Opinion
00-CV-0163E(Sc).
April 9, 2004
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
On February 16, 2000 plaintiff Lisa M. Aratari ("Aratari") filed suit against, inter alia, the Genesee County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office") asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA"). On January 3, 2003 the Sheriff's Office filed a skeletal motion for summary judgment, the supporting documents for which were filed on October 31, 2003. This motion was argued and submitted on February 6, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, the Sheriff's Office's motion will be granted.
The Sheriff's Office is the sole remaining defendant in this action.
Aratari's ADA claim was dismissed in an Order dated July 25, 2000.
Aratari was hired as a Corrections Officer ("CO") by the Sheriff's Office in 1995. Undersheriff William Sheron ("Sheron") became Aratari's supervisor in 1996. In mid-1998, Aratari applied for a position as a deputy in the Sheriff's Office. Upon passing the civil service exam, she was appointed deputy on August 14, 1998. Deputies are appointed to a one-year probationary period during which time they are at-will employees. Once the probationary period ends, the deputy becomes permanent. As a deputy with a probationary appointment, Aratari was required by the New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services ("DCJS") to pass a physical fitness test known as the Basic Course. Because of the costs associated with training-related delay, the Sheriff's Office typically requires a newly hired deputy to pass the first available Basic Course.
The Sheriff's Office granted Aratari a leave of absence from her CO position in order that she could return if she did not obtain a permanent appointment as a deputy.
Genesee County Civil Service Rule XIV(1)(e) provides that a deputy's probationary period may not be more than 52 weeks.
See N.Y. Mun. Law § 209-q; N.Y.C.R.R. Part 6020.
The Sheriff's Office spends approximately $20,000 to train a deputy, who is unable to assume active duty for approximately 33 weeks under the best-case scenario.
The Sheriff's Office sends its deputies to training academies — including the Niagara County Law Enforcement Academy ("Niagara Academy") and the Erie County Department of Central Police Law Enforcement Academy ("Erie Academy") — that offer the Basic Course. Sheron registered Aratari and another recruit, Daniel Van Valkenberg, at both Niagara and Erie Academies. When it was clear that both academies were going to administer the Basic Course, Sheron canceled the registration at Erie Academy because of cost considerations. Until 2002, Niagara Academy did not charge the Sheriff's Office tuition for its deputies, whereas Erie Academy charged approximately $1,800 each. The two academies administer the Basic Course somewhat differently — to wit, Niagara Academy places greater emphasis on the physical fitness component. Although both academies apply similar standards, Erie Academy had adopted separate standards for men and women, standards that Niagara Academy adopted after Aratari attended the Basic Course.
Sheron registered the recruits at both academies because the academies occasionally cancel a Basic Course due to insufficient enrollment and he wanted to maximize the likelihood that the recruits would take the Basic Course as soon as possible.
While taking the Basic Course, Aratari injured one of her knees. She asked the Sheriff's Office to request a six-month extension from DCJS for completion of the Basic Course. The Sheriff's Office requested a six-month extension from the DCJS for Aratari. DCJS granted an extension for twenty months — fourteen months in excess of the amount requested by Aratari and the Sheriff's Office. Sheron, however, did not inform Aratari of the additional fourteen months provided by DCJS. Rather, the Sheriff's Office limited the time extension to the six-month extension permitted by Niagara Academy.
The Sheriff's Office contends that the additional time granted by the DCJS is irrelevant because Niagara Academy limited the available extension to six months. Moreover, even assuming that the Sheriff's Office was able but not willing to grant Aratari a twenty-month extension as opposed to a six-month extension, she has proffered no evidence that the refusal to do so was based on sex. In any event, Aratari took and failed the running test in August of 2000, which was the extent of the full DCJS extension.
Niagara Academy requires deputy trainees to pass a number of physical fitness tests, including a timed run of 1.5 miles. When Aratari attended Niagara Academy, trainees had to satisfy the running component within 12 minutes — failure to do so resulted in automatic disqualification. In early 1999, Niagara Academy did not have separate requirements for men and women trainees.
Aratari attempted to pass the Basic Course several times. She failed the timed-run test on three occasions. On March 23, 1999, Aratari ran the test in 15 minutes 11 seconds. In her second attempt, on May 11, 1999, Aratari ran the test in 12 minutes 43 seconds. Niagara Academy notified the Sheriff's Office that Aratari had failed the test and was dismissed from the academy. Consequently, the Sheriff's Office terminated Aratari effective May 20, 1999. Nonetheless, Aratari was reinstated to her position as a CO in the Sheriff's Office.
