Antioch Miss. Baptist Church v. Rosewell

9 Citing cases

  1. Mount Calvary Baptist Church v. Zehnder

    706 N.E.2d 1008 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that church building damaged by fire that was used to store desks, chairs and other materials related to school and church purposes was dedicated to tax exempt religious purposes because it "facilitated the congregation's efforts to keep its church services, activities and community outreach programs ongoing after the fire."

    However, the ALJ recommended that Mount Calvary's request for exemption be denied for the other parcels of property on which the burned church, the storage building, and the remaining parking areas were located. In reaching these recommendations, the ALJ concluded that this case was "factually similar" to the case of Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell, 119 Ill. App.3d 981, 457 N.E.2d 500 (1983). In Antioch, this court held that the church failed to meet its burden of showing that boarded-up, vacant property it acquired was actually used for an exempt purpose during the years in question, though it was ultimately developed for an exempt purpose.

  2. Grace Community Church Assemblies of God v. Department of Revenue

    409 Ill. App. 3d 480 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)

    Further, to qualify for exemption, it is insufficient for a taxpayer to show no use for nonexempt purposes occurred if the taxpayer does not show actual use for exempt purposes. See Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell, 119 Ill. App. 3d 981, 982, 457 N.E.2d 500, 501 (1983) (requiring "proof of actual use for [an exempt] purpose" to demonstrate entitlement to a religious exemption under a relevantly worded precursor statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2) (internal quotation marks omitted)); compare 35 ILCS 200/15-40(a) (West 2008) (beginning, "Property used exclusively for" religious purposes), with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2 (beginning, "All property used exclusively for religious purposes").

  3. Our Savior Lutheran Church v. Department of Revenue

    562 N.E.2d 1198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that church building that was no longer used for worship services was nevertheless tax exempt property used exclusively for religious purposes, because it was used for storage of church property and paraphernalia, including church records, pews, hymnals, altar, cross, pipe organ and other furnishings, as well as for occasional bake sales and flea markets

    Following the hearing, the administrative law judge issued a recommended disposition finding that the church and office portions of the property were exempt from taxation as they were used primarily for religious purposes, i.e., the storage of church personal property and records, but that the parsonage portion of the building and the carport did not qualify for the exemption because they were essentially vacant and unused. In reaching his decision, the administrative law judge relied on Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 981, 457 N.E.2d 500, which held that property owned by a church, but left vacant and never used by the church for any purpose, did not qualify for the tax exemption for property used exclusively for religious purposes. On April 13, 1988, Church filed a complaint for administrative review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3-110).

  4. In re App. of Cook County Treasurer

    482 N.E.2d 361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    Thereafter, on December 2, 1983, in the appeal from the injunction issued in 1982 by Judge Higgins, this court determined that the evidence presented by the church failed to establish that the property had been used for exempt church purposes between 1976 and 1980 and, accordingly, reversed the order enjoining the collector from seeking a tax judgment against it or from collecting the unpaid taxes for that period. ( Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 981, 457 N.E.2d 500.) On December 21, 1983, the collector filed a motion in the trial court to vacate the order of confirmation of sale on the basis of Judge Higgins' prior finding that the property was exempt from taxation for the years in question.

  5. Illini Media Co. v. Dep't of Revenue

    664 N.E.2d 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 6 times

    Because Illini Media is an exempt organization, its parking areas are also exempt under section 19.16. However, the circuit court erred in granting exemption to both lots in their entirety. If the property is not actually being used for an exempt purpose — such as parking — it is not exempt, no matter what the owner's future intentions may be. Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell, 119 Ill. App.3d 981, 982, 457 N.E.2d 500, 501 (1983). If only the identifiable portion of a property is used for an exempt purpose, while the rest of the property is used primarily for a nonexempt purpose (or not at all), only the portion used for the exempt purpose qualifies for an exemption. City of Mattoon v. Graham, 386 Ill. 180, 186, 53 N.E.2d 955, 958 (1944).

