Opinion
No. 01-08-00465-CV
Opinion issued March 5, 2009.
On Appeal from the 412th District Court, Brazoria County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 41962.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, BLAND, and SHARP.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Milton James Anthony, a prison inmate, appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the dismissal of his claims against appellees, Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") and Brad Livingston, Jackie Edwards, Richard A. Trinci, Leonard Ellis, and Dominguez Carillo in their official capacities. The trial court found Anthony's discrimination petition to be frivolous and not in compliance with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code ("Chapter 14") and dismissed it with prejudice. We determine whether the trial court (1) abused its discretion by dismissing Anthony's suit under Chapter 14; (2) abused its discretion by failing to detail which statutory provision of Chapter 14 it relied on for dismissal; and (3) erred in not filing findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Brad Livingston is the executive in charge of TDCJ. Jackie Edwards is the regional director. Richard Trinci is the warden at the Wayne Scott Unit where Anthony is an inmate. Leonard Ellis is the assistant warden at the Wayne Scott Unit. Domingo Carillo is the building major at the Wayne Scott Unit.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.001-14.014 (Vernon 2002).
We affirm.
Background and Procedural History
On December 7, 2006, Anthony, an African-American, and another African-American inmate were removed from their support service inmate ("SSI") positions as law library clerks. Anthony was replaced by a Caucasian inmate and his co-worker was replaced by a Hispanic inmate. Anthony was then reassigned to be a prison orderly.
On December 15, 2006, Anthony filed a formal grievance with the TDCJ alleging racial discrimination. He claimed that an "unkown staff" member removed him from his SSI position and replaced him with a Caucasian inmate who had not yet been given the proper classification for the law clerk position. He also made general complaints that the prison administration treated African-American inmates differently from other inmates and that the prison system did not have enough African-American employees. His grievance specifically named Trinci, Ellis, and Carrillo as being "racially motived staff."
On December 28, 2006, Anthony received a written response from Trinci stating, "Your complaint has been investigated. Job assignments are administrative decisions based on the needs and security of the unit. No evidence of discrimination was noted. No further action required."
On January 2, 2007, Anthony appealed this response. On February 9, 2007, Doug Waldron, the Region III Assistant Regional Manager replied, "After further investigation no new evidence has been presented to support your allegations of staff misconduct or discrimination. No further action is warranted."
Assistant Regional Direction Doug Waldron is not a party to this suit.
On March 9, 2007, Anthony filed a petition in the trial court against TDCJ, Trinci, Ellis, Carrillo, Livingston, and Edwards. Anthony claimed that TDCJ and the named defendants' actions violated his rights to equal protection and due process under the United States and Texas Constitutions and that their actions violated TDCJ policies regarding inmate job assignments. Anthony asked the trial court to return all of the African-American inmates' jobs to them, to require the assignment of housing and removal of jobs be made by policy, and to require the hiring of African-American employees in supervisory positions.
Anthony titled his filing in the trial court a "complaint" and mailed it on February 22, 2007.
In the trial court, Anthony again alleged that his removal from his SSI position was racially motivated. In support of his claim, Anthony alleged that his former clerk job required support service inmate status and that his successor, who was Caucasian, did not have the necessary classification. Anthony asserted that TDCJ, Trinci, Ellis, and Carillo discriminated against African-American inmates and employees, claiming that a number of open work positions within the prison were filled with non-African-American inmates and that only African-American inmates were removed from their positions. Further, Anthony alleged that Livingston implemented racially biased policies and procedures and claimed that the TDCJ administration was racially imbalanced. Anthony argued that only two of the twenty supervisors at the prison were African-American.
Attached to his petition, Anthony included the grievance he filed on December 15, 2006 and the written response from Trinci, as well as the appeal he filed on January 2, 2007 and Waldron's written response. He also included a declaration that he was unable to pay the court costs for his action and requested leave of the trial court to proceed in forma pauperis.
On April 13, 2007, TDCJ and the five named defendants (collectively "TDCJ") filed an answer denying all allegations and asserting their entitlement to qualified, official, and sovereign immunity. Anthony attempted to conduct some discovery, but TDCJ filed a motion for a protective order seeking to halt any discovery until the trial court ruled on its entitlement to immunity from suit. On June 26, 2007, the trial court granted TDCJ's motion and stayed discovery.
