Archer v. Wedderien

11 Citing cases

  1. Price v. Wei Zhang

    2022 OK 95 (Okla. 2022)   Cited 3 times

    Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare of Oklahoma, 2001 OK 29, ¶22, 22 P.3d 695; Faulkenberry v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 1979 OK 142, ¶6, 602 P.2d 203. Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare of Oklahoma, see note 3, supra; Archer v. Wedderien, 1968 OK 186, ¶14, 446 P.2d 43; State ex rel. Gaines v. Beaver, 1945 OK 318, ¶21, 166 P.2d 776. Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare of Oklahoma, see note 3, supra; Crowell v. Thoreau Center, Partnership, 1981 OK 84, ¶2, 631 P.2d 751.

  2. J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Crites

    851 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1988)   Cited 23 times
    In J.I. Case Credit Corp. for example, the Tenth Circuit (interpreting Oklahoma law) held that, even assuming a creditor knew of the sale of its collateral, it did not waive its security interest where there was no suggestion in the record that the creditor " intended to ratify the prior sale and free the [collateral] from its security interest."

    Once again, we turn to Oklahoma law and find that "[w]aiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or conduct which warrants an inference of such intent . . ." Crowell v. Thoreau Center, Partnership, 631 P.2d 751, 752 (Okla. 1981) (citation omitted); see also Archer v. Wedderien, 446 P.2d 43, 45 (Okla. 1968). The court in Crowell also stated that waiver becomes a question of fact for the jury "where it is properly pled and there is evidence to support the plea . . ."

  3. Permian Corporation v. Armco Steel Corporation

    508 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1974)   Cited 6 times

    53 Am.Jur.2d, Mechanics' Liens, § 178, p. 697 and cases cited therein; 38 Am.Jur.2d, Gas and Oil, §§ 136-140; Annot. 59 A.L.R. 3rd, Oil and Gas — Mechanic's Materialman's Lien, pp. 278-302. These decisions are distinguishable from those which have held that the lien does not attach to the proceeds of the production where the applicable mechanic's or materialman's lien statute does not so expressly provide. Chambers v. Nation, 178 Colo. 124, 497 P.2d 5 (1972); Archer v. Wedderien, 446 P.2d 43 (Okla. 1968); Black v. Giarth, 88 Kan. 338, 128 P. 183 (1912). "The effect of the failure of a lien claimant to serve the required notice on the owner, or to serve a . . . proper notice, depends upon the terms of the statute creating the requirement . . .. Under the statutes in some states, a claimant required to give notice has no . . . enforceable lien . . .."

  4. SFF-Tir, LLC v. Stephenson

    250 F. Supp. 3d 856 (N.D. Okla. 2017)   Cited 28 times
    In SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, 250 F.Supp.3d 856 (N.D. Okla. 2017)(Browning, J), the Court excludes some evidence of settlement negotiations, where, for instance, a “letter's plain language clearly establishes that the letter was an offer to compromise a claim for less than what the Plaintiffs held to be the fair market value for their shares,” but excluded other evidence because the evidence was (i) not compromise offers between the plaintiffs and the defendants; and (ii) was unlikely to mislead or confuse the jury.

    Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare of Oklahoma, 2001 OK 29, 22 P.3d 695, 701 (Okla. 2001) (citing Faulkenberry v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 1979 OK 142, 602 P.2d 203, 206–07 ). "The doctrine is essentially a matter of intention, focusing on the intent of the party against whom waiver is asserted." Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare of Oklahoma, 2001 OK 29, 22 P.3d at 701 (citing State ex rel. Gaines v. Beaver, 1945 OK 318, 196 Okla. 560, 166 P.2d 776 ; Archer v. Wedderien, 1968 OK 186, 446 P.2d 43 ). "Waiver can be accomplished either expressly or implicitly."

  5. SFF-Tir, LLC v. Stephenson

    No. CIV 14-0369 JB/FHM (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2017)

    "The doctrine is essentially a matter of intention, focusing on the intent of the party against whom waiver is asserted." Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare of Oklahoma, 2001 OK 29, 22 P.3d at 701 (citing State ex rel. Gaines v. Beaver, 1945 OK 318, 166 P.2d 776; Archer v. Wedderien, 1968 OK 186, 446 P.2d 43). "Waiver can be accomplished either expressly or implicitly."

  6. Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare of Oklahoma

    2001 OK 29 (Okla. 2001)   Cited 50 times
    Stating that defendant in contribution action "may assert . . . any other available defenses . . . ."