  6. Knox College v. Dep't of Revenue

    169 Ill. App. 3d 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 1 times
    In Knox College v. Department of Revenue (1988), 169 Ill. App.3d 832, 523 N.E.2d 1312, the court observed that open spaces serving as a campus lawn were an integral part of a college campus.

    • 4 The final issue concerns the vacant lot which the Department found was not tax exempt. The Department relies upon the case of Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 981, 457 N.E.2d 500, for the proposition that a vacant lot cannot qualify for a tax exemption. In Antioch a building owned by a church was vacant and boarded up for four years.

  7. Lutheran Child & Family Services v. Department of Revenue

    160 Ill. App. 3d 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 9 times
    In Lutheran Child, this court found that the residence of a maintenance man on the grounds of a private school was not exempt from taxation since the maintenance man performed no educational duties and the building was never used for any educational purpose.

    • 3 Statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed strictly in favor of taxation ( Board of Certified Safety Professionals of Americas, Inc. v. Johnson (1986), 112 Ill.2d 542, 547, 494 N.E.2d 485; People ex rel. Kassabaum v. Hopkins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 473, 476, 478 N.E.2d 1332), and the party claiming an exemption has the burden of proving clearly and conclusively that the property in question falls within the terms of the statute under which the exemption is claimed. ( Board of Certified Safety Professionals of Americas, Inc. v. Johnson (1986), 112 Ill.2d 542, 547, 494 N.E.2d 485; Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill.2d 387, 390, 146 N.E.2d 73.) Every presumption is against the intention of the State to exempt property from taxation ( United Air Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1981), 84 Ill.2d 446, 456, 419 N.E.2d 899; Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 981, 982, 457 N.E.2d 500), and doubts concerning the applicability of the exemptions are to be resolved in favor of taxation. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1981), 84 Ill.2d 446, 455, 419 N.E.2d 899; In re Mi-Jack Products, Inc. (1985), 136 Ill. App.3d 721, 726, 483 N.E.2d 920.

  8. Benedictine Sisters v. Dep't of Revenue

    155 Ill. App. 3d 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 9 times
    In Benedictine Sisters, the court held that three residences located adjacent to the convent grounds and occupied by the convent's maintenance personnel did not meet either of the criteria for exemption as the residences were not used in furtherance of the organization's exempt purposes, and the employees did not perform their duties in furtherance of the institution's exempt purposes in the building.

    • 2, 3 Statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed strictly in favor of taxation ( Board of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas, Inc. v. Johnson (1986), 112 Ill.2d 542, 547, 494 N.E.2d 485; People ex rel. Kassabaum v. Hopkins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 473, 476, 478 N.E.2d 1332), and the party claiming an exemption has the burden of proving clearly and conclusively that the property in question falls within the terms of the statute under which the exemption is claimed ( Board of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas, Inc. v. Johnson (1986), 112 Ill.2d 542, 547, 494 N.E.2d 485; Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill.2d 387, 390, 146 N.E.2d 73). Every presumption is against the intention of the State to exempt property from taxation ( United Air Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1981), 84 Ill.2d 446, 456, 419 N.E.2d 899; Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 981, 982, 457 N.E.2d 500), and doubts concerning the applicability of the exemptions are to be resolved in favor of taxation ( United Air Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1981), 84 Ill.2d 446, 455, 419 N.E.2d 899; In re Mi-Jack Products, Inc. (1985), 136 Ill. App.3d 721, 726, 483 N.E.2d 920). • 4 Section 19.2 "allows an exemption only for `property used exclusively for religious purposes.'"

  9. Knack v. Phillips

    134 Ill. App. 3d 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 9 times

    As the evidence before the trial court consists entirely of depositions and documentary evidence, the appellate court makes an independent decision on the facts, and our review is not limited to the usual manifest weight of the evidence standard. Antioch Missionary Baptist Church v. Rosewell (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 981, 457 N.E.2d 500; Delasky v. Village of Hinsdale (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 976, 980, 441 N.E.2d 367. • 1 We address first plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred when it placed the burden of proof on plaintiff to show that Pamela's use of the nonowned automobile did not fall within the "regular use" exception to the Allstate policy.