The WPA further provides: Anzaldua v. Band, 457 Mich. 530, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998). MCL 15.363(1).
Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing) , 420 Mich. 567, 601, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984), quoting Manion v. State Hwy. Comm’r , 303 Mich. 1, 19, 5 N.W.2d 527 (1942). In addressing the issue before us, we find instructive our Supreme Court's reasoning in Anzaldua v. Band , 457 Mich. 530, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998).Anzalduainvolved the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq . After finding that a plaintiff had a statutory right to a jury trial in an action under the WPA, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the argument of the defendant Michigan State University (MSU) that "even if a jury right exists generally under the act, MSU is immune from suit before a jury because it is an arm of the state."
Even if they did, a plaintiff's right to a jury trial under the ELCRA is well established in Michigan's caselaw. See Anzaldua v Band, 457 Mich 530, 548; 578 NW2d 306 (1998) ("The CRA and FEPA both contained a right to a jury trial."); Smith v Univ of Detroit, 145 Mich App 468, 477; 378 NW2d 511 (1985) (recognizing in the context of a case brought under the ELCRA that "common-law actions for damages for similar discriminatory acts were recognized prior to the adoption of the 1963 Constitution," and, "[t]herefore, plaintiffs did indeed have the right to have a jury determine their action for damages in this case"); King v General Motors Corp, 136 Mich App 301, 308; 356 NW2d 626 (1984). Rather, defendants argue on appeal that this right does not extend to state defendants because the Legislature did not waive the state's immunity to jury trial in the ELCRA.
The WPA further provides: Anzaldua v Band, 457 Mich 530; 578 NW2d 306 (1998). MCL 15.363(1).
We also note that although not raised directly, at the time that the 1963 constitution was adopted, the civil liability act conferred a right to a jury trial because the act provided for actual damages, and therefore, an action brought pursuant to that act was an action at law, not equity. See Anzaldua v Band, 457 Mich. 530, 539, 548; 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998). Many other jurisdictions have addressed whether damages caps impinge on the constitutional right to a jury trial, and those cases decidedly point to two schools of thought: those striking down damages caps and those upholding damages caps.
Pursuant to the plain terms of MCL 600.6419(1)(a), as amended, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of both plaintiff's statutory WPA claim for money damages and his claim for equitable relief. In analyzing the jurisdictional issues of this case, we note that our Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff has a right to a jury trial regarding a WPA money damages claim, but no such right exists with respect to a claim for equitable relief. Anzaldua v. Band, 457 Mich. 530, 538 n. 6, 541–543, 553–554, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998). This is important because § 6419(1) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in [MCL 600.]6421 and [MCL 600.]6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, is exclusive."
Pursuant to the plain terms of MCL 600.6419(1)(a), as amended, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of both plaintiff's statutory WPA claim for money damages and his claim for equitable relief. In analyzing the jurisdictional issues of this case, we note that our Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff has a right to a jury trial regarding a WPA money damages claim, but no such right exists with respect to a claim for equitable relief. Anzaldua v. Band, 457 Mich. 530, 538 n. 6, 541–543, 553–554, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998). This is important because § 6419(1) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in [MCL 600.]6421 and [MCL 600.]6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, is exclusive."
("Had the Legislature intended all civil rights claims against the state to be tried without a jury, it would seem that it would have conferred jurisdiction over such suits upon the Court of Claims, not the circuit court.").Anzaldua v Band , 457 Mich. 530, 553-554, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998).
However, defendants' argument ignores the fact that the WPA expressly waives legislative immunity, making the act fully applicable to public employers. In Anzaldua v. Band, 457 Mich. 530, 551–552, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998), we stated that “[t]he Legislature expressly applied the act to the state by including the state and its political subdivisions in the definition of ‘employer.’ See MCL 15.
Therefore, the case presents a question of law which we review de novo. Anzaldua v. Band, 457 Mich 530, 533; 578 NW2d 306 (1998). ACCORD AND SATISFACTIONS