    The doctrine is essentially a matter of intention, focusing on the intent of the party against whom waiver is asserted. State ex rel. Gaines v. Beaver, 1945 OK 318, 166 P.2d 776; Archer v. Wedderien, 1968 OK 186, 446 P.2d 43. As a preliminary matter the physician argues the Court of Civil Appeals, by its silence, impliedly affirmed the trial court's ruling that the hospital waived its right to seek contribution. It is true the trial court ruled that the hospital's contribution claim was barred not only by the doctrine of estoppel but also by the doctrine of waiver. It is also true that the Court of Civil Appeals did not address the waiver doctrine in its opinion.

  7. Perry v. Perry

    1976 OK 57 (Okla. 1976)   Cited 26 times
    In Perry, the Court held that the legislature did not intend to preclude parties, in contemplation of divorce, from freely contracting with respect to disposition of their property and alimony for support. Perry, 1976 OK 57, ¶ 8, 551 P.2d at 258.

    The proviso in the divorce decree evidences an unequivocal intent upon the part of the husband to waive his rights under § 1289(b) to terminate the alimony payments upon wife's remarriage. This Court has on more than one occasion said that a waiver occurs where there is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. Archer v. Wedderien, Okla., 446 P.2d 43 (1968); Kirtley v. Kirtley, Okla., 301 P.2d 671 (1956). Furthermore, a right may be waived whether conferred by law or contract.

  8. Hsre-Pep I, LLC v. Hsre-Pep Crimson Park LLC

    2013 OK Civ. App. 40 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013)

    The doctrine is essentially a matter of intention, focusing on the intent of the party against whom waiver is asserted. Barringer, 2001 OK 29, ¶ 22, 22 P.3d at 701 (citing Archer v. Wedderien, 1968 OK 186, 446 P.2d 43; State ex rel. Gaines v. Beaver, 1945 OK 318, 166 P.2d 776). The settlement agreement contemplates the mortgagee bringing a foreclosure action in the future: 1.01.2 Release and Covenant Not to Sue. Mortgagee hereby remises, releases and forever discharges Mortgagor and Guarantors . . . of and from any and all claims, causes of action, suits, controversies, torts and demands whatsoever involving in personam liability Mortgagee heretofore had or now has by reason of the Note, the Security Documents, and the Guarantees or otherwise arising in connection with the Project . . . or the loan transaction evidenced by the Security Documents. Mortgagee agrees that upon any subsequent determination that it is necessary, advisable or appropriate to institute a foreclosure action in order to foreclose the interest of any third party, Mortgagee shall not seek an in personam judgment or deficiency judgment against Mortgagor or Guarantors. It is expressly understood and agreed between the parties her

  9. Hsre-Pep I, LLC v.

    303 P.3d 918 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013)

    The doctrine is essentially a matter of intention, focusing on the intent of the party against whom waiver is asserted. Barringer, 2001 OK 29, ¶ 22, 22 P.3d at 701 (citing Archer v. Wedderien, 1968 OK 186, 446 P.2d 43;State ex rel. Gaines v. Beaver, 1945 OK 318, 196 Okla. 560, 166 P.2d 776). The settlement agreement contemplates the mortgagee bringing a foreclosure action in the future: 1.01.2 Release and Covenant Not to Sue. Mortgagee hereby remises, releases and forever discharges Mortgagor and Guarantors ... of and from any and all claims, causes of action, suits, controversies, torts and demands whatsoever involving in personam liability Mortgagee heretofore had or now has by reason of the Note, the Security Documents, and the Guarantees or otherwise arising in connection with the Project ... or the loan transaction evidenced by the Security Documents. Mortgagee agrees that upon any subsequent determination that it is necessary, advisable or appropriate to institute a foreclosure action in order to foreclose the interest of any third party, Mortgagee shall not seek an in personam judgment or deficiency judgment against Mortgagor or Guarantors. It is expressly understood and agreed between the

  10. Torres v. Torres

    956 P.2d 166 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998)   Cited 3 times

    ¶ 8 Waiver consists of an actual intention to relinquish a known right, either expressly or by conduct that warrants an inference of such an intent to relinquish. See Crowell v. Thoreau Center, Partnership, 1981 OK 84, ¶ 2, 631 P.2d 751, 752. A waiver "involves the notion of an intention entertained by the holder of some right to abandon or relinquish instead of insisting on the right."Archer v. Wedderien, 446 P.2d 43, 45 (Okla. 1968) (citations omitted). Moreover, "[t]he most rudimentary essential of a waiver is that the waiving party shall in some manner publish his intention to relinquish his rights, either by words or conduct . . . . An individual cannot waive his rights by words spoken to himself, which no third person hears, or by conduct which is never seen."