Appeal of Land Acquisition

6 Citing cases

  1. Appeal of Hardy

    154 N.H. 805 (N.H. 2007)   Cited 7 times

    At issue in Land Acquisition was the authority of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) to award attorney's fees in property tax abatement appeals. At that time, the applicable statute, RSA 71-B:9, allowed the BTLA to award "costs" only; there was no mention of attorney's fees. Land Acquisition, 145 N.H. at 497; cf. Laws 2003, 133:2 (amending RSA 71-B:9 to authorize payment of attorney's fees in addition to costs). We reversed the BTLA's award of attorney's fees and disagreed with the respondent's assertion that the BTLA had the "inherent authority" to award such fees, because of the limiting language of RSA 71-B:9.

  2. Appeal of City of Manchester

    821 A.2d 1019 (N.H. 2003)   Cited 7 times
    Discussing contract bar rule during analysis of administrative rules governing elections for non-represented bargaining units

    We still must examine the agency's interpretation to determine if it is consistent with the language of the regulation and with the purpose which the regulation is intended to serve.Appeal of Land Acquisition, 145 N.H. 492, 495-96 (2000) (quotation and brackets omitted). To the extent that the PELRB held that Rule 301.01(b) only applies when the bargaining unit already has a certified representative, we agree.

  3. Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights

    162 N.H. 245 (N.H. 2011)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that statute demonstrated that the legislature knew how to delegate cost allocation powers to the site evaluation committee when it chose to do so

    We disagree. The committee's finding is contrary to Appeal of Land Acquisition, 145 N.H. 492, 767 A.2d 948 (2000), superseded by statute as stated inAppeal of Hardy, 154 N.H. 805, 917 A.2d 1237 (2007). There, we rejected an " assertion that the board [of tax and land appeals] has inherent authority to award attorney's fees," stating that " [w]hile a court may have such inherent authority, the same is not true for a quasi-judicial administrative body.

  4. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Amsco

    153 N.H. 28 (N.H. 2005)   Cited 13 times
    Refusing to address the merits of arguments on appeal that were not adequately raised below

    First, it contends that no enforceable agreement could have existed because Gulf refused to issue a release, and a release was its sole motivation in resolving the Beacon and Panciocco matters for payment of a compromised sum in order to assume Gulf's defense in the Brita case. We, however, do not stand in die shoes of the trial court on factual matters, such as the existence and terms of a contract. Chisholm v. Ultima Nashua Indus. Corp., 150 N.H. 141, 145 (2003); see Appeal of Land Acquisition, 145 N.H. 492, 494 (2000) (whether binding settlement agreement exists is question of fact), Although evidence exists supporting AMSCO's view of the negotiations, the trial court's ruling concerning the scope of the parties' intended agreement is supported by the record. Estate of Younge v. Huysmans, 127 N.H. 461, 465 (1985).

  5. Appeal of City of Portsmouth

    151 N.H. 170 (N.H. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    Portsmouth has the burden of showing that the Board's decision is clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and all findings of the Board upon questions of fact shall be deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable. See Appeal of Land Acquisition, 145 N.H. 492, 496 (2000). We first address the Board's recognition of PILOTs as "sums paid by an otherwise tax exempt property owner . . . to a municipality to compensate for the burdens of providing basic municipal services such as police and fire protection."

  6. Appeal of Taylor Home

    149 N.H. 96 (N.H. 2003)   Cited 2 times

    "Our task is not to determine whether we would have found differently than did the board, or to re-weigh the evidence, but rather to determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence in the record."Appeal of Land Acquisition, 145 N.H. 492, 496 (2000) (quotation omitted). There is competent evidence in the record to support the BTLA's finding that the August 31, 2001 petitions appealed the municipal abatement decisions, not the municipal charitable exemption decisions.