On June 27, 2007 the trial court sent a letter to all of the parties which stated:
[The trial court] has signed the Order Staying Discovery against [TDCJ]. However, [the trial court] wants to get this issue resolved at the earliest possible date so that this case can proceed in an orderly fashion. Therefore, [the trial court] has set a Status Conference for 1:00 p.m. on September 28, 2007. This Status Conference can be held by telephone conference. . . . At the status conference, [the trial court] will hear [TDCJ's] claim of qualified good faith immunity, official immunity and any other dispositive issues which [TDCJ] wish[es] to raise. . . . [T]he [trial court] will also hear any issues which [Anthony] wishes to bring forth at that hearing.
The letter further stated that any additional filings were due by July 27, 2007, in order to give each party two months to respond, and that all responsive pleadings were due 10 days prior to the status conference.
On July 27, 2007, TDCJ filed a motion requesting a 15-day extension of time to complete a motion to dismiss under Chapter 14 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The trial court granted TDCJ's motion and ordered that the motion to dismiss be completed no later than August 11, 2007.
On August 14, 2007, TDCJ filed a motion to dismiss Anthony's claims under Chapter 14, along with a motion for leave to file the motion to dismiss after the August 11 deadline. In its motion to dismiss, TDCJ alleged that Anthony failed to identify previous suits — as required by section 14.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. TDCJ also alleged that Anthony failed to properly exhaust his legal remedies against Livingston and Edwards — as required by section 501.008 of the Texas Government Code and section 14.005 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. TDCJ argued that the claims against Livingston and Edwards should be dismissed because Anthony did not mention Livingston and Edwards in his original grievance. TDCJ further argued that Anthony failed to support his due process claim or to meet the requirements necessary to bring an equal protection action.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.004-14.005; TEX. GOV'T CODEANN. § 501.008 (Vernon 2004).
In addition, TDCJ rebutted Anthony's claim that he was removed from his SSI position because of his race and argued that Anthony was removed from his position for valid penological reasons. An unsworn statement by Warden Trinci was included as an exhibit to the motion to dismiss. Trinci stated that Anthony and his co-worker were reassigned after a weapon was found in the ceiling of the law library. Anthony and his co-worker were the only offenders that had access to that particular area of the library, so they were removed and replaced with other inmates in the interest of security because officials were unable to determine who owned the weapon. Lastly, TDCJ asserted that even if there was a violation of TDCJ rules and regulations, it did not give rise to a valid cause of action pursuant to section 14.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and, therefore, Anthony's complaint should be dismissed as frivolous.
On August 17, 2007, Anthony filed a motion to amend his complaint to allege that TDCJ discriminated against capital murderers as a class because it would not let inmates with convictions for capital felonies live in dormitories where non-capital offenders were allowed to live. On September 20, 2007, Anthony filed another motion to amend his pleadings in order to provide a statement of previous lawsuits. Anthony also filed an objection to TDCJ's untimely motion to dismiss under Chapter 14.
On September 26, 2007, the combined status conference and motions hearing was reset to October 17, 2007. During the October 17 hearing, the trial court granted Anthony leave to file his amended complaints and granted TDCJ leave to file its motion to dismiss under Chapter 14. The trial court also decided to dismiss Edwards and Livingston from the suit on the grounds that Anthony failed to file a grievance against them as required by section 14.005.
On January 18, 2008, Anthony filed a motion for an injunction and a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin Trinci, Ellis, and Carrillo from assigning inmates to prison positions or filling any vacant job openings until further notice from the trial court. Further, Anthony filed a legal memorandum regarding alleged violations of these equal protection and due process rights and an affidavit supporting those contentions, in which he again made the general statement that Trinci, Ellis, and Carrillo were discriminating against him and other African-American inmates in making job and housing assignments.
On January 22, 2008, the trial court granted TDCJ's motion seeking leave to file its out-of-time motion to dismiss under Chapter 14. The trial court also sent another letter which stated:
After reviewing [TDCJ's] Motion to Dismiss under Chapter 14, I am denying [TDCJ's] Motion to Dismiss. This applies to all defendants except for Livingston and Edwards who were dismissed at the telephone hearing held on October 17, 2007.
