Opinion
No. 26625-7-III.
July 31, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 06-2-02157-3, Robert G. Swisher, J., entered November 7, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Korsmo, J., concurred in by Schultheis, C.J., and Brown, J.
Appellant Walter Copland shot his friend Harvey Anthis to death after a day spent drinking alcohol. The appellant was convicted of first degree manslaughter for the killing. Bonnie Anthis, the widow of Harvey Anthis, brought a wrongful death action against Copland on her own behalf and as personal representative of her late husband's estate. The trial court awarded $950,000 in damages. On appeal, Mr. Copland contends that the trial court erroneously awarded damages for Mr. Anthis's loss of the enjoyment of life. Counsel disavowed such an argument during trial and there is no indication that the trial court relied upon such a factor in its award. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
This court affirmed the criminal conviction in State v. Copland, No. 25250-7-III (August 7, 2007).
Mr. Copland did not contest his liability and the trial court granted summary judgment on that issue. The matter then proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. The victim, age 66 at the time of the killing, had been retired. He still worked regularly at Pasco Machinery on a part-time basis during retirement and averaged close to $15,000 in annual wages there. Trial testimony showed that Mr. Anthis was in good health and stayed very active during his retirement with hobbies and other pursuits. He and his wife had a good relationship. She was dependent upon him for income.
Mr. Copland's counsel argued that the estate had not established a basis for recovering for lost wages or damages for pain and suffering. Counsel for Ms. Anthis and the estate argued in rebuttal that they were not seeking an award for pain and suffering or for Mr. Anthis losing the enjoyment of life. Instead, they were asking for damages for the "destruction of the husband and wife relationship."
The trial court awarded $950,000 in undifferentiated damages by memorandum opinion issued two weeks after the conclusion of trial. Various findings of fact consistent with the memorandum opinion were subsequently entered in support of the judgment. Mr. Copland then appealed to this court.
Preliminarily, the respondents contend that appellant cannot proceed with this appeal because he did not seek reconsideration under CR 59. There was no need to do so. The right to appeal a civil judgment is governed by RAP 2.2(a)(1). That provision provides that a party may appeal "the final judgment entered in any action or proceeding." That is what Mr. Copland did here. He was permitted to appeal the judgment against him without first asking the trial court to reconsider its ruling.
Largely restating his trial arguments, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously considered and awarded damages for Mr. Anthis's loss of the enjoyment of life. Damages for the victim's loss of enjoyment of life are not permitted in wrongful death actions. Estate of Otani v. Broudy, 151 Wn.2d 750, 92 P.3d 192 (2004). Instead, the measure of damages under the statute is the "actual pecuniary loss" suffered by the beneficiaries. Parrish v. Jones, 44 Wn. App. 449, 453, 722 P.2d 878 (1986). "Pecuniary loss" includes not only monetary contributions the decedent would have made to the beneficiary, but also intangible losses such as the loss of the decedent's support, services, love, affection, care, companionship, society and consortium. Id. (internal citations omitted.) Recovery is not allowed for the mental anguish and grief and sorrow of the survivors. Pancratz v. Turon, 3 Wn. App. 182, 473 P.2d 409, review denied, 78 Wn.2d 995 (1970).
It is against this standard that the trial court's award must be judged. While the estate could not recover for the loss of enjoyment suffered by Mr. Anthis, it was free to seek damages for the intangible losses suffered by Ms. Anthis. That is exactly what happened here. Defense counsel argued in closing that the estate had not presented evidence on some of its claims. In rebuttal, plaintiff's counsel focused on the noneconomic losses while expressly stating that he was not seeking compensation for Mr. Anthis's loss of enjoyment of life. Under this circumstance, we do not see that the trial court actually awarded any damages for Mr. Anthis's loss of the enjoyment of life. Rather, the factual findings relating to his good health and the condition of the couple's marriage reflect the noneconomic losses suffered by Ms. Anthis. There was no award for the loss of enjoyment of life.
Mr. Copland next contends that the trial court erred by not expressly deducting the continuing costs of Mr. Anthis's life from his expected future earnings. This point was argued to the trial court and not contested at trial. The fact that the court's findings did not address the net value of the economic loss suffered by the estate does not mean that the court failed to consider this factor.
Appellant also contends the trial court erred by not apportioning damages between the wrongful death and survivorship actions. He cites no authority requiring such apportionment and we have found none. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in this regard either.
It is difficult to place a value on a human life tragically cut short and the loss suffered by a spouse in those circumstances. The wrongful death statute permits a jury to award such damages as "may to them seem just." RCW 4.20.020. This standard does not require precision or specific apportionment by type of damage. The trial court here considered the evidence and the proper argument of opposing counsel in carefully weighing the award. Nothing in this record establishes that the court erred in doing so.
The judgment is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SCHULTHEIS, C.J. and BROWN, J., concur.