Summary
In Antonacci plaintiff pursued, "inter alia"; money damages for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and the Court held that "since the action centered around a certain parcel of real property located in Suffolk County, the court properly transferred the action to that county."
Summary of this case from Eljamal v. WeilOpinion
Argued April 10, 2000.
June 5, 2000.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Carter, J.), entered January 12, 1999, which, inter alia, (1) denied their motion to find the defendants in contempt of a temporary restraining order, (2) denied their separate motion to consolidate this action with two pending actions, and (3) sua sponte transferred the action to Suffolk County.
Cositore LoPresti, Freeport, N.Y. (Genevieve Lane LoPresti of counsel), for appellants.
Nathaniel M. Swergold, Cedarhurst, N.Y., for respondent Frank Antonacci.
Bloom Borenstein, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Abraham Borenstein and Ivan R. Novich of counsel), for respondent Harry L. Stern.
Lebensfeld, Borker Sussman, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Alan M. Lebensfeld and Victor Rivera of counsel), for respondents Royal Wine Corp. and Royal Wine Corp. Profit Sharing Plan and Trust f/k/a Royal Target Benefit Fund.
Before: CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
"An application to punish a party for contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the court" (Educational Reading Aids Corp. v. Young, 175 A.D.2d 152). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to find the defendants in contempt (see, Matter of Whiteco Metrocom Div. of Whiteco Industries, Inc. v. Lambert, 221 A.D.2d 750).
Furthermore, since the action centered around a certain parcel of real property located in Suffolk County, the court properly transferred the action to that county. Pursuant to CPLR 507, "[t]he place of trial of an action in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property shall be in the county in which any part of the subject of the action is situated".
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.