Opinion
No. CIV 20-0093 JB/JFR
08-31-2020
Gregory APELIAN, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES CONGRESS, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommended Disposition, filed May 29, 2020 (Doc. 8)("PFRD"). Objections were due by no later than June 15, 2020. The parties have not filed any objections. The failure to make timely objections to the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. See U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (" One Parcel").
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (stating that "[w]hen a party may or must act within a specified time after being served and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C) (mail) ... 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire.").
LAW REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
District courts may refer dispositive motions to a Magistrate Judge for a recommended disposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1) ("A magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required proceedings when assigned, without the parties’ consent, to hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or defense or a prisoner petition challenging the conditions of confinement."). Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs objections. It states: "Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Finally, when resolving objections to a Magistrate Judge's proposal, "[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 636 provides:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
"The filing of objections to a magistrate's report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues -- factual and legal -- that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute." United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., with Bldgs., Appurtenances, Improvements, and Contents, Known as: 2121 East 30th St., Tulsa, Okla., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (" One Parcel")(quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) ). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted, "the filing of objections advances the interests that underlie the Magistrate's Act,[ ] including judicial efficiency." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (citing Niehaus v. Kan. Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986) ; United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981) ).
Congress enacted the Federal Magistrate's Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631 -39, in 1968.
The Tenth Circuit has held "that a party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. "To further advance the policies behind the Magistrate's Act, [the Tenth Circuit], like numerous other circuits, ha[s] adopted ‘a firm waiver rule’ that ‘provides that the failure to make timely objections to the magistrate's findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.’ " One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991) ). "[O]nly an objection that is sufficiently specific to focus the district court's attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute will advance the policies behind the Magistrate's Act." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. In addition to requiring specific objections, the Tenth Circuit has stated that "[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived." Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). See United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's report are deemed waived."). In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit has stated that "the district court correctly held that [a petitioner] had waived argument by failing to raise it before the magistrate." Pevehouse v. Scibana, 229 F. App'x 795, 796 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
Pevehouse v. Scibana is an unpublished opinion, but the Court can rely on an unpublished opinion to the extent its reasoned analysis is persuasive in the case before it. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A) ("Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value."). The Tenth Circuit has stated:
In this circuit, unpublished orders are not binding precedent, ... and we have generally determined that citation to unpublished opinions is not favored. However, if an unpublished opinion or order and judgment has persuasive value with respect to a material issue in a case and would assist the court in its disposition, we allow a citation to that decision.
United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005). The Court concludes that Pevehouse v. Scibana, 229 F. App'x 795 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished), has persuasive value with respect to a material issue and will assist the Court in its disposition of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit, in accord with other Courts of Appeals, expanded the waiver rule to cover objections that are timely but too general. See One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. The Supreme Court of the United States of America -- in the course of approving the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's use of the waiver rule -- noted:
It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings. The House and Senate
Reports accompanying the 1976 amendments do not expressly consider what sort of review the district court should perform when no party objects to the magistrate's report. See S. Rep. No. 94-625, pp. 9-10 (1976)(hereinafter Senate Report); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, p. 11 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 6162 (hereinafter House Report). There is nothing in those Reports, however, that demonstrates an intent to require the district court to give any more consideration to the magistrate's report than the court considers appropriate. Moreover, the Subcommittee that drafted and held hearings on the 1976 amendments had before it the guidelines of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts concerning the efficient use of magistrates. Those guidelines recommended to the district courts that "[w]here a magistrate makes a finding or ruling on a motion or an issue, his determination should become that of the district court, unless specific objection is filed within a reasonable time." See Jurisdiction of United States Magistrates, Hearings on S. 1283 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1975)(emphasis added)(hereinafter Senate Hearings). The Committee also heard Judge Metzner of the Southern District of New York, the chairman of a Judicial Conference Committee on the administration of the magistrate system, testify that he personally followed that practice. See id. , at 11 ("If any objections come in, ... I review [the record] and decide it. If no objections come in, I merely sign the magistrate's order."). The Judicial Conference of the United States, which supported the de novo standard of review eventually incorporated in § 636(b)(1)(C), opined that in most instances no party would object to the magistrate's recommendation, and the litigation would terminate with the judge's adoption of the magistrate's report. See Senate Hearings, at 35, 37. Congress apparently assumed, therefore, that any party who was dissatisfied for any reason with the magistrate's report would file objections, and those objections would trigger district court review. There is no indication that Congress, in enacting § 636(b)(1)(C), intended to require a district judge to review a magistrate's report to which no objections are filed. It did not preclude treating the failure to object as a procedural default, waiving the right to further consideration of any sort. We thus find nothing in the statute or the legislative history that convinces us that Congress intended to forbid a rule such as the one adopted by the Sixth Circuit.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 150–52, 106 S.Ct. 466 (emphasis in original)(footnotes omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has also noted, "however, that ‘[t]he waiver rule as a procedural bar need not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate.’ " One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060 (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d at 659 ("We join those circuits that have declined to apply the waiver rule to a pro se litigant's failure to object when the magistrate's order does not apprise the pro se litigant of the consequences of a failure to object to findings and recommendations." (citations omitted))). Compare Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 154, 106 S.Ct. 466 ("Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. [A failure to object] does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard."). In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit noted that the district judge had decided sua sponte to conduct a de novo review despite the lack of specificity in the objections, but the Tenth Circuit held that it would deem the issues waived on appeal, because it would advance the interests underlying the waiver rule. See 73 F.3d at 1060-61 (citing cases from other Courts of Appeals where district courts elected to address merits despite potential application of waiver rule, but Courts of Appeals opted to enforce waiver rule).
