The trial court erred when it concluded that Lorraine Price was a bona fide purchaser for value. A prior unrecorded deed may be rendered ineffective by a subsequent purchaser for value without notice. Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117 (3) ( 21 SE2d 51) (1942). The consideration of a deed is always open to inquiry as to whether it is for valuable consideration or voluntary. Martin v. White, 115 Ga. 866, 871 ( 42 SE 279) (1902).

The first time that she had title to the house searched, her attorney discovered the security deed. In Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 127 ( 21 S.E.2d 51) (1942), we held: "The purpose of the recording statute is to protect against the negligent." The statute accomplishes this by encouraging the diligent.

Held: 1. A junior deed, properly recorded, taken without notice of an unrecorded senior deed from the same vendor and for a valuable consideration, has priority over such unrecorded senior deed. Code, § 29-401; Nickerson v. Porter, 189 Ga. 671 (3) ( 7 S.E.2d 231); Terry v. Ellis, 189 Ga. 698 ( 7 S.E.2d 282); Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 120 ( 21 S.E.2d 51); Patellis v. Tanner, 199 Ga. 304 ( 34 S.E.2d 84). 2.

Herndon v. Kimball, 7 Ga. 432 (50 Am. D. 406); Coniff v. Hunnicutt, 157 Ga. 823, 836 ( 122 S.E. 694). Sims and Grant were in possession of the property at the time they conveyed by deed to secure debt, and there is no fact or circumstance alleged in the petition which could be said to impute any notice, or put the defendant, First Federal Savings Loan Association, on inquiry, as to the plaintiff's claims. Under the rules stated in McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 714 (8-c) ( 132 S.E. 547), Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117 ( 21 S.E.2d 51), and McDonald v. Taylor, 200 Ga. 445 ( 37 S.E.2d 336), the plaintiff can not recover from the First Federal Savings Loan Association. A different result is not authorized by the decisions cited by counsel for the plaintiff in their original brief.

Equity requires diligence. Code, § 37-211; Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117 ( 21 S.E.2d 51). It is plain, therefore, that under the facts here shown equity must follow the law and grant to the named beneficiary her full vested rights under the policy and award the proceeds to her. West v. Pollard, 202 Ga. 549 ( 43 S.E.2d 509). There are decisions of this court which in the absence of clear analysis might be erroneously construed to be in conflict with what we have held above.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except DUCKWORTH, J., who dissents on authority of the ruling in Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117 ( 21 S.E.2d 51).

In Johnson v. Girtman, 115 Ga. 794 ( 42 S.E. 69), it was held that a deed conveying for a valuable consideration "all the right, title, interest, claim, or demand [the grantor] has or may have had in and to his interest in and to" a described lot of land was sufficient to convey whatever interest the grantor had in the entire lot; and where the grantee purchased in good faith, and held the land adversely under the deed for more than seven years, such claim ripened into a good prescriptive title. See generally, as to the effect of such a deed as a conveyance of title and as color of title, Perkins v. Rhodes, 192 Ga. 331 ( 15 S.E.2d 426); Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117 ( 21 S.E.2d 51); Hall v. Waterman, 220 Ill. 569 ( 77 N.E. 142, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 776); Lloyd v. Mills, 68 W. Va. 241 ( 69 S.E. 1094, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 702); Power v. Kitching, 10 N.D. 254 ( 86 N.W. 737, 88 Am. St. R. 691, 719, note); 2 C. J. S. 603, § 72; 1 Am. Jur. 901, § 196. The deed here not only conveyed "any and all rights grantor . . may have in and to the use of the stairway leading from Broad Street to the second floor of the buildings," but conveyed "also all rights to use of the hallways in said buildings.

See Middle Ga. Realty v. IDS Homes, 231 Ga. 57 (1) ( 200 S.E.2d 141) (1973).Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 122 (1) ( 21 S.E.2d 51) (1942). Although the use restrictions in the settlement agreement are functionally equivalent to those found in restrictive covenants contained in or incorporated into deeds, VHCA acknowledges that it did not record the settlement agreement within the property's chain of title.

It is by that statute made the plain duty of a grantee to record his deed, thereby giving constructive notice to every one of its existence and of his rights thereunder; and since it is thus made the duty of such grantee to supply notice, every one is justified in relying upon an examination of the record and believing that a purchase of land will convey all title which the record fails to disclose is in another." Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 127 (3) ( 21 S.E.2d 51) (1942). When a deed incorporates a recorded plat by reference as the legal description, such incorporated plat has the effect as if it were written out in the deed.

A quitclaim deed affords the same protection to a purchaser as a warranty deed when executed by the true owner and properly recorded. Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 122 (1) ( 21 S.E.2d 51) (1942); Pindar, Ga. Real Estate Law and Procedure, § 19-5, (4th ed. 1993). In interpreting an express easement, the rules of contract construction apply and the cardinal rule is to ascertain the intent of the parties.