Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n

23 Citing cases

  1. People v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n

    2015 Ill. App. 122981 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    ¶ 27 "In reviewing an order of the Commission, '[t]he findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall be held prima facie to be true and as found by the Commission [and] rules, regulations, orders or decisions of the Commission shall be held to be prima facie reasonable ***.' " Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill. 2d 391, 396-97 (1998) (quoting 220 ILCS 5/10(d) (West 1996)). "[T]he Commission is entitled to great deference because it is an administrative body possessing expertise in the field of public utilities.

  2. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n

    2017 Ill. App. 162410 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)

    ¶ 31 "[T]he Commission is entitled to great deference because it is an administrative body possessing expertise in the field of public utilities." Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1998). "The Commission's interpretation of the Act is accorded deference because administrative agencies enjoy wide latitude in effectuating their statutory functions."

  3. Adams Cnty. Prop. Owners & Tenant Farmers v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n

    2015 Ill. App. 4th 130907 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 8 times

    ¶ 29 "[T]he Commission is entitled to great deference because it is an administrative body possessing expertise in the field of public utilities." Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill. 2d 391, 397, 704 N.E.2d 387, 390 (1998). "We will not reevaluate the credibility or weight of the evidence, nor substitute our judgment for that of the Commission."

  4. Prestwick Capital Mgmt., Ltd. v. Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc.

    727 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2013)   Cited 19 times
    Rejecting equitable estoppel claim where plaintiff's claimed lack of knowledge was not reasonable

    INEOS Polymers Inc. v. BASF Catalysts, 553 F.3d 491, 500 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Coles–Moultrie Elec. Coop. v. City of Sullivan, 304 Ill.App.3d 153, 237 Ill.Dec. 263, 709 N.E.2d 249, 253 (1999)). Undefined contractual terms are typically afforded their plain and ordinary meanings “[u]nless the agreement unequivocally specifies” nuanced connotations, Frederick v. Prof'l Truck Driver Training Sch., Inc., 328 Ill.App.3d 472, 262 Ill.Dec. 535, 765 N.E.2d 1143, 1152 (2002), and words of art or technical terms are assigned their industrial meanings within the commercial context of the agreement, Archer–Daniels Midland Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill.2d 391, 235 Ill.Dec. 38, 704 N.E.2d 387, 392 (1998) (noting that Illinois follows the approach described in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(3)(b)). These rules of construction emanate logically from the notion that contracts do not exist in a vacuum.

  5. Gemini Ins. Co. v. W. Marine Ins. Servs. Corp.

    No. 2:10-cv-03172-KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal. Jun. 21, 2016)

    WMRS No. 13. Under Illinois law, undefined contractual terms are typically afforded their plain and ordinary meanings "[u]nless the agreement unequivocally specifies" nuanced connotations, Frederick v. Prof'l Truck Driver Training Sch., Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d 472 (2002), and words of art or technical terms are assigned their industrial meanings within the commercial context of the agreement, Archer-Daniels Midland Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill. 2d 391 (1998) (noting that Illinois follows the approach described in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(3)(b)). See also Prestwick Capital Management, Ltd. v. Peregrine Financial Group, Inc., 727 F.3d 646, 656 (7th Cir. 2013).

  6. Loeffel Steel Products, Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc.

    379 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Ill. 2005)   Cited 12 times

    Contracts do not exist in a vacuum; their terms must be understood in light of the commercial context in which they were drawn. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill.2d 391, 400, 704 N.E.2d 387, 392 (1998); Fleet Business Credit, LLC v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 352 Ill.App.3d 456, 469, 816 N.E.2d 619, 629 (1st Dist. 2004). The Loeffel/DBI contract does not provide the answer.

  7. Holcim U.S. Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n

    2025 CO 1 (Colo. 2025)

    And other states' courts that have considered challenges to similar rate structures likewise have upheld them, further supporting our conclusion that the PUC adopted a just and reasonable rate in this case. See, e.g., Gulf Power Co. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 487 So.2d 1036,1036 (Fla. 1986); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. III. Com. Comm'n, 704 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Ill. 1998); City of Chicago v. III. Com. Comm'n, 150 N.E.2d 776, 778-80 (Ill. 1958); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 230 S.E.2d 651, 662-63 (N.C. 1976); City of Norfolk v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 90 S.E.2d 140,141,149-50 (Va. 1955).

  8. People ex rel. Madigan v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n

    2015 IL 116005 (Ill. 2015)   Cited 16 times
    Stating that the Commission's decision will be entitled to less deference on review only when it departs from the Commission's usual rules to obtain a different unexplained result in a single case

    ¶ 37 The rule, however, does not apply “except in the context of a complete base rate proceeding,” where the Commission must balance costs against other, potentially offsetting changes in a utility's ledger. Citizens Utility Board, 166 Ill.2d at 137, 209 Ill.Dec. 641, 651 N.E.2d 1089 ; see Archer–Daniels–Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill.2d 391, 401, 235 Ill.Dec. 38, 704 N.E.2d 387 (1998). And the rule does not circumscribe the Commission's power to approve recovery of such a cost through a rider when a utility faces unexpected or fluctuating expenses that are difficult to forecast.

  9. Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission

    212 Ill. 2d 237 (Ill. 2004)   Cited 25 times

    On this issue, our review proceeds de novo. See Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1998) ("the Commission's interpretation of a question of law is not binding on a court of review"), citing United Cities Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 163 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994); accord Citizens Utility Board v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 166 Ill. 2d 111, 121 (1995) ("we are not bound by the Commission's interpretation of law"); see also 220 ILCS 5/10 — 201(e)(iv)(C) (West 2002) (providing that a reviewing court must reverse an ICC order if it violates state or federal law). Though we owe deference to the ICC's interpretation of the Act where there is a reasonable debate about its meaning (see Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 152 (1983); Bloom Township High School v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 309 Ill. App. 3d 163, 174 (1999), citing Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 97-98 (1992); Board of Education of Plainfield Community Consolidated School District No. 202 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relatio

  10. Pembroke Envtl. Justice Coal. v. The Ill. Commerce Comm'n

    2023 Ill. App. 3d 220108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    220 ILCS 5/10-201(d) (West 2020); Madigan, 2015 IL 116005, ¶ 22. "The Commission's interpretation of the Act is accorded deference because administrative agencies enjoy wide latitude in effectuating their statutory functions." Madigan, 2015 IL 116005, ¶ 22 (citing Commonwealth Edison, 398 Ill.App.3d at 514); see also Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 184 Ill.2d 391, 397 (1998) ("Indeed, the Commission is entitled to great deference because it is an administrative body possessing expertise in the field of public utilities."). Such deference extends to an interpretation of an ambiguous statute.