Opinion
Civ. No. 16-1417
07-14-2017
SHARON ANTHONY, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.
ORDER
Sharon Anthony, who is represented by counsel, appeals from the Social Security Administration's denial of her application for benefits. On September 22, 2015, an Administrative Law Judge ruled that Plaintiff (who is 54 years old) was not disabled. (R. 18-31, Doc. No. 7-2.) Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial activity since her amended alleged onset date and that she suffered from several severe impairments. (R. 20); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(c). He next determined that none of Plaintiff's impairments was sufficiently severe to meet any of the listings. (R. 21-22); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work with some additional restrictions. (R. 22-29); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). Finally, although Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past relevant work, the ALJ concluded that, after consideration of Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were sufficient jobs in the national economy that she could perform. (R.29-30); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f)-(g). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. (R. 1-4.)
On March 30, 2016, Plaintiff brought the instant suit, against then-Social Security Commissioner Carolyn Colvin, challenging the denial of benefits. (Doc. No. 3); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). After the Parties briefed the matter, I referred it to Magistrate Judge Lloret for a Report and Recommendation. (See Doc. Nos. 8-11.) On March 31, 2017, in a thoughtful, comprehensive thirty-one page Report, Judge Lloret recommended that I deny Plaintiff's request for review. (Rep't & Rec., Doc. No. 13.)
On February 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed five pages of objections, arguing that Judge Lloret made five errors in his Report and Recommendation. (Obj., Doc. No. 14.) On February 28, 2017, the Commissioner responded. (Doc. No. 17.)
I must affirm the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986). "Substantial evidence 'does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). "The presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as the record provides substantial support for that decision." Malloy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 306 F. App'x 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009).
I must review de novo each issue addressed by the Magistrate Judge to which Plaintiff has raised a timely and specific objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). I may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the [Magistrate Judge's] findings and recommendations." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is within my discretion to rely on the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and recommendations. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).
I will adopt Judge Lloret's Report and Recommendation, overrule Plaintiff's objections, and deny her request for relief.
Plaintiff argues that Judge Lloret improperly concluded that four of the ALJ's determinations—(1) that Plaintiff did not meet Medical Listing 1.04(A) (Obj. at 1-2); (2) that treating physician Dr. Niehls' opinion respecting Plaintiff's mental health deserved only limited weight (id. at 2-3); (3) that consultative examiner Dr. McLaughlin's opinion respecting Plaintiff's ability to operate foot controls, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl deserved only limited weight (id. at 3-4); and (4) that Plaintiff did not meet Medical Vocational Guideline 201.09 (id. at 5)—were supported by substantial evidence. In his report, Judge Lloret explained in detail why substantial evidence supported each of these determinations. (See Rep't & Rec. at 7-11 (substantial evidence supported determination that Plaintiff did not meet Listing 1.04(A)); id. at 14-17 (substantial evidence supported decision to give Dr. Niehls' opinion limited weight); id. at 17-27 (substantial evidence supported decision to give Dr. McLaughlin's opinion limited weight); id. at 29 (substantial evidence supported determination that Plaintiff was not entitled to a finding of disability under Guideline 201.09).) In her Objections, Plaintiff argues only that Judge Lloret misconstrued the administrative record in reaching his conclusions.
After de novo review, I agree with Judge Lloret that substantial evidence supports each of the ALJ's determinations. (Rep't & Rec. at 7-30; see R. 21, 28, 30, Doc. No. 7-2 (ALJ's determinations); see also, e.g. R. 52, Doc. No. 7-2 (able to walk 10-20 minutes at a time); R. 396, Doc. No. 7-9 (radiological report reflects only "mild bilateral foraminal narrowing" and not nerve root compression); R. 72, 83, Doc. No. 7-3 (reports of state agency medical consultants concluding that Plaintiff could stand and walk for four and six hours in an eight-hour day and could occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl); R. 355, Doc. No. 7-8 (Dr. McLaughlin notes that "Plaintiff needed no help changing for exam or getting on and off exam table"); R. 438, Doc. No. 7-9 (Dr. Niehls' mental impairment questionnaire concludes that despite some limits Plaintiff possessed mental abilities to do unskilled work)); Brown, 649 F.3d at 195.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred by failing to account for Social Security Ruling 85-15, which governs whether an applicant has the basic mental capacity to perform unskilled work. (Obj. at 4); see Titles II & Xvi: Capability to Do Other Work-The Medical-Vocational Rules As a Framework for Evaluation Solely Nonexertional Impairments, SSR 85-15 (S.S.A. 1985), 1985 WL 56857. Although Judge Lloret did not directly address this contention, it is nonetheless apparent that the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff's mental abilities. The ALJ fully canvassed Plaintiff's mental health treatment history before concluding that Plaintiff retained the mental capacity to do unskilled work. (R. 26-29.) The record amply supports this finding. As just one example, Dr. Niehls concluded that Plaintiff retained all mental abilities and aptitudes necessary to perform unskilled work. (R. 438, Doc. No. 7-9.) The ALJ then incorporated Plaintiff's mental capacity in the hypotheticals he presented to the vocational expert and properly relied on the vocational expert's testimony that Plaintiff would be able to perform jobs that exist in the national economy. (R. 30, 63-64 (hypothetical limiting individual to "simple routine tasks with only occasional changes in the work setting")); see Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 2014) ("Testimony of vocational experts in disability determination proceedings typically includes, and often centers upon, one or more hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert.'" (quoting Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984))).
In sum, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not disabled. In these circumstances, I will deny her request for review.
* * *
AND NOW, this 14th day of July, 2017, upon consideration of the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lloret (Doc. No. 13), and after de novo review of the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 13), Plaintiff Sharon Anthony's Objections (Doc. No. 14) the Acting Commissioner's Response (Doc. No. 17), and all related submissions, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is SUBSTITUTED as the Defendant in this action for Carolyn W. Colvin. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d);
2. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 13) is APPROVED and ADOPTED;
3. Plaintiff's Objections (Doc. No. 14) are OVERRULED;
4. Plaintiff's request for judicial review is DENIED. The ALJ's opinion, being the final decision of the Acting Commissioner, is AFFIRMED; and
5. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul S . Diamond
Paul S. Diamond, J.