found in the court’s January 19, 2018, order.
Most relevant to the defendants’ motion for reconsideration, however, are the filings beginning with the court’s memorandum of decision issued January 19, 2018. See Docket Entry No. 110.20. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss counts three, seven, eleven, and fifteen, alleging violations of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), and also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on counts seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, and twenty, alleging violations of General Statutes § 31-51q; counts four, eight, twelve, and sixteen, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress; counts one, five, nine, and thirteen, alleging breach of contract; and counts two, six, ten, and fourteen, alleging promissory estoppel.
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S., 138 S.Ct. 594, 199 L.Ed.2d 473 (2018), the court issued a sua sponte order six days after its memorandum of decision, on January 25, 2018, inviting the parties to reargue the summary judgment motion. See Docket Entry No. 122. The order stated in relevant part: "[T]he parties are directed and/or provided an opportunity to re-argue the motion for summary judgment. The court will hear the re-arguments on a date and time mutually agreed upon by the parties. Except March 12 to 23, and April 4-6, the parties are directed to select a date after consulting with the Case-flow Coordinator for the re-argument of summary judgment."
Following the court’s January 25, 2018, order, no activity occurred on the case until a caseflow request filed by the plaintiffs on August 3, 2018. See Docket Entry No. 123. At first, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request to schedule reargument. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking reargument on at least the intentional infliction of emotional distress and § 31-51q claims after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Artis . See Docket Entry No. 125. The court then modified its January 19, 2018, order, denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress and § 31-51q claims. See Docket Entry No. 125.20. The defendants then filed their motion for reconsideration, asking the court to reverse its September 25, 2018, order. See Docket Entry Nos. 127-28. Argument was heard on the defendants’ motion at short calendar on May 6, 2019.
The defendants include a July 30, 2018, email from the plaintiffs’ attorney as an attachment to their objection to the plaintiffs’ August 3, 2018, caseflow request seeking to schedule reargument. See Docket Entry No. 124. The defendants claim this is the plaintiffs’ first attempt to schedule reargument after this court’s January 25, 2018, order inviting the same.
DISCUSSION
The court will first summarize briefly its previous orders as they relate to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Artis, in interpreting the (federal) supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367(d), which contemplates the plaintiff re-filing state claims in state court in the event the district court dismisses the federal and state claims, provides: "The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period."
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) states in relevant part: "[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."
As of this court’s January 19, 2018, order, there was a split of authority over how to read the statute’s tolling provision. Prior to the Artis decision, two readings of § 1367(d) had emerged- a stop-the-clock reading, where the state statute of limitations period is suspended during the pendency of the district court action and for thirty days thereafter, and a grace-period reading, where the plaintiff is to re-file state claims in state court within thirty days after dismissal. Artis v. District of Columbia, supra, 138 S.Ct. 598. Without guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, or Connecticut courts, this court relied on the grace-period reading in issuing its January 19, 2018, order. Three days later, however, the U.S. Supreme Court went the other way, endorsing the stop-the-clock reading. Id., 608.
Had this court applied the stop-the-clock reading in issuing its January 19, 2018, order, its decision would have been partly impacted. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were entertained and later dismissed by the district court in line with § 1367(d). Using a stop-the-clock reading, the three-year limitations period was tolled while these claims were pending in district court and for thirty days thereafter, and they were subsequently brought timely before this court. Though the § 31-51q claims were not asserted in the district court action and, not raised as separate counts until the plaintiffs’ revised complaint filed March 27, 2017, the court later found these claims were preserved by the relation back doctrine. In its September 25, 2018, order, this court- relying on Artis - denied summary judgment on these two sets of counts.
I.
"The granting of a motion for reconsideration ... is within the sound discretion of the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mangiante v. Niemiec, 98 Conn.App. 567, 575, 910 A.2d 235 (2006). "[T]he purpose of a reargument is ... to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts ... A reconsideration implies reexamination and possibly a different decision by the [court] which initially decided it ... [A] reconsideration hearing involves consideration of the trial evidence in light of outside factors such as new law, a miscalculation or a misapplication of the law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaser v. Jaser, 37 Conn.App. 194, 202-03, 655 A.2d 790 (1995).