I have also reviewed [Anthony's] Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order against Trinci, Ellis and Carrillo and this Motion is denied.
[Counsel for TDCJ] is to prepare an Order in accordance with this letter and forward a copy of the proposed Order to [Anthony]. If [Anthony] has any objections to the form of the order, he must send those objections to me within twenty days of the date of [counsel for TDCJ's] letter.
The trial court received the requested proposed order, but never signed it. On February 27, 2008, Anthony filed an objection to this proposed order asking the trial court to reconsider the dismissal of the claims against Edwards and Livingston based on the theory of respondeat superior.
The trial court apparently did sign the order dismissing Livingston and Edwards from the suit on February 19, 2007, but later struck through his signature on the order and wrote a statement that he had signed the order in error and would not sign the order until after March 3, 2008 in order to allow Anthony time to file any objections.
On March 4, 2008, the trial court wrote another letter to the parties in which the trial court noted that he reviewed Anthony's objection to the order filed by TDCJ and that he reconsidered TDCJ's motion to dismiss and Anthony's responses, including all of Anthony's amended complaints and the memorandum of law and affidavit filed on January 18, 2007. The letter stated:
After reviewing all of the above pleadings, the Motions and the responses, I am withdrawing my original decision and now find that [TDCJ's] motion as to all defendants is meritorious and should be granted. [Counsel for TDCJ] will prepare an Order in accordance with this letter. I have not signed the prior Order as to Defendants Livingston and Edwards, so [counsel for TDCJ] is to include all defendants in one Order. I will not sign the proposed Order until the expiration of twenty days from the date of [counsel for TDCJ's] letter so that [Anthony] may file objections if he wishes to, or file a different proposed Order.
Also on March 4, 2008, Anthony filed another objection to TDCJ's earlier proposed order, arguing that it was not in compliance with the instructions of the trial court and reurging his equal protection and due process claims. This objection was filed with the trial court on March 10, 2008. Anthony did not file any further objections.
On April 25, 2008, the trial court signed the order granting TDCJ's Motion to Dismiss all defendants with prejudice. This appeal followed.
Anthony filed his notice of appeal prematurely in the trial court and in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals on April 7, 2008. The final order was not signed by the trial court until April 25, 2008, and Anthony's notice of appeal should have been filed in this court. However, according to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.2, "the appellate court may treat actions taken before an appealable order is signed as relating to an appeal of that order and give them effect as if they had been taken after the order was signed." TEX. R. APP. P.27.2.
Dismissal Under Chapter 14
In his first issue, Anthony complains that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his claims under Chapter 14. The trial court's final order stated that it found Anthony's petition was frivolous and did not comply with the requirements set forth in Chapter 14. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed all of Anthony's claims with prejudice. Anthony argues that his due process and equal protection claims were not frivolous or lacking any basis in law.
A. Standard of Review
Chapter 14 applies to suits brought by inmates in a district court in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs has been filed. TEX CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002 (Vernon 2002). When an inmate files an affidavit of inability to pay, the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss the suit as frivolous or malicious. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(2), (b)(2) (Vernon 2002); see Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). Generally, we review the dismissal of an inmate's Chapter 14 case under an abuse of discretion standard. Jackson v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons Paroles, 178 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); Moreland v. Johnson, 95 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). An abuse of discretion can be found when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Jackson, 178 S.W.3d at 275. However, when a trial court dismisses a claim without a hearing, the issue on appeal is whether the claim had no arguable basis in law. Moreland, 95 S.W.3d at 394. Therefore, we review de novo the legal question of whether the trial court properly concluded that the claims had no arguable basis in law. Id.
Although the trial court held a telephone hearing on October 17, 2007, that hearing does not appear to meet the requirements of section 14.008 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which states that a trial court "may conduct the hearing with video communications technology that permits the court to see and hear the inmate and that permits the inmate to see and hear the court and any other witnesses." TEX CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.008(Vernon 2002). Section 14.008 also requires that the hearing be recorded on videotape, which can serve as the record of the hearing. See id. There is no evidence that a video hearing was held, and no recording is contained in the record.
