Opinion
No. 05-07-01490-CR
Opinion issued March 3, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-87639-MW.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and MOSELEY. Opinion By Justice WRIGHT.
OPINION
Claudia Aranda waived a jury and pleaded guilty to burglary of a building. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating appellant's guilt, placed her on three years' community supervision, and assessed a $1500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate appellant's guilt, alleging she violated several conditions of community supervision. At a hearing on the motion, the trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at eighteen months' confinement in a state jail facility. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in accepting, and not sua sponte withdrawing, her plea of true. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in adjudicating her guilt because there was insufficient evidence she violated the conditions of her community supervision. Appellant asserts that because her testimony raised issues about her innocence, the trial court should have withdrawn her pleas of true to the allegations in the motion to adjudicate. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating appellant's guilt. A trial court's determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Appellate review of an order adjudicating guilt and revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order adjudicating guilt and revoking community supervision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of community supervision. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd.). Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.). In its amended motion to adjudicate, the State alleged appellant violated several terms of her community supervision, including committing a new prostitution offense, failing to report to the probation officer, failing to report to the court for a summons as directed, and failing to report for a post-sentence interview. In a hearing, appellant testified she was pleading true to each allegation in the motion to adjudicate. Appellant testified she failed to report to the probation department because she was rearrested twice for prostitution. A plea of true, standing alone, supports the revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Appellant's signed plea of true and stipulation of evidence was admitted into evidence. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting appellant's plea of true and adjudicating her guilt. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64; Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128. We resolve appellant's sole issue against her. We affirm the trial court's judgment.