Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-001829-ME
01-20-2017
A.R., E.-P. APPELLANT v. F. W. AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: A.R., E.-P., pro se Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, F. W.: No brief filed. BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES: Michael J. O'Connell Jefferson County Attorney Lily Patteson Assistant Jefferson County Attorney Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOLLY W. BERRY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 15-CI-501232 OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: J. LAMBERT, NICKELL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. NICKELL, JUDGE: A.R., E.-P. ("Father"), pro se, has appealed from an order of the Jefferson Family Court registering a foreign child support order for enforcement against him. He contends the Virginia order was invalid as the underlying civil action had been dismissed and further alleges the Jefferson Family Court was without personal and subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with the registration. Following a careful review of the facts and the law, we affirm.
The foreign order was issued by the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton, Virginia, and ordered Father to pay $756 per month to F.W. ("Mother") for the support and maintenance of the parties' minor son beginning on January 22, 2008. Mother and child continue to reside in the Commonwealth of Virginia, while Father resides in Jefferson County, Kentucky.
The case had actually been discontinued but not dismissed, an important distinction which will be explored in this Opinion. Father incorrectly uses these terms interchangeably.
Mother and Father were divorced in Jefferson County, Kentucky, in 2008. For reasons unclear from the limited record before us, issues related to the division of marital property, child custody, parenting time, and child support were decided by the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton, Virginia, in early 2009. That court concluded it was the proper venue to resolve these issues as the parties had last resided there as husband and wife, Father had personally appeared before that tribunal, and Mother and child resided in that jurisdiction. Pertinent to this appeal, Mother was granted sole legal and physical custody of the child and Father was ordered to pay support for the child. Father apparently failed to comply with the child support obligation.
Several years later, on Father's motion to discontinue the Virginia action, the case was removed from the court's active docket. However, no order dismissing the action or modifying any prior orders was entered. As the child's home state, the Commonwealth of Virginia continued to actively maintain attempts to enforce the child support order, and on June 4, 2014, requested assistance from the Commonwealth of Kentucky in the form of registration and enforcement of the order based on Father's residence in this state pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA").
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 407.5101 et seq. --------
On April 21, 2015, the Jefferson Family Court accepted the Virginia support order for registration and enforcement and, pursuant to KRS 407.5605, caused notice to be mailed to Father's last known address advising him of the action and his right to contest confirmation of the registration within 20 days. The notice was returned to the court approximately one week later bearing a notation that the location appeared to be vacant and no forwarding address was available. Because no contest to the validity or enforcement of the foreign order was raised, under KRS 407.5606(2), at the expiration of twenty days the registration was confirmed as a matter of law.
Approximately four months later, Father moved to vacate the judgment and order, arguing he had never been properly served and the underlying Virginia child support order was unenforceable as the case in that state precipitating the order had allegedly been dismissed. Following a brief hearing, the court continued the matter for sixty days for Father to obtain proof of the dismissal of the Virginia action and for the Commonwealth to review the matter more fully. Following a second hearing at which Father challenged registration on the same grounds previously alleged, the trial court determined the Virginia action had not been dismissed and the support order was valid and enforceable. Father's subsequent motion to reconsider was denied after a brief hearing.
Father filed a notice of appeal, but named only Mother as an appellee. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services ("CHFS") by and through the Jefferson County Attorney's office, moved to intervene. CHFS further asserted it was a necessary and indispensable party and moved to dismiss the action for Father's failure to name it as an appellee or, alternatively, for leave to file a responsive brief. Father filed an objection to both motions on June 21, 2016. On July 15, 2016, a motion panel of this Court passed the motions to the panel considering the merits of the appeal, and ordered CHFS to file a brief within thirty days. CHFS duly complied. Inexplicably, on August 9, 2016—approximately seven weeks after filing his response—Father moved this Court for an extension of time to respond to the motion to dismiss and tendered a largely unintelligible response with the motion. This motion too was passed to the merits panel for consideration.
Upon careful review, the motion by CHFS to intervene in this appeal is GRANTED. Because we believe the interests of justice are better served by resolution of the merits of the issues raised on appeal, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. Based on this denial, Father's motion for an extension of time to file his tendered response is DENIED as MOOT. We now turn to analysis of the issues raised.
Father's claims of error are not presented in the customary fashion; his specific legal claims are hidden beneath a veneer of citations to foreign case law and statutory provisions having little, if anything, to do with the matters at bar. Acting pro se, his improper usage of legal jargon only confuses already deficient and incomplete arguments. This format creates difficulty for this Court—as well as opposing counsel—in construing Father's pleadings liberally and deciphering the legitimate legal arguments, if any, from the general prose. As we can best determine, Father argues the Virginia court had dismissed the underlying action, thereby making registration of the support order improper. He further appears to contend the Jefferson Family Court was without jurisdiction—both personal and subject-matter—to register the foreign judgment. Father's arguments widely miss the mark.
Father's first contention centers on his belief the Virginia court's dismissal of the civil action precipitating the support judgment rendered it void and unenforceable. Father offers no authority supportive of his position. On November 21, 2013, the Circuit Court for the City of Hampton entered an order discontinuing the parties' divorce action from its active docket pursuant to a Virginia statutory provision. Contrary to Father's bald assertion, our review of the applicable Virginia statutes and cases interpreting them reveals entry of an order discontinuing an action does not equate to dismissal and does not impact prior final orders entered in the action. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-335; Nash v. Jewell, 227 Va. 230, 234, 315 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1984). Father was permitted an opportunity by the trial court below to provide proof the Virginia action had been dismissed or that the support order was otherwise invalid. The trial court determined Father's subsequently tendered documentation was insufficient to carry his burden. We discern no error in the trial court's decision that the support order remains valid.
Father next argues the trial court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction to register the support judgment. His contentions consist primarily of rambling and generalized statements. He cites no applicable authority supportive of his position. "It is not the job of the appellate courts to scour the record in support of an appellant['s] argument." Dennis v. Fulkerson, 343 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Ky. App. 2011) (citation omitted). We will not consider bare allegations of error which are unsupported by evidence or argument on appeal. Stewart v. Jackson, 351 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Ky. 1961) (citations omitted). We are unable to discern any viable challenge to the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction and refuse to create an argument for a litigant. No further discussion of these assertions is necessary.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Family Court is AFFIRMED and the motions pending in this Court are disposed of as previously set forth in this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
/s/ C. Shea Nickell
Judge, Kentucky Court of Appeals ENTERED: January 20, 2017 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: A.R., E.-P., pro se
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, F. W.: No brief filed. BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES: Michael J. O'Connell
Jefferson County Attorney Lily Patteson
Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky