Opinion
No. 78-386
Decided January 11, 1979.
Discharged for engaging in picketing, employee sought review of an order of the Industrial Commission that disqualified her from unemployment benefits for a period of six weeks.
Order Affirmed
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — First Amendment Rights — May Be Limited — Contract — Union Agreement — Prohibit Picketing — Not — Denial of Rights. Although picketing is ordinarily within the ambit of protected First Amendment rights, these rights may be limited by contractual agreement; consequently, provision of union agreement prohibiting its members from engaging in picketing did not impermissibly deny union members First Amendment rights.
2. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION — Provision — Prohibit — Denial of Benefits — Orderly Union Activity — Inapplicable — Violation — Collective Bargaining Agreement — Notice — Picketing — Jeopardize Employment Status. Although provision of Unemployment Compensation Act prohibits a denial of benefits to one who engages in orderly union activity, that provision is inapplicable where the employee violates a collective bargaining agreement limiting the employee's actions; consequently, the Industrial Commission could reduce the unemployment compensation of employee who, by engaging in picketing, had violated a specific provision of her union contract which gave her notice that, by such violation, she was jeopardizing her employment status.
Review of an Order from the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado
Karp Goldstein, Jeffrey A. Goldstein, Kenneth H. Stern, for petitioner.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, David W. Robbins, Deputy Attorney General, Edward G. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, David L. Lavinder, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.
Petitioner, Joan T. Anyon, seeks review of an order of the Industrial Commission disqualifying her from unemployment benefits for a period of six weeks. We affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission.
The agreement between petitioner's union, United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and her employer, the Redfield Company, provided:
"The union and its members agree that they will not authorize, encourage, engage or participate in any strikes, slowdowns, work-stoppages or picketing during the life of this agreement." (emphasis added)
Under the facts as determined by the commission, petitioner was discharged for picketing the offices of Outdoor Sports, Inc., the parent corporation of the Redfield Company. This picketing was for the purpose of seeking the reinstatement of discharged employees of the Redfield Company.
[1] Although picketing is ordinarily within the ambit of protected First Amendment rights, Denver Local Union No. 13, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Buckingham Transportation Co., 108 Colo. 419, 118 P.2d 1088 (1941), these rights may be limited by contractual agreement. Gentry v. Culinary Workers, Bartenders Hotel Service Employees, 157 Cal. App. 2d 776, 321 P.2d 799 (1958); 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 249. Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention, the contract provision did not impermissibly deny petitioner's First Amendment rights.
The Industrial Commission relied upon § 8-73-108(5)(g), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Cum. Supp.), in denying full unemployment benefits to petitioner. This section provides that benefits may be reduced when separation from work results from insubordination and defines the term to include:
"repeated acts of agitation against employer working conditions, pay scale, policies, or procedures; except that orderly action on the part of an employee or through union negotiations shall not be so considered if such action does not interfere with work performance . . . ." (emphasis added)
Although petitioner's action did not cause a work disturbance, the Commission was nevertheless authorized to reduce petitioner's benefits. The unemployment compensation insurance statute must be interpreted in light of its overall purpose, i.e., to compensate persons who are involuntarily unemployed. Section 8-73-108(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Cum. Supp.), provides:
"In the granting of benefit awards, it is the intent of the general assembly that the Division [of Employment] at all times be guided by the principle that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own . . . and that certain acts of individuals are the direct and proximate cause of their unemployment, and such acts may result in such individuals receiving a special award or a reduced award."
[2] The provision of § 8-73-108(5)(g), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Cum. Supp.) excepting orderly action that does not interfere with work performance is inapplicable where the employee violates a collective bargaining agreement limiting the employee's actions. The Commission could reduce petitioner's benefits, where, as here, she violated a specific provision of her union contract which gave her notice that, by such violation, she was jeopardizing her employment status. Petitioner's unemployment was not entirely "through no fault of [her] own," and the Industrial Commission was thus authorized to reduce her benefits.
The mere fact that petitioner's picketing took place at the office of the parent corporation of her employer, rather than on the premises of her employer's plant, is not relevant where the purpose of the picketing was to influence the actions of the employing corporation regarding relationships with its employees, and where the picketing was obviously directed against the actions of the Redfield Company in refusing to reinstate some of petitioner's fellow workers.
Order affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN and JUDGE BERMAN concur.