Opinion
1:23-cv-67
06-06-2023
BRIAN DOUGLAS ANTHONY, Plaintiff v. TODD MANGES, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is hereby recommended that Plaintiff Brian Douglas Anthony's claims against Defendant Emily Downing be dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. Report
Because he is seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see ECF No. 1, Anthony's claims are subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
In the instant case, Anthony's claims against Downing, an Erie County Assistant District Attorney, should be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e) because they “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Anthony's only factual allegation concerning Downing is that she “wrote out an information charging Brian Anthony with sending 4 letters to the victim April 20, 2020 through April 29, 2020 and threatened the victim within the letters knowing that the envelopes were with other inmates names in the return address to the victim and knowing that the investigative report of 4-21-2020 said the victim identified the writing as not that of Brian Anthony (the Plaintiff in this case).” ECF No. 10 ¶ 13. Anthony contends that he never sent the letters Downing charged him with sending.
The doctrine of absolute immunity protects prosecutors from liability related to their official acts. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-20 (1976). “More than a mere defense to liability, prosecutorial immunity embodies the right not to stand trial.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Under this doctrine, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for money damages under § 1983 for acts “within the scope of [their] duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410. “Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state's ‘advocate' while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993)).
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that Downing's actions are protected by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Anthony's lone allegation concerning Downing relates entirely to her conduct in initiating a criminal proceeding. Courts have consistently held that such acts fall within the scope of a prosecutor's duties while pursuing a criminal prosecution. See Sealander v. Brague, 2019 WL 5829373, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2019) (“[A] prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity while performing his official duties as [an] officer of the court, even if, in the performance of those duties, he is motivated by a corrupt or illegal intention.”) (quoting Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1221-22 (3d Cir. 1977) (internal quotations omitted)); Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F.Supp.2d 391, 399 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune in § 1983 actions for their decisions to prosecute, and withholding exculpatory evidence is a quasi-judicial act protected by absolute immunity.”). As our Court of Appeals has explained:
The decision to initiate a prosecution is at the core of a prosecutor's judicial role. A prosecutor is absolutely immune when making this decision, even where he acts without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing has occurred. Harm to a falsely-charged defendant is remedied by safeguards built into the judicial system-probable cause hearings, dismissal of the charges-and into the state codes of professional responsibility.Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1992). Based on the facts alleged, this principle plainly bars Anthony's claims against Downing here.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Anthony's claims against Downing be dismissed as legally frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Moreover, because Anthony's claims are plainly barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity, any attempt at amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Bressi v. Gembic, 2018 WL 3596859, at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2018) (denying leave to amend where claims “clearly and universally lack merit and are legally frivolous”). The Clerk should be directed to terminate Downing from this action, with prejudice.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).