Opinion
No. 05-10-00656-CR
Opinion issued October 31, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F09-01455-KS.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant Raul Aranda guilty of murder; the trial court sentenced him to seventeen years' imprisonment. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The procedural history, pleadings, and evidence are known to the parties, so we do not recite the facts in detail. We issue this memorandum opinion because the law to be applied is well settled. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Shortly before midnight on August 30, 2008, Richard Alexander and his girlfriend, Veronica Smith, returned to their apartment parking lot after seeing a movie. An altercation took place in the parking lot that included Alexander, appellant, and others. At the end of the altercation, Alexander had been stabbed; he died as a result of the wounds. Police arrested appellant, charged him with murder, and advised him of his rights. Appellant admitted he stabbed Alexander and disposed of the knife. The medical examiner determined the knife wounds were the cause of Alexander's death. These facts are undisputed. However, nearly every other fact presented at trial was disputed. Although details varied somewhat, the jury was presented with two basic versions of the facts leading up to Alexander's death. The State's version of events was supported by the testimony of Smith, her mother Cynthia New, and two neighbors. Although the details of the these witness's recollections varied, and the portions of the altercation they witnessed differed, their descriptions identified appellant, Joel Saldana, and their girlfriends as the aggressors. The group spoke and acted threateningly toward Alexander when he got out of the car with Smith. Alexander retrieved a baseball bat from the trunk of his car for protection. Alexander did not hit anyone else with the bat, but one of the aggressors wrested the bat from him and used it to knock Alexander down on the ground. Appellant and his companions then set on Alexander, striking him with their hands, feet, and the bat. When the aggressors heard police sirens approaching, they jumped into Saldana's car and drove away. Alexander's knife wounds were discovered after the assailants left. Appellant's version of the facts is quite different. According to his statement, and the statements of his companions, Alexander was the aggressor in the fight. With no provocation, he took the bat out of his trunk and ran at Saldana and then appellant, swinging the bat at them as he ran. One neighbor told police she saw Alexander hit Saldana with the bat; appellant told police Alexander hit Saldana and appellant with it. Appellant swung his pocketknife at Alexander, trying to get him to drop the bat. Once the bat was taken away from Alexander, appellant did not touch him. Appellant contended he was in fear for his life and he acted only in self-defense and in defense of his girlfriend and children who were playing outside their apartment. By finding appellant guilty, the jury implicitly rejected appellant's claims of self-defense and defense of a third person. See Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In his second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting this rejection. Self-defense (including use of deadly force in defense of one's person) and defense of third persons are defenses to prosecution. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 2.03, 9.02, 9.32, 9.33 (West 2011). The defendant bears the initial burden of producing some evidence to support these defenses. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Once the defendant has done so, the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Because the State bears this ultimate burden, we review the sufficiency of the evidence under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) ("[T]he Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also Smith v. State, No. 01-09-00634-CR, 2011 WL 1233367, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2011, pet. ref'd) (applying Jackson v. Virginia standard to jury's rejection of self-defense claim). We examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Again, a jury's verdict of guilty is an implicit, but necessary, rejection of a defendant's self-defense claims. See Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 422. We defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Appellant depends primarily upon his own statement to the police, in which he asserted that he acted only to defend himself and those around him from Alexander's aggressive acts. He also contends that New and Smith "had an agenda, a motive, and a willingness to lie." This argument ignores the rule that determination of each witness's credibility is for the jury, not for an appellate court. See id. The jury was presented, fundamentally, with two stories concerning the events surrounding Alexander's death. Jurors rejected appellant's version of the facts, and the record contains ample evidence supporting the State's alternative version. At a minimum, interested and disinterested witnesses both testified that after the bat had been taken away from Alexander, appellant participated in the attack on him. There can be no self-defense where force is no longer immediately necessary. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(a). We conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could have rejected appellant's claim of self-defense and defense of third persons. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We overrule appellant's second issue. In his third issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mens rea element of his murder conviction. Again we apply the Jackson standard, asking whether a rational jury could have concluded appellant (a) intentionally or knowingly caused Alexander's death, or (b) caused Alexander's death while intending to cause him serious bodily harm. See id. "[M]ental culpability is of such a nature that it generally must be inferred from the circumstances under which a prohibited act or omission occurs." Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Accordingly, we look to the accused's conduct to discern his intent. Id. Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, appellant's conduct included participation in a violent assault on Alexander. Witnesses described appellant hitting and kicking Alexander when he was down on the ground and the bat had already been taken away from him. Appellant's own statement concedes he stabbed Alexander. But Appellant stresses that his statement also asserts that when he stabbed Alexander he did not do so in an effort to kill him; he used his knife against Alexander only to make him drop the bat with which he was threatening appellant. Of course the jury, as trier of fact, was free to disbelieve some or all of appellant's statement. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326 (jury is sole judge of witnesses' credibility). As both appellant and the State acknowledge, the intent to kill can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner. See Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 580-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Appellant states correctly that a knife is not a deadly weapon per se. Appellant does not, however, contend that the knife with which he stabbed Alexander was not a deadly weapon. The evidence is undisputed that the wounds inflicted by that knife were the cause of Alexander's death. Accordingly, the jury's verdict is supported by the rational inference raised by a deadly weapon used in a deadly manner. See id. Finally, appellant contends the nature and placement of the knife wounds were consistent with slashing movements as opposed to stabbing movements. He argues this supports an inference that appellant used the knife defensively. The medical examiner testified that only one of the five knife wounds Alexander sustained was an incised wound; the other four were stab wounds. And according to the medical examiner, the "most rapidly fatal" wound was a four-and-one-half inch stab wound that pierced Alexander's heart and lung. Moreover, Alexander received significant injuries-including knife wounds and a strike from the baseball bat-to his back, which is not consistent with unintentional injury. We conclude the circumstances surrounding the present offense, viewed in a light favorable to the judgment, support a rational finding that appellant acted with the intent necessary for a finding of murder. See Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We overrule appellant's third issue as well. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Appellant also complains of the trial court's failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law after denying his motion to suppress the statement he made while in police custody. The trial court has now entered the requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant stated in his brief that "[i]t is possible that, once the trial court enters findings, Appellant may wish to supplement his brief with additional points of error under Tex. R. App. P. 38.7." The trial court's findings and conclusions were made part of a supplemental clerk's record and were filed in this Court on May 6, 2011. Appellant did not attempt to supplement his brief before this case was submitted on September 28, 2011. Appellant's first issue has become moot and is overruled.