"[A]ppellate courts have held that the trier, in the exercise of its discretion, need not entertain reargument with respect to issues for which the proponent of a motion to reargue presents no new authority or facts ... None of these authorities purports to deprive the trier of the power to undertake reconsideration that the trier believes to be warranted on equitable grounds." (Citations omitted.) Mangiante v. Niemiec, supra, 98 Conn.App. 577.
The defendants are moving this court to reconsider the September 25, 2018, order. Their position is that the court’s January 19, 2018, order- granting the defendants summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress and § 31-51q claims- should stand, as the plaintiffs’ response to the court’s January 25, 2018, order inviting reargument is untimely. Further, the defendants argue the court did not have jurisdiction to enter the September 25, 2018, order. The plaintiffs’ position is that the September 25, 2018, order- denying the defendants summary judgment on the two sets of claims- should stand. The plaintiffs argue, in light of Artis, that the court’s January 19, 2018, order was based on an incorrect interpretation of the law. In response to the defendants’ timeliness arguments, the plaintiffs argued at short calendar that they read the court’s January 25, 2018, order as setting aside the judgment.
II.
To start, the court finds that the General Statutes § 31-51q claims were previously conceded by the plaintiffs and will grant the defendants’ motion with respect to those claims. In their memorandum submitted in support of their motion for reconsideration; see Docket Entry No. 128; the defendants attach a court transcript, where the plaintiffs’ attorney acknowledged they were no longer pursuing the CFEPA and § 31-51q claims. More recently, at short calendar, the plaintiffs’ attorney, though not expressly stating the plaintiffs were conceding the § 31-51q claims, stated that if the court were to rule in the plaintiffs’ favor on the present motion, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims would survive.
The court grants the defendants’ motion for reconsideration on these claims and returns to its original order of summary judgment for the defendants on counts seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, and twenty, sounding in wrongful termination pursuant to § 31-51q.
The court next assesses the plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, addressing various arguments raised by the parties in no particular order.
The court considers the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the January 25, 2018, order as setting aside the judgment entered six days earlier a stretch. The court at no point in that order uses any terminology that could lead one to reasonably make such an interpretation. Further, Practice Book § 17-4(a) requires a motion to open or set aside be filed by a party within four months of notice of judgment; the plaintiffs did not do so here. The order indeed states in relevant part, "[T]he parties are directed and/or provided an opportunity to re-argue the motion for summary judgment," and later, "Except March 12 to 23, and April 4-6, the parties are directed to select a date ... for the re-argument of summary judgment." (Emphasis added.) The inclusion of specific dates- as far out as over three months post-order- was for the parties’ convenience, so everyone was aware the court would be unable to hear argument on those dates. The order provides that parties were provided an opportunity to re-argue the motion, and if such re-argument was desired, the parties were to schedule a date other than the ones mentioned. The language of the order does not excuse the plaintiffs’ six-plus months of inaction- from the January 25, 2018, order until the July 30, 2018, email or August 3, 2018, caseflow request.
The defendants raise a series of timeliness-related arguments, asserting the court lacked jurisdiction to enter its September 25, 2018, order because the plaintiffs failed to respond to the court’s January 25, 2018, order by any feasible cutoff date. The defendants cite to the twenty-day appeal window prescribed by Practice Book § 63-1(a) and the four-month deadline to open or set aside a judgment prescribed by Practice, Book § 17-4(a) or General Statutes § 52-212a. The defendants also cite to Practice Book § 11-11, which states in relevant part: "Any motions which would, pursuant to Section 63-1, delay the commencement of the appeal period, and any motions which, pursuant to Section 63-1, would toll the appeal period and cause it to begin again, shall be filed simultaneously insofar as such filing is possible, and shall be considered by the judge who rendered the underlying judgment or decision ... The foregoing applies to motions to reargue decisions that arc final judgments for purposes of appeal ..." Prior to the defendants’ present motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on August 22, 2018; see Docket Entry No. 125; which preceded the court’s September 25, 2018, order. The plaintiffs’ motion was brought pursuant to Practice Book § 11-11. See Andrews v. Charest, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-12-6018041-S (May 15, 2015, Tanzer, J.T.R.) ("The applicable Practice Book Section for filing this motion [for reconsideration] is § 11-11 rather than § 11-12"); Practice Book § 11-12(d) ("This section shall not apply to motions to reargue decisions which are final judgments for purposes of appeal"). The timeline for filing a motion for reconsideration is not restricted to twenty days. See SVS II Partnership v. Patel, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-05-4016571-S (January 14, 2010, Rittenband, J.) ("[A]ny time limitation on a motion to reargue is not applicable to a motion for reconsideration ... [T]his Court has inherent equitable authority in a matter of this type, and pursuant to the motion for reconsideration, the Court finds that an injustice would be done if the plaintiff were not to be awarded attorneys fees in this case"); Pedro v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 564838 (July 23, 2007, Hurley, J.) (43 Conn.L.Rptr. 805) (entertaining motion for reconsideration past twenty days in light of new law).