Where a party files timely and specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendation, "on ... dispositive motions, the statute calls for a de novo determination, not a de novo hearing." United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The Tenth Circuit has stated that a de novo determination, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), "requires the district court to consider relevant evidence of record and not merely review the magistrate judge's recommendation." Griego v. Padilla (In re Griego), 64 F.3d 580, 583-84 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has noted that, although a district court must make a de novo determination of the objections to recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) when there is no objection, the district court is not precluded from relying on the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406 ("[I]n providing for a ‘de novo determination’ rather than de novo hearing, Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) )); Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42 of Stephens Cty., 8 F.3d 722, 724-25 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court's adoption of the magistrate judge's "particular reasonable-hour estimates" is consistent with a de novo determination, because "the district court ‘may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate,’ ... [as] ‘Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.’ " (emphasis omitted)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406 )).
Where no party objects to the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommended disposition, the Court has, as a matter of course and in the interests of justice, reviewed the Magistrate Judge's recommendations. In Workheiser v. City of Clovis, No. CIV 12-0485 JB/GBW, 2012 WL 6846401 (D.N.M. Dec. 28, 2012) (Browning, J.), where the plaintiff failed to respond to the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommended disposition, although the Court determined that the plaintiff "has waived his opportunity for the Court to conduct review of the factual and legal findings in the [PFRD]," the Court nevertheless conducted such a review. 2012 WL 6846401, at *3. The Court generally does not review, however, the Magistrate Judge's PFRD de novo and determine independently necessarily what it would do if the issues had come before the Court first, but rather adopts the PFRD where "[t]he Court cannot say that the Magistrate Judge's recommendation ... is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, [obviously][ ] contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion." Workheiser v. City of Clovis, 2012 WL 6846401, at *3. This review, which is deferential to the magistrate judge's work when there is no objection, nonetheless provides some review in the interest of justice and seems more consistent with the waiver rule's intent than no review at all or a full-fledged review. Accordingly, the Court considers this standard of review appropriate. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 151, 106 S.Ct. 466 ("There is nothing in those Reports, however, that demonstrates an intent to require the district court to give any more consideration to the magistrate's report than the court considers appropriate."). The Court is reluctant to have no review at all if its name is going to go at the bottom of the order adopting the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendations.
The Court previously used, as the standard for review when a party does not object to the Magistrate Judge's PFRD, whether the recommendation was "clearly erroneous, arbitrary, contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion," thus omitting "obviously" in front of contrary to law. Solomon v. Holder, No. CIV 12-1039 JB/LAM, 2013 WL 499300, at *4 (D.N.M. Jan. 31, 2013) (Browning, J.)(adopting the recommendation to which there was no objection, stating: "The Court determines that the PFRD is not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion, and accordingly adopts the recommendations therein."); O'Neill v. Jaramillo, No. CIV 11-0858 JB/GBW, 2013 WL 499521 (D.N.M. Jan. 31, 2013) (Browning, J.)("Having reviewed the PFRD under that standard, the Court cannot say that the Magistrate Judge's recommendation is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. The Court thus adopts Judge Wormuth's PFRD." (citing Workheiser v. City of Clovis, 2012 WL 6846401, at *3 )); Galloway v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. CIV 12-0625 JB/RHS, 2013 WL 503744 (D.N.M. Jan. 31, 2013) (Browning, J.)(adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendations upon determining that they were not "clearly contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion"). The Court concludes that "contrary to law" does not reflect accurately the deferential standard of review that the Court intends to use when there is no objection. Concluding that a Magistrate Judge's recommendation is not contrary to law would require the Court to analyze the Magistrate Judge's application of law to the facts or the Magistrate Judge's delineation of the facts -- in other words performing a de novo review -- which the law requires only when a party objects to the recommendations. The Court concludes that adding "obviously" better reflects that the Court is not performing a de novo review of the Magistrate Judges’ recommendations. Going forward, therefore, the Court will, as it has done for some time now, review the Magistrate Judges’ recommendations to which there are no objections for whether the recommendations are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion.
