It is the established rule that a demurrer to the evidence should be sustained only when there is no evidence to sustain the plaintiff's cause of action, or when the evidence fails to sustain some material issue. First State Bank v. Lattimer, 48 Okla. 104, 149 P. 1099; Archer v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 P.2d 268; Bell v. Radabough, 178 Okla. 106, 62 P.2d 79. And a demurrer to the evidence admits the truth of all the evidence offered on the part of the plaintiff, together with such inferences and conclusions as are reasonably deducible therefrom. Flesher v. Callahan, 32 Okla. 283, 122 P. 489; Fipps v. Stidham, 174 Okla. 473, 50 P.2d 680.

Defendant says the court committed reversible error in striking the following: "the allegations of fraud, corruption and deceit," from her amended cross-petition, but cites no authority in support of such claim, but it is clear that such contention is without merit. Defendant says the court erred in permitting one D.C. Patterson to testify as an expert witness in the examination of handwriting over the objection of the defendant; that the court erred in permitting said witness to testify for the reason and on the ground that he was not properly qualified as a witness in said cause, and cites Archer v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 268. He also states that this case establishes the rule in Oklahoma for qualification of an expert witness of this nature; wherein Chief Justice Burford, who wrote the opinion, states: "Evidence of experts based upon comparison is at best not very reliable, and we do not think that we should be justified in holding that writing can be used as standard writing, the evidence of whose genuineness rests only on opinion."

The objection made thereto by the plaintiff is that "the instruction was a clear invasion of the province of the jury and an unwarranted assumption by the judge as to the facts." Citing John W. Archer v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 268; and C. O. G. R. R. Co. v. Desperade, 12 Okla. 367, 71 P. 629. In response to such objection, the defendants suggest that the first or quoted paragraph of the instruction is a typographical error in writing or copying the same, and contend that the error in the first paragraph was entirely cured by the three succeeding paragraphs of the same numbered instruction.

It is reversible error for the court, in its instructions, to invade the province of the jury, assume a controverted fact as proven, or treat it as a question of law, and withhold the same from the determination of the jury. Archer v. U.S., 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 268. It is true that W. W. Pryor, an attorney who was associated with defendant in the prosecution of the Saber Jackson claim against the Thlocco estate, sued defendant for his part of the attorney's fees and alleged in his petition that he had been associated with defendant as counsel for Saber Jackson in the case appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals; that the defendant had settled said litigation and collected $50,000 as attorney's fee; and that the defendant filed his answer admitting as true all of the material allegations of the petition.

"A charge that in effect assumes the existence and proof of disputed facts, or which restricts or interferes with the discretion of the jury is erroneous." Chi., R. L. P. Ry. Co. v. Stibbs, 17 Okla. 97, 87 P. 293: Archer v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 268. "The court, in its instructions to the jury, should not call attention to particular facts in evidence in such a manner as to amount to an intimation of the court's opinion as to the weight of the evidence."

'The Supreme Court of this state has held in a number of cases that a demurrer to the evidence should be sustained, where the evidence does not reasonably support the allegations of the petition and will not support a verdict" — citing the following cases from this court in support of this proposition: Pitman v. City of El Reno, 4 Okla. 638, 46 P. 495; Archer v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 268; McCormick v. Bonfils 9 Okla. 605, 60 P. 296; Hanenkratt v. Hamil, 10 Okla. 219, 61 P. 1050; Sanders v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 10 Okla. 325, 61 P. 1075; Yingling v. Redwine, 12 Okla. 64, 69 P. 810; Watkins v. Havighorst, 13 Okla. 128, 74 P. 318; Pringey v. Guss, 16 Okla. 82, 86 P. 292. There is another proposition of law that counsel for plaintiffs in error has overlooked, and that is, that where a case is tried before a jury, or before the court sitting as a jury, the verdict of the jury or the finding of the court will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support the verdict or the findings.

The evidence was conflicting as to what the agreement was. The plaintiff contended the primary object of the contract was to drill a well and the defendant contending it was to clean out five producing wells; however, there is no conflict that the plaintiff drilled the well, described in the petition, and at it price agreed upon for day work, and that the defendant paid the plaintiff $2,500, and all of the conflicting testimony was determined by the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, and upon an examination of this record we think the testimony is amply sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, and under the well established rule of this court the verdict should not be disturbed. Archer et al. v. U.S., 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 968; Tulsa Hospital Association v. Juby, 73 Oklahoma, 175 P. 519; Lauderdale v. O'Neil, 74 Oklahoma, 177 P. 113; Peters Branch of Int. Shoe Co. v. Blake, 74 Oklahoma, 176 P. 892; St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Go. v. Peek, 591 Okla. 195, 158 P. 595. 3.

"When the record presents no question for review, except such as would require the Supreme Court to weigh the evidence and determine where the preponderance lies, the judgment of the court below will be affirmed." Carr v. Maxwell Trading Co., 24 Okla. 758, 105 P. 333; Town of Watonga v. Morrison, 78 Okla. 74, 189 P. 737; McDonald v. Strawn, 78 Okla. 271, 190 P. 558; Archer et al. v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 268. Neither counsel for plaintiff nor defendant has favored us with any authority upon any general ruling of this or any other court upon a question of law or a rule of this court, but content themselves with a brief argument on the facts that might well be presented to the trial court or jury, and as there was no demurrer to the evidence nor motion for judgment in the trial court, the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.

"When the record presents no question for review except such as would require the Supreme Court to weigh the evidence and determine where the preponderance lies, the judgment of the court below will be affirmed." Carr v. Maxwell Trading Co., 24 Okla. 758, 105 P. 333; Town of Watonga v. Morrison, 78 Okla. 74, 189 P. 737; McDonald v. Strawn, 78 Okla. 271, 190 P. 558; John W. Archer Robt. Crawford v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 268. The next assignment of error relied upon by the plaintiff in error is that the court erred in giving instructions numbered 1, 3, and 4. The objection of plaintiff in error to instruction number 4 is based upon the assertion that there was no competent evidence on which the jury might return a verdict fixing the value of the property, and as this question has already been determined in this opinion, we way eliminate instruction number 4 from our further consideration.

Where the plaintiff, in making out her case in chief, fails to prove sufficient facts to entitle her to recover, but, on the contrary, proves a state of facts that precludes her from recovering, and the defendant interposes a demurrer to the testimony of the plaintiff, such demurrer should be sustained. Norman v. Groves, 22 Okla. 98, 97 P. 561; Sanders v. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co., 10 Okla. 325, 61 P. 1075; Archer et al. v. U.S., 9 Okla. 569, 60 P. 268; Pringey v. Guss, 16 Okla. 82, 86 P. 292; Yingling v. Redwine, 12 Okla. 64, 69 P. 810. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded, with instructions to sustain the demurrer of Lee Williams to the evidence of the plaintiff below and render judgment accordingly.