B. The Law
Chapter 14 requires inmates filing in forma pauperis to comply with various filing requirements, including the attachment of an affidavit identifying previous lawsuits filed by the inmate, an affidavit stating that a grievance was filed and a copy of the written response, and records relating to the inmate's ability to pay costs. See TEX CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.004-14.006 (Vernon 2002).
After the inmate satisfies the necessary filing requirements, the trial court may dismiss the inmate's claim as frivolous under Section 14.003. Comeaux v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 193 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an "indisputably meritless legal theory" or is based on "wholly incredible or irrational factual allegations." Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Minix v. Gonzales, 162 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
TDCJ argues that Anthony did not satisfy all of the filing requirements under Chapter 14 because he failed to file a copy of written grievance responses regarding any complaints of Edwards and Livingston as required by section14.005. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005. However, the trial court's order dismissed all of the appellees in the same order which stated that all of Anthony's claims were "frivolous and not in compliance with the requirements" of Chapter 14. Because we hold that the trial court properly dismissed all of Anthony's claims as frivolous under section 14.003, we do not address any arguments concerning the exhaustion of administrative procedures.
C. Was Anthony's Due Process Claim Properly Dismissed?
Anthony asserts that he was deprived of his due process rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions when he was removed from his SSI position and replaced by a Caucasian inmate without just cause and that the trial court improperly dismissed this claim under Chapter 14.
Anthony also makes several allegations concerning TDCJ's discrimination in its hiring of supervisors and other employees. However, Anthony has nostanding to bring these claims because he did not plead any facts showing that he had a particularized interest in any alleged impropriety in TDCJ's hiring procedures. See South Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. 2007) (citing Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001)).
In order to bring a due process claim, the plaintiff must assert a property interest that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-06 (1972); Concerned Cmty. Involved Dev., Inc. v. City of Houston, 209 S.W.3d 666, 671 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). If the plaintiff does not assert a protected property interest, the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the suit. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Yeo, 171 S.W.3d 863, 870 (Tex. 2005). The Yeo court stated, "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 870 n. 19 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S. Ct. at 2709).
Inmates have no constitutionally protected liberty or property interests per se in their job assignments. Bulger v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 49 (5th Cir. 1995). Anthony did not allege any facts in his petition that would show he had a legitimate claim of entitlement to his job assignment. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that Anthony's due process claims had no arguable basis in law. Because they had no basis in law, the due process claims were properly dismissed under Chapter 14. See Roth , 408 U.S. at 570-71, 92 S. Ct. at 2705-06; Concerned Cmty., 209 S.W.3d at 671; see also Moreland, 95 S.W.3d at 394.
D. Was Anthony's Equal Protection Claim Properly Dismissed?
Anthony also asserts that he was deprived of his equal protection rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions and that the trial court erred by dismissing these claims under Chapter 14. The requirements for equal protection under the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution are substantially the same. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Combs, 270 S.W.3d 249, 272 n. 46 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. filed 2/12/09); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3; Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002) ("[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.").
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "all persons similarly circumstanced be treated alike." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394 (1982). To assert an equal protection claim, the deprived party must establish two elements: (1) that he was treated differently than other similarly-situated parties; and (2) he was treated differently without a reasonable basis. Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810, 112 S. Ct. 55 (1991); City of Lubbock v. Corbin, 942 S.W.2d 14, 22 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied)).
In his petition, Anthony alleged that he and another African-American inmate were removed from their library clerk positions and replaced with non-African-American inmates. He also made general allegations that TDCJ employees harass African-American inmates and remove them from their jobs and housing assignments based on information received from other prisoners. However, Anthony did not allege any facts showing that he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates of different ethnic backgrounds.
Even if the trial court had found that Anthony had pled sufficient facts to show he had been treated differently than other similarly-situated parties, Anthony did not plead any facts to show that he was treated differently without a reasonable basis. When reviewing policies designed to preserve internal order, discipline, and security, a court should give "broad deference to prison administrators regarding the reasonableness of the scope, the manner, the place, and the justification for a particular policy." Hay v. Waldron, 834 F.2d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 1987). We will defer to the prison administrator's expertise if a policy is reasonably related to legitimate security objectives and there is no substantial evidence to indicate that prison officials have exaggerated their response to security considerations. Id.; see also Thomas v. Brown, 927 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) ("[A] prison regulation that impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights may nevertheless be valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.") (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987)).
