Apple v. Denver

13 Citing cases

  1. Bartnick v. City of Englewood

    Case Number: 2009CV1942 (D. Colo. Jun. 30, 2012)

    An owner of property is not immune from the exercise of the police power because he or she constructed a building that was in full compliance with the law when it was built. Apple v. City & County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964). "To hold that existing buildings are exempt from ordinances which impose standards designed to protect the safety and welfare of the public would in effect permit those whose actions are dangerous to the health and safety of the community to continue their deleterious conduct unchecked."

  2. Van Sickle v. Boyes

    797 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1990)   Cited 67 times
    Holding that reliance on a building permit does not insulate the permit holder from later changes in ordinances enacted under the police power for protection of the public

    The constitutional ban of retrospective operation does not prevent a city from enacting and enforcing ordinances to protect the health and safety of the community. Apple v. City County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 172, 390 P.2d 91, 94 (1964). The purpose of the constitutional ban of retrospective legislation, like the ban on ex post facto laws, is to prevent the unfairness that results from changing the legal consequences of an act after the act has occurred.

  3. City of St. Louis v. Brune

    515 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. 1974)   Cited 3 times
    In Brune, an unreasonable as applied case, our Supreme Court stated that cost "may be a material element in a consideration of the reasonableness of the law" where enforcement becomes confiscatory.

    The Nash case was followed with approval in City of St. Louis v. Hoevel Real Estate Building Co., 59 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1933), on somewhat similar facts. In general, the following requirements have been held valid in other states as to existing buildings, usually apartments or "tenement" houses; rent regulation (Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921)); safety and sanitary improvements costing $5,000 on a forty-room tenement assessed at $13,500, details not explained (Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937)); water on each floor in suitable "appliances" (Health Dept. of the City of New York v. Rector, Church Wardens and Vestrymen of Trinity Church, 145 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895)); a tub or shower, sink, and toilet with running water (Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955) a 3-2 decision); separate lavatories, adequate tubs, sinks (Apple v. City County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964)); demolition of building which had become a nuisance (Perepletchikoff v. City of Los Angeles, 174 Cal.App.2d 697, 345 P.2d 261 (1959)); adequate fire escapes (City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 82 P. 747 (1905)); prohibition of glass panel doors (Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill.2d 197, 188 N.E.2d 700 (1963)); central heat or approved water heater (Danker et al. v. City of New York et al., 20 Misc.2d 557, 194 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959)); tub or shower with hot water (Givner v. Com. of Health, 207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 899 (1955)); hot water and screens in "cold water flats" (Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959)); tub or shower, sink, lavatory and water heater (Wheat v. Ramsey, 284 Ala. 295, 224 So.2d 649 (1969)); tub or shower and hot water (City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1960)); hot water "apparatus" (City of Newark v. Charles Realty Co., 9 N.J. Super. 442, 74 A.2d 630 (Essex County, 1950)); water closet for each apartment (City of N

  4. Trailer Haven v. City of Aurora

    81 P.3d 1132 (Colo. App. 2003)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that “ nonconforming use is one which lawfully existed before the enactment of zoning ordinances and is maintained after the effective date of the ordinances,although it presently does not comply with the zoning restrictions applicable to the district in which it is situated.”

    It is true, as Trailer Haven suggests, that some financial burden will be imposed upon it to effect compliance with the amended ordinances; but this burden, by itself, is not a sufficient reason for declaring the law invalid. See Apple v. City County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964). Only 10 to 20 of the 216 mobile homes in Trailer Haven do not meet the new spacing requirements, and Trailer Haven may seek variances for those nonconforming mobile homes.

  5. Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condominiums Home Owners Ass'n

    325 P.3d 1032 (Colo. 2014)   Cited 7 times
    Considering constitutionality of municipal ordinance

    Id. (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388–89, 52 S.Ct. 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167 (1932)); see also Cottrell Clothing Co. v. Teets, 139 Colo. 558, 563, 342 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1959) (same). ¶ 29 Although in Apple v. City & County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 172–73, 390 P.2d 91, 95 (1964), we suggested that an ordinance must, in its application to a specific property, “be such as not to be an unreasonable demand upon the individual for the benefit of the public welfare,” our ultimate holding in that case hinged not on the burden of compliance faced by the plaintiff, but on our conclusion that the provisions of the ordinance had a “definite relation” to the health and safety of the public, and that the repairs the plaintiff was required to make to her property were “not unreasonable in the light of the objective sought to be obtained.” Similarly, in U.S. West Communications, we held that an ordinance compelling a public utility to relocate its facilities from the public right-of-way at the utility's own expense was a reasonable exercise of police power because the relocation would improve the city's aesthetics, enhance traffic safety, and better protect electric facilities, and thus the ordinance fairly related to the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the

  6. Frayer v. People

    684 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 17 times
    Concluding that defendant was guilty of tampering with physical evidence when she threw and broke bottle containing narcotic cough syrup while struggling with police

    There can be little doubt that the legislature may incorporate federal statutory provisions in state statutes by appropriate reference. People v. Harper, 193 Colo. 116, 562 P.2d 1112 (1977); Apple v. City County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964). Hydrocodone is now specifically listed as a schedule II controlled substance in section 12-22-310(1)(a)(I)(J), 5 C.R.S. (1983 Supp.).

  7. People v. Tenorio

    197 Colo. 137 (Colo. 1979)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that the defendant opened the door to a topic that the court previously ruled to be inadmissible hearsay

    We hold that this is a legitimate and constitutional means of accomplishing the General Assembly's obvious purpose. Cf., United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 78 S.Ct. 291, 2 L.Ed.2d 282 (1958) (Congress may assimilate state laws by reference); Apple v. Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964) (incorporation into a Colorado statute of the provisions of another Colorado statute by reference); Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill.2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969) (state legislature created state tax law by incorporating federal tax laws by reference); accord, First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 483, 115 A.2d 455 (1955). Colo. Const., Art. X, section 19 expressly authorizes the General Assembly to define income subject to state income tax by reference to federal laws "whether retrospective or prospective . . . ."

  8. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs

    193 Colo. 543 (Colo. 1977)   Cited 1 times

    The police power authorizes home rule cities, such as Colorado Springs, to pass ordinances to alleviate such local problems. Colo. Const. Art. XX, § 6. Cf., Apple v. City and County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964). See generally, Shoemaker, "An Engineering-Legal Solution to Urban Drainage Problems," 45 Denver L.J. 381 (1968).

  9. People v. Harper

    193 Colo. 116 (Colo. 1977)   Cited 3 times

    See generally, 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes § 28 (1974). In Apple v. City and County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964), we held that "incorporating into a statute the provisions of other statutes by reference is recognized as a proper enactment of legislation to avoid encumbering the statute books by unnecessary repetition." [6] The defendant also attacks the Colorado statute as facially invalid on the ground that it incorporates prospective or future determinations of illegal substances under the Federal Controlled Substances Act.

  10. Holmes v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review

    351 A.2d 518 (D.C. 1976)   Cited 2 times
    Affirming Board of Appeals and Review decision sustaining a denial of Mr. Holme's application for renewal of a license to operate an apartment house

    State v. Schaffel, supra. See also Moton v. City of Phoenix, 100 Ariz. 23, 410 P.2d 93 (1966); Apple v. City and County of Denver, 154 Col. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964) (en banc). In so concluding, we add the caveat that should an apartment house operator's license be denied because of the existence of merely technical or cosmetic violations of the Housing Code, which would not pose a substantial threat to the health or safety of the tenants, the spectre of an unconstitutional taking of property may well be raised.