Apple Inc. appeals from an order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denying Apple's request for a permanent injunction against Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively, “Samsung”). See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F.Supp.2d 1147 (N.D.Cal.2012) (“Injunction Order ”). Apple sought to enjoin Samsung's infringement of several of Apple's design and utility patents, as well as Samsung's dilution of Apple's iPhone trade dress. We affirm the denial of injunctive relief with respect to Apple's design patents and trade dress.
On December 17, 2012, this Court denied Apple's request as to all the intellectual property at issue. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. ("Apple III"), 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2012). A brief description of the portion of the Court's order denying Apple's requested permanent injunction with respect to the utility patents-in-suit follows.
As this Court found before, "though evidence that Samsung attempted to copy certain Apple features may offer some limited support for Apple's theory, it does not establish that those features actually drove consumer demand." Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Apple also argues that its own use of the patented features in its products and advertisements demonstrates that the features are important to consumers.
See ECF No. 246 at 7; ECF No. 253 at 4. In the former opinion, the plaintiff submitted evidence that ease-of-use was important to smartphone consumers but the lower court deemed that evidence “too general” where the patented feature-tap-to-zoom-was “very specific.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2012). A consumer may want a phone that is easy to use, but this does not establish that a tap-to-zoom feature, for example, or any given type of gesture, is a driver of consumer demand.
the lower court deemed that evidence “too general” where the patented feature-tap-to-zoom-was “very specific.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
The juror's comments are equally consistent (if not more consistent) with the jury's returning a verdict for Deputy Yoder based on a proper understanding of the law, which it applied in making a finding on the facts. See generally Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 6574785, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012) ("'[T]he law presumes that jurors carefully follow the instructions given to them.'") (quoting Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Moreover, as this Court previously noted in connection with evaluating a permanent injunction, the absence of current infringement does not foreclose future infringement: "The fact that Samsung may have stopped selling infringing products for now says nothing about what Samsung may choose to do in the future." Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff'd in part, 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (footnote omitted). While Apple could resort to filing new lawsuits to address any continuing infringement, see Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012), ongoing royalties may reduce unnecessary future litigation.
Lermer Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32-33 (2008) (noting the similarity in the factors considered in the preliminary injunction and permanent injunction setting); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) ("The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception th the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success."); Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1148 n.3 (noting that the standard for irreparable harm is the same in the preliminary and permanent injunction settings); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Case No. 11-cv-1846 LHK, 2012 WL 6569786, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012) (noting that "the irreparable harm requirement applies to both preliminary and permanent injunctions" and that nothing in Apple II limits its application to preliminary injunctions). The court must confess to doubt that the causal nexus as articulated in Apple II should be required for all irreparable harms offered in support of a request for a permanent injunction.