Opinion
C.A. No. 1:95-2895 (LAE, C.A. No. 2:95-1052) Docket No. 997.
October 19, 2001
REMAND ORDER
This matter is before the Panel on the defendants' motion, pursuant to Rule 7.6, R.P.J.P.M.L., 199 F.R.D. 425, 436-38 (2001), to
Ciba-Geigy Corporation (now merged into Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.); Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation (now merged into Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.); Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation; Abbott Laboratories; American Home Products Corporation (including American Cyanamid Company); Bristol-Myers Squibb Company; Eli Lilly and Company; G.D. Searle Company; Glaxo Wellcome Inc.; Hoechst Marion Roussel (now merged into Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc.); Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc.; Johnson Johnson; Knoll Pharmaceutical Company; Merck Company, Inc.; Pharmacia Upjohn Company (now known as Pharmacia Corporation); Pfizer Inc.; The Purdue Frederick Company; Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. (now merged into Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc.); Schering-Plough Corporation; SmithKline Beecham Corporation; Warner-Lambert Company; and Zeneca Inc.
vacate the Panel's order separating the Sherman Antitrust Act claims from the Robinson-Patman Act claims in the actions listed on Schedule A and conditionally remanding the Sherman Act claims to their respective transferor courts as suggested in an order entered by the transferee court. All responding plaintiffs oppose the motion to vacate and support remand of these claims.
On the basis of the papers filed and hearing session held, the Panel finds that remand of the Sherman Act claims in these MDL-997 centralized actions is appropriate at this time. The following quotation from an earlier Panel opinion is very instructive:
The Panel's Rules of Procedure provide that the Panel shall consider the question of remand on the motion of any party, on the suggestion of the transferee court or on the Panel's own initiative. Rule [7.6(c)], R.P.J.P.M.L., [199] F.R.D. [425, 437 (2001)]. In considering the question of remand, the Panel has consistently given great weight to the transferee judge's determination that remand of a particular action at a particular time is appropriate because the transferee judge, after all, supervises the day-to-day pretrial proceedings. See, e.g., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 254, 256 (J.P.M.L. 1976).In re Holiday Magic Securities and Antitrust Litigation, 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 1977).
Whether Section 1407 remand is appropriate for actions or claims in any particular multidistrict docket is based upon the totality of circumstances involved in that docket. In the matter now before us, Judge Charles P. Kocoras issued a suggestion of Section 1407 remand of the Sherman Act claims which explains his view that remand of these claims has become appropriate. We agree that separation and remand of the Sherman Act claims is now appropriate.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the Sherman Act claims in the actions listed on the attached Schedule A are separated and remanded from the Northern District of Illinois to their respective transferor courts.