By order of the New York State Supreme Court, Aratari was given a third chance to pass the Niagara Academy fitness test. Moreover, sometime before Aratari's third test, Niagara Academy altered its requirements to permit women trainees 12 minutes and 45 seconds to pass the running element of the Basic Course. On August 7, 2000 Aratari took the test for a third time, but her time of 13 minutes 38 seconds failed to satisfy the revised women's standard.
The record, however, is silent as to when Niagara adopted this standard. Moreover, failure to satisfy the revised running standard adopted by Niagara Academy no longer subjects a candidate to automatic disqualification. Nonetheless, the record does not indicate whether Aratari's score was sufficient to pass the Basic Course under the revised standard.
Aratari filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on November 15, 1999 alleging that the Sheriff's Office required her "to pass a more stringent test than required of other police departments" and that she was "treated differently than male deputy sheriffs" on the basis of her sex. Aratari filed this suit on February 16, 2000.
On April 8, 2000, Aratari filed a complaint with the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") regarding her allegations against the Sheriff's Office. The DOJ investigated the employment practices at the Sheriff's Office but declined to pursue any further action.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP") states that summary judgment may be granted only if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In other words, after discovery and upon a motion, summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is thus appropriate where there is "no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Of course, the moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). If the moving party makes such a showing, the non-moving party must then come forward with evidence of specific facts sufficient to support a jury verdict in order to survive the summary judgment motion. Ibid.; FRCvP 56(e).
With respect to the first prong of Anderson, a genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence in the record "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, at 248. Stated another way, there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" where there is a "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, at 323. Under the second prong of Anderson, the disputed fact must be material, which is to say that it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law * * *." Anderson, at 248.
See also Anderson, at 252 ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [movant].").
Furthermore, "[i]n assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the district court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson, at 255). Nonetheless, mere conclusions, conjecture, unsubstantiated allegations or surmise on the part of the non-moving party are insufficient to defeat a well-grounded motion for summary judgment. Goenaga, supra note 11, at 18. Indeed, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs in discrimination cases must offer more than "purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars * * *." Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985). Summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate in discrimination cases. Holtz v. Rockefeller, 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001).
In employment discrimination cases, district courts must be "especially chary in handing out summary judgment * * * because in such cases the employer's intent is ordinarily at issue." Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer * * * to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's * * * sex * * *." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Sexual harassment claims are reviewed under the framework promulgated by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff"); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 n. 3 (1993) (discussing the burden-shifting analysis described in McDonnell Douglas and construed in Burdine).
"Even if the plaintiff succeeds in presenting a prima facie case, the defendant may rebut that showing by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. Upon the defendant's articulation of such a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, the presumption of discrimination arising with the establishment of the prima facie case drops from the picture. For the case to continue, the plaintiff must then come forward with evidence that the defendant's proffered, non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for actual discrimination. The plaintiff must produce not simply some evidence, but sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the [defendant] were false, and that more likely than not [discrimination] was the real reason for the [employment action]." Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, plaintiff must show: (1) that she was within a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the position; (3) that she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of sex discrimination. Weinstock, at 42. Aratari's burden in establishing a prima facie case is de minimis. Ibid. Assuming arguendo that Aratari established a prima facie case, this Court finds that the Sheriff's Office has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its termination of Aratari — to wit, that she was unable to pass the Basic Course within her one-year probationary period. Consequently, "to defeat summary judgment the plaintiff's admissible evidence must show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant's employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination." For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that Aratari has failed to satisfy this burden.
Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
As a preliminary matter, Aratari's claim of sex discrimination is undermined by the same-actor inference. Because she was hired as a CO and as a deputy by Sheriff Maha, it is highly unlikely that he terminated her as a deputy, on the basis of sex, nine months after he hired her. Moreover, Aratari was hired over two male candidates against whom she was competing — further undermining Aratari's contention that the Sheriff's Office discriminated against her on the basis of sex. Moreover, as discussed more fully below, Aratari has not proffered any evidence suggesting that the Sheriff's Office was motivated by anything other than cost considerations when it terminated her as a result of her inability to pass the Basic Course after three unsuccessful attempts to satisfy the running requirement. Aratari makes several arguments in support of her claim that the Sheriff's Office discriminated against her on the basis of sex. First, she claims that the Sheriff's Office, with discriminatory intent, sent her to Niagara Academy for the Basic Course because it knew that Niagara Academy administered a course/examination that was more physically demanding and purportedly more difficult for women to pass than the course/examination administered by Erie Academy. Aratari's claim, however, fails because she proffered no evidence demonstrating that the Sheriff's Office knew that the examination administered by Niagara Academy was more physically demanding than the one administered by Erie Academy — or that women had a more difficult time passing the Basic Course at Niagara Academy as opposed to Erie Academy.
See, e.g., Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Although each case must involve an examination of all the circumstances, some factors strongly suggest that invidious discrimination was unlikely. For example, when the person who made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire, it is difficult to impute to [him] an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire. This is especially so when the firing has occurred only a short time after the hiring."); see also Browne v. CNN Am., Inc., 2000 WL 1506195, at *1 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying Grady and noting that it was "highly implausible" that plaintiff was discriminated against where he was terminated by the same supervisor who had hired him sixteen months earlier because the supervisor was aware of plaintiff's age and medical condition when he hired plaintiff); Szostak v. Modern Landfill, Inc., 2001 WL 1823606, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying Grady's same-actor inference where plaintiff was fired by same person who had hired him three months earlier); Ramos v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the same-actor inference "remains significant where the time period between the hiring and firing is less than two years"); Watt v. New York Botanical Garden, 2000 WL 193626, at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying Grady and discussing its rationale, to wit, that "it is suspect to claim that the same manager who hired a person in the protected class would suddenly develop an aversion to members of that class") (citation omitted). Likewise, Undersheriff Sheron was involved in hiring Aratari as a deputy and terminating her nine months later — thereby undermining the contention that he acted with discriminatory animus.
Cf. Wood v. The Sophie Davis School, 2003 WL 22966288, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying Grady's same-actor inference and noting that plaintiff's claim of discrimination was further undermined by the fact that the defendant had accorded a benefit denied to the plaintiff to several minority employees).
Aratari testified at her deposition that someone in the Sheriff's Office — although she does not recall whether it was the Sheriff, Undersheriff or the Chief Deputy — told her that the Basic Course at Niagara Academy was more physically demanding. This in itself, however, does not demonstrate discriminatory animus. First, to say that the Basic Course is more demanding physically is not to say that the examination to pass the course is more physically demanding. Second, the fact that the Sheriff's Office informed Aratari that the Basic Course at Niagara Academy was more physically demanding suggests that they were attempting to advise her in order that she may prepare for the course. Third, even assuming arguendo that the Sheriff's Office knew that the examination at Niagara Academy was more physically demanding, such is not evidence of discrimination on the basis of sex. Indeed, the Sheriff's Office need not send its recruits to the least challenging academy available and the decision not to do so does not, standing alone, demonstrate discrimination on the basis of sex.
Second, Aratari claims that the fact that the Sheriff's Office did not give her the full twenty-month extension permitted by DCJS demonstrated discriminatory animus. This fact, however, is consistent with the Sheriff's Office's desire to avoid unnecessary and expensive delay. Furthermore, Niagara Academy only permitted a six-month extension — which made the point moot and irrelevant for purposes of disclosure. In any event, there is no evidence that such non-disclosure was based on Aratari's sex.
Finally, Aratari claims that discriminatory animus is demonstrated by the fact that the Sheriff's Office refused to permit her to repeat the Basic Course at the Erie Academy at her own expense. Although such an offer would have eliminated the tuition as a cost, it failed to eliminate the substantial cost associated with the delay — as well as the risk of having Aratari's probationary period expire without the assurance that she would subsequently pass the Basic Course at the Erie Academy. Aratari's claim of sex discrimination is further undermined by the fact that the Sheriff's Office permitted her to start the Field Training Officer ("FTO") Program before she passed the Basic Course — an exception to its standard practice of requiring deputies to successfully complete the Basic Course before starting FTO training. Moreover, as noted above, Aratari has failed to proffer any evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact that the Sheriff's Office acted with discriminatory animus in its treatment of her.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and that the Clerk of this Court shall close this case.