Opinion
No. 107488.
November 7, 1996.
Summary Disposition November 7, 1996:
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals order of October 9, 1996, is vacated insofar as it granted leave to appeal. MCR 7.302(F)(1). The case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings on an expedited basis. The Court of Appeals order staying the preliminary injunction entered by the circuit court is to remain in effect until final disposition by the circuit court of the request for a permanent injunction because the Supreme Court is persuaded that a showing of sufficient irreparable harm so as to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction has not been made. Michigan State Employees Ass'n v Dep't of Mental Health, 421 Mich. 152 (1984). The plaintiffs' motion for a stay is denied. Jurisdiction is not retained.
Court of Appeals No. 198073.
We join in the Court's order for the reasons that:
• expedited and final disposition on the merits by the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court would, it appears, avoid irreparable harm to the city, especially if the city prevails on the merits at the circuit court;
• it appears that 1996 PA 374, while changing the employer of 36th District Court employees from the State Judicial Council to the City of Detroit, does not alter the terms of any current collective bargaining agreement;
• the city's argument in support of its claim of irreparable harm has been essentially economic without stress of noneconomic consequences that would follow on implementation of Act 374; nor does it appear that noneconomic consequences of implementation of Act 374 will not await final disposition on the merits;
• while Act 374 replaces the state's obligation for the operating expenses of the 36th District Court with that of the City of Detroit, it provides for retention of court generated revenues by the city, cancels the city's annual fixed obligation, and earmarks revenues in a hold harmless fund, appropriated in Act 375, with the clear intent to ensure that the City of Detroit presently incurs no greater obligation than it had in fiscal year 1995-96.
• the employees of the 36th District Court have been timely paid on and after October 1, and the city is entitled to reimbursement out of the hold harmless fund no later than upon conclusion on December 31, 1996, of the first quarter of the current fiscal year.
Finally, it appears that the current appropriations are more than sufficient, for at least the first quarter of fiscal year 1996-97, to effect the statutorily expressed will of the Legislature.
I would grant the motion for immediate consideration, and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, I would vacate the order of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the stay of the trial court, and remand for expedited disposition.
Although the trial court found that since there was a very strong likelihood of constitutional and statutory violations "irreparable injury exists," we need not reach the issue whether the statement is legally correct. The trial court also found harm to the plaintiffs in the "time" and "effort" involved in transferring funding responsibility from the city to the state in the event that plaintiffs prevail on the merits. Such harm is not quantifiable and is not compensable by an adequate legal remedy, an appropriate consideration in the determination whether irreparable injury has been shown. Michigan State Employees Ass'n v Dep't of Mental Health, 421 Mich. 152, 157-158 (1984). Thus, restoration of the proportional share of state funding, or a declaration that the state is required to continue an appropriate level of funding should plaintiffs prevail on the merits, would not make the plaintiffs whole. Harm to the city's interest in restoring long-range fiscal integrity is similarly not remediable. Moreover, although defendants claim irreparable harm " [i]f the payment of these employees is to come from the budget of the judiciary," Motion for Stay, p 3 (emphasis added), there has been no determination as a matter of law that payment of 36th District Court employees must come from nonrestricted general funds appropriated to the judiciary. Nor have the parties or the trial court addressed the question of a mechanism to assure payment from funds appropriated by PA 375. Thus, there is no foundation for the Court of Appeals apparent conclusion that there would be an adverse effect on the budget and operations of the state judiciary if the stay is not lifted. The trial court having found a strong likelihood that plaintiffs would prevail on the merits, the public interest is served by maintaining the status quo.
The granting of a preliminary injunction is discretionary, and essentially involves the question of weighing the likelihood of success on the merits against the injury to the opponent if the preliminary decision is in error. 11A Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice Procedure, § 2948.3, p 200. If the order will be burdensome, the policy against the imposition of judicial restraint before adjudication of the merits becomes more significant. However, even where there is a presumption against a stay, it may be overcome if the balance is tipped against it, Hilton v Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987). The essential question is not the application of a mechanical test, but how best to preserve or create a state of affairs in which effective relief can be awarded to either party at the conclusion of the trial. Review is for abuse of discretion, which will be found only if the trial court incorrectly applied the law or relied on clearly erroneous findings of fact. Golden v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 73 F.3d 648 (CA 6, 1996).
The Court of Appeals made no finding of abuse of discretion, and I find none. Simply stated, given the inevitable administrative burden placed on the city by PA 374, and the trial court's finding of a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it would be better not to make the changeover, than to make the changeover and have to reverse it.
I concur with Justice BOYLE.