In his complaint, Anthony states that he was removed from his SSI position because of his race. The written response to Anthony's grievance stated that Anthony was reassigned for security reasons. Anthony lists other situations that he considered violations of security in which prison administrators did not take any action. However, this is not sufficient to support his claim that prison administrators' action in his case was not related to the legitimate penological interest in the security of the unit. See Thomas, 927 S.W.2d at 126.
The written statement from Warden Trinci regarding the reasons that Anthony and his co-worker were removed from their SSI positions is not valid evidence to consider for purposes of dismissal under Chapter 14 because it does not comply with section 14.009. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.009(requiring written statement be made under oath or made as un sworn declaration). Trinci's statement was in the form of an Inter-Office communication that was initialed by Trinci, and it contained no statement that it was true under penalty of perjury.
This same reasoning applies to Anthony's claims that the prison administration discriminated against inmates incarcerated for capital felonies. Anthony does not cite any authority, nor can we find any, supporting the claim that capital offenders are a protected class.
Furthermore, Anthony did not allege any facts regarding the personal involvement of any of the named defendants in removing him from his SSI position. See Poteet v. Sullivan, 218 S.W.3d 780, 794 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) ("Personal involvement is an essential element in a civil rights cause of action alleging constitutional deprivation.") (citing Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987)). He merely made the conclusory statement that Trinci, Ellis, and Carrillo were "involved" in his removal. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that Anthony's equal protection claims had no arguable basis in law. See Moreland, 95 S.W.3d at 394.
We overrule Anthoney's first issue.
Failure to Identify Statutory Grounds
In his second issue, Anthony argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to specifically state the provision of Chapter 14 relied on for dismissal. The same issue was addressed in Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 654. In Retzlaff, the inmate contended that the trial court erred when it did not specifically state the grounds for the dismissal of his suit. Id. The Retzlaff court stated that Chapter 14 gives trial courts the power to "summarily dismiss" inmate suits, even in absence of a hearing. Id; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003. It is because of this power that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not specifically state the grounds for dismissal. Id.
Here, the trial court's order stated that Anthony's claims were dismissed because they were frivolous and did not comply with Chapter 14, which clearly implicates section 14.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003 ("A court may dismiss a claim, either before or after service of process, if the court finds that . . . the claim is frivolous or malicious."). Anthony fails to cite any authority, and we have not found any, requiring a trial court to specify which section of Chapter 14 it relied upon. Thus, the trial court did not err in not stating a specific grounds for dismissal of Anthony's claims.
Anthony also appears to argue that the trial court should have stated the specific grounds for its dismissal so that Anthony could have amended his pleadings. However, Anthony had already been put on notice of the ground son which TDCJ was seeking dismissal under Chapter 14 through its motion to dismiss and through the October 17, 2007 telephone hearing. Further, the trialcourt had allowed Anthony to amend his pleadings twice. Anthony also argues that the trial court failed to view his pleadings with less-stringent standards. However, a trial court is merely required to view a pro se inmate's petition "with liberality and patience." Perales v. Kinney, 891 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). The record demonstrates that the trial court allowed Anthony to amend his pleading twice and viewed all of his arguments, his legal memorandum, and his affidavit with indulgence.
We overrule Anthony's second issue.
Findings of Fact
In his third point of error, Anthony argues that the trial court erred in not making findings of fact or conclusions of law. "When neither party requests findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is implied that the trial court made all fact findings necessary to support its judgment." Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003). Further, the judgment must be affirmed, "if it can be upheld on any basis." Neely v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 196 S.W.3d 174, 181 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
Neither Anthony or the TDCJ requested findings of fact or conclusions of law in their pleadings. Accordingly, we must presume that the trial court made the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law to properly dismiss Anthony's claim under Chapter 14. See Sixth RMA Partners, L.P., 111 S.W.3d at 52. Anthony argues that he was entitled to finding of fact and conclusions of law because the trial court used TDCJ's proposed order to dismiss his claims. However, Anthony does not cite any authority to support this contention, nor did we find any.
We overrule Anthony's third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.