ANALYSIS
The Court has reviewed carefully the PFRD. Because the parties have not objected to it, the Court does not review the PFRD de novo, but rather reviews the PFRD from the Honorable John F. Robbenhaar, United States Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to determine if it is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. The Court determines that the PFRD is not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the PFRD.
IT IS ORDERED that: (i) the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed May 29, 2020 (Doc. 8) are adopted; and (ii) the Plaintiff's Second Amended Pro Se Petition Seeking Emergency Injunctive Relief, filed February 3, 2020 (Doc. 5) be dismissed without prejudice.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
On May 5, 2020, United States District Judge James O. Browning entered an Order of Reference referring this case to the undersigned to "conduct hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary hearings, and to perform any legal analysis required to recommend to the Court an ultimate disposition of the case." Doc. 7.
JOHN F. ROBBENHAAR, United States Magistrate Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Second Amended Pro Se Petition Seeking Emergency Injunctive Relief (Doc. 5), filed February 3, 2020 ("Second Amended Complaint"). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Relevant Procedural Background
On January 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed his Plaintiff's Second Amended Pro Se Petition Seeking Emergency Injunctive Relief. Doc. 5. Plaintiff characterizes his Second Amended Complaint as a "1st, 10th, and 14th Amendment-supported Citizen's Indictment of widespread House & Senate: Fraud; Malfeasance; Breach of Contract (relative to the illegally abrogated Constitution which must always be the Highest Calibrating Legal Standard of the land); Perjury (for breaking their oaths of office swearing to)." Second Am. Compl. at 2. Plaintiff also alleges the "lack of an Article of Impeachment for Treason, is a central aspect of this Civil Complaint against Congress (in this case the House Majority) for the clear malfeasance of aiding and abetting said Treason, inadvertently or otherwise, by failing to address this weightiest and easiest to prove charge." Id. at 4. Much of the Second Amended Complaint discusses the actions of President Trump, his administration and his associates. Plaintiff "ask[s] the Court to enjoin the Senate to watch the recording of Trump's Helsinki performance again in its entirety." Id. at 16. Although not clearly expressed, Plaintiff appears to ask that the Court order Congress to impeach President Trump. See id. at 27.
The Court notified Plaintiff that he has not met his burden of showing that the Court has jurisdiction over this matter stating:
The [Second] Amended Complaint does not contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Plaintiff asserts that the First Amendment "stipulates to: ... the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Second Amended Complaint at 2. However, the First Amendment does not give the Court subject matter jurisdiction over this matter:
"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits suits against the United States except in those instances in which it has specifically consented to be sued." United States v. Richman (In re Talbot), 124 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 1997). "The United States consents to be sued only when Congress unequivocally expresses in statutory text its intention to waive the United States’ sovereign immunity." Id.
Fent v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd. , 235 F.3d 553, 556 (10th Cir. 2000) ; Normandy Apartments, Ltd. V. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development , 554 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The defense of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, depriving courts of subject-matter jurisdiction where applicable"). Plaintiff has not referenced any statutory text that unequivocally expresses Congress’ intention to waive the United States’ sovereign immunity in this matter.
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const., amend. I.
Mem. Opinion and Order to Show Cause at 2-3, Doc. 6, filed April 22, 2020 ("Order to Show Cause"). The Court ordered Plaintiff to either show cause why the Court should not dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction or file a third amended complaint containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for the Court's jurisdiction. Order to Show Cause at 3. The Court notified Plaintiff that failure to timely show cause or file an amended complaint containing a statement of the grounds for the Court's jurisdiction may result in dismissal of this case. Id.
Plaintiff did not show cause or file a third amended complaint by the May 6, 2020, deadline.
Analysis
Relevant Law Regarding Jurisdiction
As the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, Plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts that support jurisdiction. See Dutcher v. Matheson , 733 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, we presume no jurisdiction exists absent an adequate showing by the party invoking federal jurisdiction"); Evitt v. Durland , 243 F.3d 388 *2 (10th Cir. 2000) ("even if the parties do not raise the question themselves, it is our duty to address the apparent lack of jurisdiction sua sponte") (quoting Tuck v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 859 F.2d 842, 843 (10th Cir. 1988) ).
Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." ("[D]ismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be without prejudice because the court, having determined that it lacks jurisdiction over the action, is incapable of reaching a disposition on the merits of the underlying claims."). Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp. , 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006).
The Second Amended Complaint Does Not Show that the Court has Jurisdiction
The Court notified Plaintiff that he has the burden of establishing jurisdiction and explained why the Second Amended Complaint failed to establish jurisdiction. The Court also notified Plaintiff that the Court must dismiss this case if the Court determines it lacks jurisdiction and granted Plaintiff leave to show cause why the Court should not dismiss this case or to file a third amended complaint. Plaintiff did not show cause why the Court should not dismiss this case or to file a third amended complaint by the May 6, 2020, deadline.
Proposed Finding
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter.
Recommended Disposition
The Court recommends that this case be dismissed without prejudice.