The contract thus arises out of a New Jersey transaction - not a New York transaction. This is because the unilateral action of an insured party driving into New York and having an accident there, without more, does not confer jurisdiction over the insurer. See New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 260 A.D.2d 638, 639, 688 N.Y.S.2d 681, 681 (2d Dep't 1999); see also Franklin v. Catawba Ins. Co., 291 A.D.2d 371, 371, 737 N.Y.S.2d 378, 378 (2d Dep't 2002) (defendant insurer not subject to personal jurisdiction where “plaintiffs failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the defendants transacted business or contracted to provide goods or services in New York”); Appollon Waterproofing & Restoration Corp. v. Kodiak Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 552, 552, 655 N.Y.S.2d 635, 635 (2d Dep't 1997) (same); Sound Around Inc. v. Audiobahn, Inc., No. 07-cv-773, 2008 WL 5093599, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008) (declining to exercise jurisdiction where defendant was authorized to do business in the state but there was no evidence that the defendant sold into New York the “specific products involved in [the] lawsuit”).
We agree. Although one of defendant's senior claims examiners indeed averred that defendant is not licensed to do insurance business in this State, does not "regularly and knowingly transact any business or contract to supply goods or services in New York relating to the issuance of insurance policies", maintains no offices or agents here nor solicits any business in this State, those general denials must be viewed in the context of the specific language contained on the face of the certificate of insurance (see, footnote 1, supra), which at least raises a question of fact as to whether defendant knowingly insured plaintiff, a New York corporation, with respect to work performed by Hatch on the Riverwalk project (compare, Matter of Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. [Fu Guan Chan], 267 A.D.2d 181,with Appollon Waterproofing Restoration Corp. v. Kodiak Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 552). Stated another way, we are of the view that plaintiff has made a sufficient start to warrant further discovery on this issue. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
On their motion to dismiss, the defendants established that they are not licensed to do business in New York, they have no offices, agents, or telephones in New York, and they do not solicit any business in New York. The plaintiffs failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the defendants transacted business or contracted to provide goods or services in New York (see, CPLR 302[a][1]; New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 260 A.D.2d 638; Appollon Waterproofing Restoration Corp. v. Kodiak Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 552). Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction should have been granted.
We agree with MAIF that there was no basis upon which the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over it, since NYCMIC failed to produce evidence demonstrating that MAIF transacted business in New York or contracted to provide goods or services in New York such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over MAIF would be proper (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Appollon Waterproofing Restoration Corp. v. Kodiak Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 552; Roldan v. Dexter Folder Co., 178 A.D.2d 589). In its opposition papers, MAIF established that it is not licensed to do business in New York, is barred from supplying insurance to non-residents of Maryland or to vehicles registered outside of Maryland, that it has no office, agent, or telephone in New York and that it does not solicit business in New York.