Aranda v. Park East Construction

127 Citing cases

  1. Guenther v. Modern Continental Companies

    06-CV-1420 (FB) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2007)

    "The title by which a party is known is not determinative." Aranda v. Park E. Constr., 772 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (2d Dept. 2004). The agent must have control of the work performed and "authority to insist that proper safety procedures safety procedures be followed."

  2. Celentano v. City of New York

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 30977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

    The purpose of the statute is for the protection of workers from elevation-associated risks of injury ( Reinoso v Ornstein Layton Mgt., 19 AD3d 678 [2d Dept. 2005], citing Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs of N.Y. City, Inc., 1 NY3d at 284-285). The scope of a construction manager's liability under the Labor Law has been frequently litigated in the courts ( see e.g., Aranda v Park E. Constr., 4 AD3d 315 [2d Dept. 2004]; Walls vTurner Constr. Co. 4 NY2d 861, 863); Mulcaire v Buffalo Structural Steel Constr. Corp., 45 AD3d 1426 [4th Dept. 2007]). Courts will generally impose liability for violations of Lab. Law ยง 240(1) against owners, contractors, and any others who have been delegated the duties to supervise and control the workplace to the degree that they become agents of the owners and contractors ( see, Russin v Picciano Sons, 54 NY2d 329, 411. Plaintiff first argues that defendant Pirnie-Baker's agreement with the City to provide contract management services for construction on the premises makes Pirnie-Baker an appropriate defendant within the meaning of the statute.

  3. Barrios v. City of N.Y.

    Action No. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sep. 18, 2012)

    In support of its request that the Court (1) deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under Labor Law ยง240(1), (2) search the record and (3) dismiss plaintiff's claim under Labor Law ยง240(1), Skanska maintains that it was retained by EDC as the construction manager and one of two prime contractors on the project, and that it had no authority over plaintiff's work at the time of the occurrence. Liability for the violation of Labor Law ยง240(1) may be imposed upon an owner, a contractor and those parties who, e.g., by the delegation of authority to supervise and control the work, have become the statutory agents of the owner or contractor (see Tomyuk v. Junefield Assoc, 57 AD3d at 520; Aranda v. Park E Constr, 4 AD3d 315, 316). In this regard, it has been held that the title by which an entity is known is not determinative, and a party with essentially the same duties as an owner or contractor will be held responsible as such for purposes of this section of the Labor Law (id.).

  4. Hanson v. Turner Construction Co.

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 32549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

    Labor Law ยง 200 codifies the common-1aw duty of an owner or general contractor to provide a safe place to work ( Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 352). "Liability for causes of action sounding in common-law negligence and for violations of Labor Law ยง 200 is limited to those who exercise control or supervision over the work" ( Aranda v Park East Constr., 4 AD3d 315, 316 [2004]; see also Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY 2d 290, 295). General supervisory authority for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose Labor Law ยง 200 liability ( see e.g. Dos Santos v STV Engrs., Inc., 8 AD3d 223, 224); however, an entity given authority by an owner or contractor to supervise and control the activity that produce 1 the injury is subject to liability ( see e.g. Ryder v Mount Loretto Nursing Home Inc., 290 AD2d 892, 893-894).

  5. Desabato v. 674 Carroll Street Corp.

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 32250 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    The term "owner" as used in Labor Law ยงยง 240 (1) and 241 (6) has been interpreted to include the owner/leasee of an apartment in a multi-unit co-operative apartment building Maciejewski v 975 Park Avenue, 37 AD3d 773, 774; Xirakis v 1115 Fifth Avenue Corp., 226 AD2d 452, 453-454). Liability for causes of action sounding in common-law negligence and for violations of Labor Law ยง 200 is likewise limited to those who exercise control or supervision over the methods that plaintiff employs in his work, or who have actual or constructive notice of, or are otherwise responsible for, an unsafe condition that causes an accident ( Aranda v Park East Constr., 4 AD3d 315 [ 2004]; Akins v Baker, 247 AD2d 562, 563). Here, there is no evidence of negligence by Fleischer or that she controlled plaintiff's work.

  6. Seales v. Trident Structural Corp.

    142 A.D.3d 1153 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)   Cited 80 times
    In Seales v Trident Structural Corp., 142 AD3d 1153 (2d Dept 2016), plaintiff was injured by a piece of sheetrock which had been stored by leaning it against a wall.

    In opposition to Trident's motion, the plaintiffs submitted a transcript of the deposition of Daniel Erber, a minority shareholder of 2794 Broadway, in which he testified, among other things, that Trident was a general contractor retained to oversee the entire project, to coordinate the subcontractors, and to instruct the subcontractors, including the plaintiff's employer, as to how the work was to be completed. This testimony was sufficient to raise triable issues of fact as to whether Trident was a general contractor or an agent of the owners subject to liability under the Labor Law (see Aranda v. Park E. Constr., 4 A.D.3d 315, 316, 772 N.Y.S.2d 70 ). Labor Law ยง 200 โ€œis a codification of the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to provide workers with a safe place to workโ€ (Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d 54, 60, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323 ). โ€œCases involving Labor Law ยง 200 fall into two broad categories: namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performedโ€ (id. at 61, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323 ).

