See RSA 151-C:8, III (Supp. 1983). In addition, our decision in Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 436 A.2d 1329 (1981) does not persuade us to reach a contrary result. In that case we upheld the decision of the State Office of Health Planning and Development, on reconsideration, to treat an application which had not been filed within sixty days of the original applicant's letter of intent as a competing application.
RSA 151-C:6, I(a) (Supp. 1981); Dep't of Health and Welfare Rules He-C 304.01(a). 2. Public Health and Welfare — Institutional Health Services — Certificate of Need Bureau of institutional health services, in its consideration of applications for certificates of need, properly met the requirements adopted in Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928 (1981), that mutually exclusive applications must be considered together in order to insure the fair treatment of each. 3.
Nevins v. N.H. Dep't of Resources and Economic Dev., 147 N.H. 484, 487, 792 A.2d 388 (2002). Thus, although we have occasionally noted that an agency “should ... adopt rules,” Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 935, 436 A.2d 1329 (1981), or even that it “was required to promulgate rules,” Nevins, 147 N.H. at 487, 792 A.2d 388, it has been nearly a century since we last held that failure to adopt rules, by itself, divested a regulatory body of its authority. See Hanover Precinct v. Atkins, 78 N.H. 308, 310–11, 99 A. 293 (1916).
Petition of Smith, 139 N.H. 299, 307 (1994); see also Appeal of Morgan, 144 N.H. 44, 51 (1999); Petition of Rattee, 145 N.H. 341, 347 (2000). But cf. Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 934-35 (1981) (holding that agency should adopt rules and regulations to clarify the requirements of statute in light of provisions requiring adoption of rules and regulations). The plaintiffs contend that the superior court erred in applying the rule articulated in Stuart and later cases because in those cases, the statute either contained a clear mandate or was sufficiently detailed to effectuate its purpose.
In addition to complying with the statutory requirements of RSA chapter 151-C, the board must also comply with its own rules and regulations which implement the provisions of the statute. Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 934-35, 436 A.2d 1329, 1332-33 (1981); Appeal of the City of Nashua, 121 N.H. 874, 876, 435 A.2d 1126, 1127-28 (1981). New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services Rule ("Div.
Due process under our constitutional republic has, as a primary consideration, the notion that no matter how rich or how poor, all of our citizens are entitled to fundamental fairness when government agencies seek to regulate them. We recently found serious deficiencies in administrative procedures of several of our agencies, ranging from a lack of meaningful notice of a Medicaid benefit change, Petition of Clark, 122 N.H. 888, 891, 451 A.2d 1303, 1305 (1982); to lack of procedures which led to an "unfair and inconsistent" result in the issuance of hospital certificates of need under RSA chapter 151-C, Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 935, 436 A.2d 1329, 1333 (1981); to agency bias and prejudgment by the water resources board, Appeal of Lathrop, 122 N.H. 262, 266, 444 A.2d 505, 507 (1982). Because neither our legislature nor the attorney general, see RSA 7:8, has yet adopted a procedure for due-process adjudication by administrative agencies, see H.B. 897 (1981), this court is again being called upon to write such procedures into law on a case-by-case basis.
In any event, we conclude that Coastal could have reasonably relied on the longstanding administrative practice of the PUC not to exercise jurisdiction over stock transfers or sales and could have expected that this practice would apply to Coastal's case. See generally Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 935, 436 A.2d 1329, 1332-33 (1981). Moreover, the PUC is not in a position to blame its failure to investigate the issue of dormancy on Coastal, because it had in fact received notice that dormancy might be an issue for it to consider in the authorization of the asset transfer, and it had ample opportunity to elicit the necessary information to resolve this issue at the asset transfer hearing.
A uniform procedure for processing requests for leave and for granting or denying leave should be promulgated to insure that parties in the future will be treated fairly. See Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 935, 436 A.2d 1329, 1333 (1981). For the reason indicated, the plaintiff's suspension should be removed from his record, and the plaintiff should be awarded full pay for the week of suspension.
Although the Ashbacker doctrine has never been applied by the Illinois courts to CON cases, it has been applied to other jurisdictions to require batching of CON applications when the applications are mutually exclusive and filed within the same time period. See, Gulf Court Nursing Center v. Department of Health Rehabilitative Services (Fla. App. 1985), 483 So.2d 700; Appeal of Behavior Science Institute (1981), 121 N.H. 928, 436 A.2d 1329. • 3 In urging this court to find that the Board was required to batch under Ashbacker, Charter maintains that the applications of CPC and HCA were mutually exclusive.
Thus the proposed capital expenditure for a decrease of 12 ICF and 12 SNF beds was a capital expenditure subject to the Section 1122 review process. Cf. Appeal of Behavior Science Institute, 121 N.H. 928, 436 A.2d 1329 (1981). SHPDB knew of this required review at the time it "settled" with Americare.