Appeal of the House Legislative Facilities Subcom

11 Citing cases

  1. In re N.H. Troopers Ass'n

    175 N.H. 167 (N.H. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    We have interpreted RSA 273-A:9 as "grant[ing] the executive branch effective control over the bargaining process." Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 446, 685 A.2d 910 (1996).

  2. In re State

    175 N.H. 327 (N.H. 2022)

    To hold otherwise would undermine the Governor's "sole authority to direct the negotiation process." Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 446, 685 A.2d 910 (1996) ; see RSA 273-A:9, I (Supp. 2021) (providing that "[a]ll cost items and terms and conditions of employment affecting state employees in the classified system generally shall be negotiated by the state, represented by the governor as chief executive" (emphasis added)). We further conclude that, because the Executive Council cannot override the Governor's rejection of a fact-finder's report, RSA 273-A:12, II does not require the Governor to submit the report to the Council for its consideration.

  3. State v. Lilley

    171 N.H. 766 (N.H. 2019)   Cited 7 times
    Holding ordinance content-neutral, in part because it "merely regulates the manner in which activities may be carried out"

    As we have noted, however, "[w]e can discern no clear meaning from the legislature's failure to enact the proposed amendment." Dover News, Inc., 117 N.H. at 1069, 381 A.2d 752 ; see also Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 449, 685 A.2d 910 (1996) (rejecting as misguided argument that failure of proposed amendment to Public Employee Labor Relations Act that would have expressly excluded legislative and judicial employees from its coverage demonstrated legislative intent that such employees be covered, and observing that "the amendment's failure could as easily have resulted from the belief that those employees were not covered by the Act in the first place"). For these reasons, we find that the ordinance is not preempted by RSA 645:1, I.

  4. In re Appeal of City of Concord

    168 N.H. 533 (N.H. 2016)

    "To achieve this goal, the [PELRA] granted public employees the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining with their employers, mandated that public employers negotiate in good faith with employee organizations, and established the PELRB to assist in resolving disputes between government and its employees." Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 446, 685 A.2d 910 (1996) ; see Laws 1975, 490:1. Thus, we conclude that, pursuant to the recognition clause of the successor CBA, a retiree is not an "Employee."

  5. Professional Fire Fighters of Wolfeboro, Iaff Local 3708 v. Town of Wolfeboro

    164 N.H. 18 (N.H. 2012)   Cited 4 times

    Appeal of Hollis Educ. Assoc., 163 N.H. 337, 340, 42 A.3d 863 (2012). The first statute grants municipalities discretionary authority to recognize unions and enter into collective bargaining agreements with them, see Tremblay, 108 N.H. at 419–20, 237 A.2d 668, while the second mandates that public employers negotiate in good faith with employee organizations, see Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 446, 685 A.2d 910 (1996) —that is, with certified employee organizations of ten employees or more, see RSA 273–A:8, I. We generally assume that when the legislature enacts a provision, it has in mind previously enacted statutes relating to the same subject matter.

  6. In re Silverstein

    163 N.H. 192 (N.H. 2012)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that procedure whereby final decision on termination of public school teacher was made by the school board rather than a neutral third party, such as an arbitrator, did not offend due process

    “To achieve this goal, the Act granted public employees the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining with their employers, mandated that public employers negotiate in good faith with employee organizations, and established the PELRB to assist in resolving disputes between government and its employees.” Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 446, 685 A.2d 910 (1996). RSA chapter 273–A:6 (2010) bestows on the PELRB “primary jurisdiction” over all unfair labor practices of public employers.

  7. Dillman v. Town of Hooksett

    153 N.H. 344 (N.H. 2006)   Cited 6 times

    RSA chapter 273-A was enacted in 1975 "to foster harmonious and cooperative relations between public employers and their employees and to protect the public by encouraging the orderly and uninterrupted operation of government." Laws 1975, 490:1; see Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 445-46 (1996). Specifically, RSA chapter 273-A reflects a legislative purpose of achieving labor peace by requiring collective bargaining between a public employer and an exclusive representative of all employees within a bargaining unit.

  8. State v. Leonard

    855 A.2d 531 (N.H. 2004)   Cited 3 times

    Where statutory language is not specifically defined, we look to the intent of the legislation, which is determined by examining the construction of the statute as a whole." Appeal of HouseLegislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 446 (1996) (quotations and ellipsis omitted). RSA 135:17-a requires that within twelve months of an order committing a defendant for treatment, a further hearing be held to assess the defendant's competency and that, prior to that second hearing, the "treating psychiatrist" must conduct a further competency evaluation.

  9. Appeal of Intl. Brotherhood of Police Officers

    148 N.H. 194 (N.H. 2002)   Cited 4 times

    The applicable standard of review in this case is provided by RSA 541:13 (1997), which authorizes our review of agency decisions for errors of law. See Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 445 (1996). We presume the PELRB's findings of fact to be "lawful and reasonable."

  10. Appeal of Reid

    143 N.H. 246 (N.H. 1998)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that municipality could not assess tax against lessees of real properties where relevant leases did not provide for the payment of property taxes, and explaining that "the plain language of RSA 72:23, I, reveals that it contains ... a tax provision that ensures that the lessees are aware of, and consent to, taxation of their leasehold"

    In light of our holding that the underlying leaseholds were not taxable to the petitioners, we need not address the petitioners' challenge to the board's valuation of their respective leasehold interests. Cf. Appeal of House Legislative Facilities Subcom., 141 N.H. 443, 449, 685 A.2d 910, 913 (1996). Vacated and remanded.