  7. Carrasco v. Weissman

    120 A.D.3d 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses

    In support of that branch of its motion, NCJ argued that it could not be held liable under that statute because it was neither the general contractor nor the statutory agent of the owner. However, NCJ's own submissions raised triable issues of fact as to whether it was the general contractor on the project or had the ability to control the activity which brought about the injury ( see Walls v. Turner Const. Co., 4 N.Y.3d 861, 864, 798 N.Y.S.2d 351, 831 N.E.2d 408; Gonzalez v. TJM Constr. Corp., 87 A.D.3d 610, 611, 928 N.Y.S.2d 344; Aranda v. Park E. Constr., 4 A.D.3d 315, 316, 772 N.Y.S.2d 70).

  8. Myles v. Claxton

    115 A.D.3d 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 27 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The plaintiff appeals. A construction manager without authority to control the activity which brought about the plaintiff's injury is not considered an agent of the owner under Labor Law ยงยง 240(1) and 241(6) ( see Walls v. Turner Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.3d 861, 863, 798 N.Y.S.2d 351, 831 N.E.2d 408;Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 A.D.3d 949, 950โ€“951, 919 N.Y.S.2d 40;Lodato v. Greyhawk N. Am., LLC, 39 A.D.3d 491, 493, 834 N.Y.S.2d 242). The label given a defendant, whether โ€œconstruction managerโ€ or โ€œgeneral contractor,โ€ is not determinative ( see Walls v. Turner Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.3d at 864, 798 N.Y.S.2d 351, 831 N.E.2d 408;Tilford v. Sweet Home Real Prop. Trust, 40 A.D.3d 966, 966, 834 N.Y.S.2d 664;Aranda v. Park E. Constr., 4 A.D.3d 315, 316, 772 N.Y.S.2d 70). Instead, the core inquiry is whether the defendant had the โ€œauthority to supervise or control the activity bringing about the injury so as to enable it to avoid or correct the unsafe conditionโ€ ( Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 A.D.3d at 951, 919 N.Y.S.2d 40;see Delahaye v. Saint Anns School, 40 A.D.3d 679, 683, 836 N.Y.S.2d 233).

  9. Perez v. 347 Lorimer

    84 A.D.3d 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 18 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Applying the same standard for statutory agency to claims under ยงยง 200, 240, and 241

    Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements. "A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done" at the location a plaintiff is injured ( Linkowski v City of New York, 33 AD3d 971, 974-975; see Walls v Turner Constr. Co., 4 NY3d 861, 863-864; Russin v Louis N Picciano Son, 54 NY2d 311, 318), and "must have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury so as to enable it to avoid or correct the unsafe condition" ( Linkowski v City of New York, 33 AD3d at 975; see Russin v Louis N. Picciano Son, 54 NY2d at 318; Pino v Irvington Union Free School Dist., 43 AD3d 1130, 1131; Lodato v Greyhawk N. Am., LLC, 39 AD3d 491, 493). "It is not a [party's] title that is determinative, but the amount of control or supervision exercised" ( Linkowski v City of New York, 33 AD3d at 975; see generally Aranda v Park E. Constr., 4 AD3d 315, 316). Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that both the plaintiff and the defendant/third-party defendant, Precision Elevator Corp. (hereinafter Precision), failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by eliminating all triable issues of fact as to whether Precision was the statutory agent of the defendant/third-party plaintiff, EFI Construction, LLC (hereinafter EFI), and/or the defendant 347 Lorimer, LLC.

  10. Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC

    82 A.D.3d 949 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 66 times   1 Legal Analyses

    emises ( see Walls v Turner Constr. Co., 4 NY3d 861; Russin v Louis N. Picciano Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317-318; see also Comes v New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 878; Pino v Irvington Union Free School Dist., 43 AD3d 1130). "A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done where a plaintiff is injured" ( Linkowski v City of New York, 33 AD3d 971, 974-975; see Walls v Turner Constr. Co., 4 NY3d at 863-864; Russin v Louis N. Picciano Son, 54 NY2d at 317-318). To impose such liability, the defendant must have the authority to supervise or control the activity bringing about the injury so as to enable it to avoid or correct the unsafe condition ( see Linkowski v City of New York, 33 AD3d 971; Damiani v Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 23 AD3d 329, 331-332). It is not a defendant's title that is determinative, but the degree of control or supervision exercised ( see generally Aranda v Park E. Constr., 4 AD3d 315, 316; see also Armentano v Broadway Mall Props., Inc., 30 AD3d 450; Loiacono v Lehrer Mc-Govern Bouis, 270 AD2d 464). In opposition to JMB's prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether JMB was an agent of the owners or a general contractor on the project ( see Russin v Louis N Picciano Son, 54 NY2d 311; Delahaye v Saint Anns School, 40 AD3d 679). The role of JMB was only one of general supervision, which is insufficient to impose liability under the Labor Law ( see Armentano v Broadway Mall Props., Inc., 30 AD3d 450; Loiacono v Lehrer McGouern Bovis, 270 AD2d 464). Paragraph 2.3.15 of the agreement between JMB and the Direnzos provided that "the Construction Manager shall not have control over or charge of and shall not be responsible for construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions and programs in connection with the Work of each of the Contractors,