Practice Book § 63-1(a) provides in relevant part: "[A]n appeal must be filed within twenty days of the date notice of the judgment or decision is given."
Practice Book § 17-4(a) provides in relevant part: "Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent."
General Statutes § 52-212a provides in relevant part: "Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed."
Practice Book 11-12(a) contains a twenty-day deadline, running from issuance of notice of decision or order, for a party seeking to reargue said decision or order. The defendants’ motion having been filed pursuant to Practice Book § 11-11, § 11-12(a) is not relevant.
In ruling on the defendants’ motion with respect to the remaining counts, the court assesses whether it had jurisdiction to enter its September 25, 2018, order. "Our case law establishes that any substantive modification of a judgment constitutes an opening of the judgment. The issue of whether a particular action by the trial court opens the judgment typically arises when the court alters the judgment more than four months after the judgment was rendered and a party challenges the court action as an untimely opening of the judgment under § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4, both of which provide that the trial court lacks the power to open a judgment more than four months after the judgment is rendered ... This court consistently has held that [i]n the absence of waiver or consent of the parties, a court is without jurisdiction to modify or correct a judgment in other than clerical respects beyond the four-month period." (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696, 705-06, 894 A.2d 259 (2006). "The continuing jurisdiction exception [in General Statutes § 52-212a] to the four-month rule is rooted in a court’s interest in preserving the integrity of its judgments. Specifically, this court previously has recognized that it is within the equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocque v. Light Sources, Inc., 275 Conn. 420, 433, 881 A.2d 230 (2005).
Here, the court’s September 25, 2018, order- modifying the January 19, 2018, order- was improper unless continuing jurisdiction was met. In AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission of Orange, 260 Conn. 232, 796 A.2d 1164 (2002), the Supreme Court examined the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to interpret an ambiguous judgment to effectuate the same. See id., 246, 250-51. This court’s January 19, 2018, order, however, was not ambiguous; summary judgment was awarded for the defendants. Further, reconsideration, as sought by the plaintiffs, was not warranted on equitable grounds; the claims implicated and the history of this case make it dissimilar from instances where the court has exercised such discretion. See, e.g., Pedro v. Miller, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 564838 (granting reconsideration in light of equitable reason excusing noncompliance with limitations period).
The court recognized that the terms "reasonable and necessary"- used in the rescript- could be open to interpretation and the trial court was within its continuing jurisdiction to interpret and effectuate the rescript in postjudgment proceedings. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission of Orange, 260 Conn. 232, 250-51, 796 A.2d 1164 (2002).
The court finds that its equitable authority to effectuate the prior judgment was not implicated in this case. The court will add that, in issuing its post-January 19, 2018, orders, it was not contemplating the finality of the judgment, but rather trying to be thorough and candid. The court and the parties were aware that the U.S. Supreme Court was to rule on the tolling issue in Artis . Judgment in this matter just happened to be rendered three days before the Artis ruling- when there remained a split of authority over how to interpret the tolling provision.
The court grants the defendants’ motion for reconsideration on the remaining claims and returns to its original order of summary judgment for the defendants on counts four, eight, twelve, and sixteen, sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court grants the defendants’ motion for reconsideration and grants the defendants summary judgment on the remaining counts.
It is So Ordered.