Appeal of Town of Bethlehem

24 Citing cases

  1. In re Town of Seabrook

    163 N.H. 635 (N.H. 2012)   Cited 21 times
    Explaining that while an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to some deference, we are still the final arbiter of the legislature's intent and are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute

    “The scope of our review of agency decisions under RSA 72:12–a is narrow.” Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 318, 911 A.2d 1 (2006). We will overturn DES's decision only if it committedan error of law, or if the appealing party shows by a clear preponderance of evidence that DES's decision is unjust or unreasonable.

  2. In re Town of Rindge

    959 A.2d 188 (N.H. 2008)   Cited 3 times
    Stating court will not add words to statute

    Our review of agency decisions under RSA 72:12-a is narrow in scope. Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 318, 911 A.2d 1 (2006). “Agency findings are deemed prima facie lawful and reasonable and we do not sit as a trier of fact in reviewing them.

  3. N. Country Envtl. Servs. v. State of N.H

    157 N.H. 15 (N.H. 2008)   Cited 5 times

    This case is the latest involving a landfill site NCES operates in Bethlehem. See generallyAppeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 911 A.2d 1 (2006); N. Country Envtl. Servs. v. Town of Bethlehem, 150 N.H. 606, 843 A.2d 949 (2004); N. Country Envtl. Servs. v. Town of Bethlehem, 146 N.H. 348, 772 A.2d 330 (2001). We recite only those facts relevant to decide the issues in this appeal.

  4. Fisher v. Minichiello

    155 N.H. 188 (N.H. 2007)   Cited 12 times

    When examining the language of the statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, ___, 911 A.2d 1, 5 (2006). We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.

  5. In re Port City Air Leasing, Inc.

    No. 2023-0278 (N.H. Dec. 24, 2024)

    Compare Appeal of Richards, 134 N.H. 148, 154 (1991) (per curiam) (explaining that party has standing to raise constitutional issue when party's own personal rights have been or will be directly affected - in other words, that the party has suffered or will suffer an "injury in fact"), with Nguyen, 170 N.H. at 243 (outlining procedural due process analysis). To prevail on its procedural due process claim, Port City must establish a protected liberty or property interest, see Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 328 (2006), of which it will be deprived, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1972) (reasoning that application of replevin statutes to temporarily seize plaintiffs' goods constituted a "deprivation" for due process purposes). "The hallmark of a legally protected property interest is an individual entitlement grounded in State law," Bethlehem, 154 N.H. at 329, which "cannot be removed except for cause," Duffley v. N.H.

  6. Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights

    162 N.H. 245 (N.H. 2011)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that statute demonstrated that the legislature knew how to delegate cost allocation powers to the site evaluation committee when it chose to do so

    " The law of this State is well settled that an administrative agency must follow its own rules and regulations." Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 327, 911 A.2d 1 (2006) (quotation omitted). Because the committee's treatment of the appellants as applicants conflicts with Rule 102.

  7. Appeal of Sch. Admin. Unit #44

    162 N.H. 79 (N.H. 2011)   Cited 3 times

    To determine whether particular procedures satisfy the requirements of due process, we typically employ a two-prong analysis. Appeal of Town, of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 328 (2006). Initially, we ascertain whether a legally protected interest has been implicated.

  8. Petition of Grant Kilton

    156 N.H. 632 (N.H. 2007)   Cited 23 times
    Explaining that to determine whether particular procedures satisfy the requirements of due process, "we ascertain whether a legally protected interest has been implicated"

    To determine whether particular procedures satisfy the requirements of due process, we typically employ a two-prong analysis. Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 328, 911 A.2d 1 (2006). Initially, we ascertain whether a legally protected interest has been implicated. See id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).

  9. Lachance v. U.S.

    156 N.H. 88 (N.H. 2007)   Cited 34 times
    In LaChance, he New Hampshire Supreme Court was answering an Illinois Brick question: did the court's rule that indirect purchasers may not bring claims under the Granite State antitrust statute, announced in Minuteman, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 147 N.H. 634, 795 A.2d 833 (2002), apply to claims under the NHCPA as well.

    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 319, 911 A.2d 1 (2006). When examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used.

  10. Gravel v. Town of Goshen

    155 N.H. 762 (N.H. 2007)   Cited 6 times
    In Guildhall, a case involving permit-required excavation, we held that the legislature did not intend to preempt local regulation of such excavation.

    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Appeal of Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 319, 911 A.2d 1 (2006). When examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used.