In support of the first-mentioned position, defendant contends that through laches plaintiff abandoned his right to civil service protection, citing Nicholas v. United States, 257 U.S. 71, in which an inspector of customs, unlawfully removed from office, was held to be barred by laches by reason of a three years' delay in bringing suit to recover salary. The equitable defense of laches in mandamus actions is one based on grounds of expediency and public policy, "to the end that if his [petitioner's] contention be justified, the Government service may be disturbed as little as possible and that two salaries shall not be paid for a single service": Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 372. These reasons, while persuasive if appellant had sought reinstatement through mandamus proceedings in 1936, are inapplicable to the instant situation where the City, by voluntary action, sought to rectify its former error and injustice to appellant.
The defense of laches is untenable. Norris v. United States, 257 U.S. 77; Nicholas v. United States, 257 U.S. 71; Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367; id., 55 Ct. Cls. 327. Forbidding removal of postmasters of the first class without the consent of the Senate is constitutional.
But mandamus has not been governed by similar statutory regimes; instead, the timeliness of a petition for such relief has historically been judged by flexible, equitable standards. See U.S. ex rel. Arant v. Lane , 249 U.S. 367, 371, 39 S.Ct. 293, 63 L.Ed. 650 (1919). Even the statutory regime at issue here does not purport to impose a general deadline for victims seeking to vindicate their rights through mandamus.
Does this include any monetary loss (such as the need to pay increasing sums in back wages) or only a diminution in the ability to defend against the claim? Compare Lingenfelter, supra, 691 F.2d at 342 (expressing doubt that an increase in liability for back pay is "prejudice"), with United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293, 63 L.Ed. 650 (1919) (delay that requires government to pay two salaries for a single service is prejudicial). In this case the City says it will have to pay substantial back wages; Smith says that what is big money to him is small from the City's perspective.
But since what we have already said calls for dismissal of the present action, and since defendant has expressed in his administrative order a willingness to reinstate those who can prove that their demotion was involuntary, it is not necessary to rest our decision on this ground. Cf. United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 1918, 47 App.D.C. 336, affirmed, 1919, 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293, 63 L. Ed. 650; Nicholas v. United States, 1921, 257 U.S. 71, 42 S.Ct. 7, 66 L.Ed. 133; Norris v. United States, 1921, 257 U.S. 77, 42 S.Ct. 9, 66 L.Ed. 136; Caswell v. Morgenthau, 1938, 69 App.D.C. 15, 98 F.2d 296, certiorari denied, 1938, 305 U.S. 596, 59 S.Ct. 81, 83 L.Ed. 378; United States ex rel. Cromwell v. Doyle, 1938, 69 App.D.C. 215, 99 F.2d 448, certiorari denied. 1939, 306 U.S. 640, 59 S. Ct. 488, 83 L.Ed. 1041. "When a public official is unlawfully removed from office, whether from disregard of the law by his superior or from mistake as to the facts of his case, obvious considerations of public policy make it of first importance that he should promptly take the action requisite to effectively assert his rights, to the end that if his contention be justified the government service may be disturbed as little as possible and that two salaries shall not be paid for a single service."
47 App.D.C. 336. 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293, 294, 63 L.Ed. 650. Leander H. Caswell v. Henry Morgenthau et al., 69 App.D.C. 17, 98 F.2d 296.
1. Plaintiffs' delay of over 27 months in filing this action, which resulted in substantial prejudice to TVA, constitutes laches which bars the action. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293, 63 L.Ed. 650 (1919). In the leading case of Arant v. Lane, supra, the Supreme Court held that a supervisor of a national park who waited 20 months after being discharged by the Secretary of the Interior before filing an action in court was barred by laches, saying:
He has never had a chance to present testimony to GSA, to the Civil Service Commission, or to any court. If he has delayed reaching the courthouse so long that he cannot get a hearing here, he is foreclosed from relief. United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 1919, 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293, 63 L.Ed. 650, is the leading case on the subject of laches in presenting claims against the United States. Arant had delayed 20 months in suing the U.S. It does not appear from the opinion what he did in the meanwhile and the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, saying:
The action in this court was started on May 7, 1963. The application of the rule of laches to a case of this type was discussed in United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293, 63 L.Ed. 650 (1919) in a case involving a national park superintendent. The Supreme Court said, 249 U.S. at page 372, 39 S.Ct. at page 294, 63 L.Ed. 650:
The reason for this is obvious: The Government has the right to have its services disturbed as little as possible, and the Government should not be obliged to pay the salaries of two persons for a single service due to delay over a long period of time. The Supreme Court and this court have consistently, and in a large number of cases, applied the bar of laches; among those cases, Dion v. United States, 137 Ct.Cl. 166; Baskin v. United States, 95 Ct.Cl. 455, certiorari denied, 1942, 316 U.S. 675, 62 S.Ct. 1043, 86 L.Ed. 1749; Nicholas v. United States, 1921, 257 U.S. 71, 42 S.Ct. 7, 66 L.Ed. 133; United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 1919, 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293, 63 L.Ed. 650. In this case the Government hired a replacement for plaintiff, and has paid for the service of that employee.